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普丁時期俄羅斯國家與社會關係

不同於葉爾欽時期國家弱、社會也弱的情形，普丁設法透過「總統集權」的「管理式民主」來提振國家能力。由於有利於國家的政治機會結構的改變，造成了國家與社會基本關係的重組。在缺乏完整運作的公民社會與政黨體系之下，國家與社會的差距再度加大。社會弱化症候群的出現，將使得崩離的社會網絡成為常態。國家與社會連結的侵蝕，阻礙國家建造與民主化的進程。伴隨著個人化權威與民主要素混合的政權，俄羅斯的轉型仍徘徊於獨裁與民主之間。

關鍵詞：俄羅斯、普丁、國家與社會關係、民主化

State-Society Relations in Putin's Russia

Contrary to the situation of weak state and weak society in the Yeltsin era, Vladimir Putin attempts to enhance state capacity through the “presidential vertical” in the form of a “managed democracy.” The changing political opportunity structure has caused a basic realignment of relations between the state and society in favor of the former. The gap between state and society has become wider in the absence of fully functioning civil society and party system. The fragmented social network might become the norm due to a weak society syndrome. The erosion of links between state and society undermines the process of state building and democratization. With a hybrid regime, which combines personalized nature of authority relations with democratic elements, transitional Russia is still lingering between dictatorship and democracy.

Keywords: Russia; Putin; state-society relations; democratization

State-Society Relations in Putin's Russia

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(Executive Summary)

Russian state-society relations have been transitional thanks to a protracted state-building process.¹ Responding to an expanding political opportunity structure created by Mikhail Gorbachev's *glasnost* and *perestroika*, a myriad of grass-roots groups emerged spontaneously in a communist-dominated society. The motor of political change was more of a matter of elite choice than societal initiatives, but the interaction between the state and society gradually changed state-society relations in favor of the latter. The activation of electoral mechanism and the emergence of local separatism contributed to the collapse of the communist regime and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. State capacity in Boris Yeltsin's Russia continued to decline because of the corruption, tax evasion, organized crime, capital flight, the absence of rule of law, powerful financial oligarchs, and center-periphery conflict. Contrary to the situation of weak state and weak society in the Yeltsin era, Vladimir Putin attempts to enhance state capacity through the "presidential vertical" (the recentralization of power through a vertical chain of authority, i.e. strong executive power and a unitarian state) in the form of a "managed democracy" (transforming democratic practices without altering formal democratic rules enshrined in the Constitution, i.e. with the façade of democracy in the absence of accountability). The gap between state and society has become wider in the absence of fully functioning civil society and party system. The fragmented social network of civic disengagement and collective inaction might become the norm due to a weak society syndrome.

This paper provides the following: first, Russia's political context matters; second, an analysis of the interaction between the state and civil society; third, an exploration of the obstacles to Russian state building; and finally, arguing for the

¹ According to Gordon B. Smith, "State-Building in the New Russia: Assessing the Yeltsin Record," in *State-Building in Russia: The Yeltsin Legacy and the Challenge of the Future*, ed. Gordon B. Smith (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), 3-16, state-building can be seen as the process of expanding the state's integrative, extractive, decision-making, adjudicative, and coercive capacities vis-à-vis society. Building legitimate and effective political institutions is the key to making state function well. Richard Sakwa, "State and Society in Post-Communist Russia," in *Institutions and Political Change in Russia*, ed. Neil Robinson (Hampshire: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 195, indicates state-building involves five key elements: territorial-juridical, administrative-governmental, procedural-constitutional, operational-legal, and ethical-purposive.

important role played by civil society for normalizing Russian state-society relations and for enhancing the quality of democracy.

Russia's Political Context

Post-Communist societies are path-dependent, built not on a political *tabula rasa* but on the ruins of their Communist predecessors, as they have been forced to wrestle with the Communist legacy.² The direction of post-Soviet state policy and institutional designs can have a profound impact upon the capacity and autonomy of society. Protracted, conflictual, and imposed by the winners of the contests rather than negotiated, the process of Russia's democratic transition has impeded the consolidation of liberal democratic institutions and values.³

Political context matters for societal activities in terms of the collective action timing and the activity outcomes. In the protracted process of democratic transition, social forces in the former Soviet Union and post-Soviet Russia have been shaped by political opportunity structure, elites' choices, and institutional arrangements. However, despite the fact that the state and institutions dominate the strategic choices and interaction among collective actors, "society is never entirely absent from political process," in William M. Reisinger's words, "especially when one seeks to understand nontrivial process of social change."⁴ Thus, the reciprocal relations between the power of the state and the power of society must be given close attention. By the same token, a realist theory of civic activism emphasizes the balance of power between state and society as a constraint that may make the costs of suppression too high for a government.⁵

² For the legacy of the penetration of the Communist party-state which managed to prevent the development of political and civil society and caused the low level of citizens' participation, see German Diligenskiy, "Chto my znaem o demokratii i grazhdanskom obshchestve?" *Pro et Contra* 2, no. 4 (October 1997): 5-21; and Valerie Bunce, *Subversive Institutions: The Design and the Destruction of Socialism and the State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

³ Michael McFaul, Nikolai Petrov, and Andrei Ryabov, eds., *Between Dictatorship and Democracy: Russian Post-Communist Political Reform* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004).

⁴ See William M. Reisinger, "Transitions from Communism: Putting Society in Its Place," in *Can Democracy Take Root in Post-Soviet Russia?: Explorations in State-Society Relations*, eds. Harry Eckstein, et al. (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), 233.

⁵ See Philip G. Roeder, "Transitions from Communism: State-Centered Approaches," in Eckstein, et al., eds., *Can Democracy Take Root in Post-Soviet Russia?*, 206.

Interaction between the State and Civil Society

The analyses of the interaction between civil society and the state under bureaucratic authoritarian regimes concentrate on the effects of resistance by groups within civil society to repressive state rule and, reciprocally, on the ways in which the structures and strategies of authoritarian states have influenced the options and strategies of opposition social groups.⁶ The expansion of the public arena diminished the role of central control and inevitably gave new impetus to the emergence of civil society. In the light of the late Soviet experience, we can explain that, in a reform process, the relationship between the regime's ability to control the pace, direction, and agenda of reform and the extent of change is affected by a shift in the balance of power between the state and society.

The authorities' responses to the unofficial organizations could have been co-operation, benign tolerance, infiltration, or confrontation.⁷ The actors of the unofficial groups had to understand their own organizational goals, capacities and constraints in order to accurately assess the external political environment, understand the power relations at different levels of society, examine the political culture within the country, and realize the limits of the legal framework.⁸ The proliferation of civic groups alongside the state's response developed along two sets of cleavages: state-society cleavage; and centre-periphery cleavage.

In general, an amorphous civil society constitutes a very weak check on the state

⁶ See, for example, Stepan, "State Power and the Strength of Civil Society in the Southern Cone of Latin America," in *Bringing the State Back In*, eds. Peter B. Evans, et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 317-343; Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); and Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).

⁷ In an effort to analyze the Soviet state response to the rapid growth of social groups, Jim Butterfield and Marcia Weigle constructed a typology of state/group relations which consisted of five categories. This characterization is a tendency because the state response, in fact, has been varied and, at times, incoherent due to the absence of a strong, unified will at the centre. See Jim Butterfield and Marcia Weigle, "Unofficial Groups and Regime Response in the Soviet Union," in *Perestroika from Below: Social Movements in the Soviet Union*, eds. Judith B. Sedaitis and Jim Butterfield (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), 175-195.

⁸ Roy Trivedy, "Effective Work in Difficult Political Environments: A Case Study from Malawi," in *NGOs, Civil Society and the State: Building Democracy in Transitional Societies*, ed. Andrew Clayton (Oxford: INTRAC, 1996), 99-112.

power, and most of its social organizations are still unable to resist the state's co-option and repression. In the case of post-Soviet Russia, if civil society stays weak and the state becomes stronger, "state corporatism," in the form of a populist and technocratic-developmental authoritarian regime as well as state-led organization of societal interests, might be an alternative to civil society.⁹ In this scenario, a web of bureaucratic structures and legal regulations exist to bind the third sector to state patronage and control their activities. Structured by the political context, civil society organizations serve as an instrument of state social control rather than a mechanism of collective empowerment.

Obstacles to Russian State Building

It is widely recognized that state weakness has negative consequences for a liberal democratic state-building that protects civil liberties and political rights. In the Yeltsin era, the new Russian state tended to be weak in any dimension of state capacity. The state did not have the ability to govern effectively. For example, it failed to collect taxes, enforce the rule of law, fight crime, prevent the sale of natural resources at bargain prices, forestall the concentration and massive flight of capital, and rebuild the social welfare system.¹⁰ The erosion of state authority allowed sectoral interests represented by financial-industrial oligarchs to influence decision-making directly at the expense of society as a whole. Central power had deteriorated vis-à-vis powerful regional baronies thanks to "a poorly orchestrated, largely anarchic decentralization-by-default."¹¹ At the local level the horizontal ties and autonomous participation of democratic citizenship were blocked by the vertical dependence of clientelism.

Putin's policies have been responding to Yeltsin's legacies of state weakness and poor legal discipline. The strengthening of the state is thought of specifically in bureaucratic terms through the political practices of the vertical power structure and

⁹ M. Steven Fish, "Russia's Fourth Transition," in *The Global Resurgence of Democracy*, 2nd edition, eds. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 272-273.

¹⁰ Valerie Sperling, "Introduction: The Domestic and International Obstacles to State-Building in Russia," in *Building the Russian State: Institutional Crisis and the Quest for Democratic Governance*, ed. Valerie Sperling (Boulder: Westview Press, 2000), 28.

¹¹ Fish, "Russia's Fourth Transition," 182.

the dictatorship of law at the expense of developing civil society.¹² “Unlike Yeltsin,” as Lilia Shevtsova points out, “Putin openly relies on the bureaucratic instruments of consolidating power, limiting both democratic and oligarchic tendencies simultaneously.”¹³ In Putin’s Russia, “the parade of sovereignties” has been replaced by “the parade of loyalties.” With the introduction of a “ruling vertical,” Putin seems to champion a system that is federal in form and unitary in content through revisions in tax policy, the right to dismiss elected regional leaders and dissolve regional legislatures, the removal of regional leaders from the Federation Council, the abandonment of bilateral treaties, and the establishment of seven federal districts headed by governors-general.¹⁴

As for political society, four State Duma elections had been held after the initiation of multi-party politics in post-Soviet Russia. There is always a pro-Kremlin “party of power” backed by administrative resources for every parliamentary elections, for example, Igor Gaidar’s Russia’s Choice in 1993, Viktor Chernomyrdin’s Our Home is Russia in 1995, Sergei Shoigu’s Unity in 1999, and Boris Gryzlov’s United Russia in 2003. The opposition parties were overwhelmed by United Russia’s victory in the 2003 Duma elections, which served as the first successful test of Putin’s model of “managed democracy,” and caused concerns about the looming one-party authoritarian rule. The incongruence between the norms of democracy and the autocratic norms of societal institutions mediating between individuals and the state might jeopardize the future of democracy.¹⁵

Conclusion

Democracy requires a direct and reciprocal form of state-society relations to

¹² Mikhail Krasnov, “The Rule of Law,” in *Between Dictatorship and Democracy: Russian Post-Communist Political Reform*, eds., Michael McFaul, Nikolai Petrov, and Andrie Ryabov (Washington, D. C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004), 210.

¹³ Lilia Shevtsova identifies the formation in Putin’s Russia of a quasi-authoritarian bureaucratic regime. See Lilia Shevtsova, “Power and Leadership in Putin’s Russia,” in *Russia after the Fall*, ed. Andrew C. Kuchins (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002), 66. For a research concerning about Putin’s militocracy (the growing numbers of military and security representatives at all levels of government), see Olga Kryshantovskay and Stephen White, “Putin’s Militocracy,” *Post-Soviet Affairs* 19, no. 4 (2003): 289-306.

¹⁴ Eugene Husky, “On the Future of the Russian State,” *Demokratizatsiya* 11, no. 1 (Winter 2003): 116-118.

¹⁵ Eckstein, et al., eds., *Can Democracy Take Root in Post-Soviet Russia?*

function properly. In Russia, there are no effectively domestic institutions which can channel societal demands to state leadership. The self-serving rather than state-serving Russian bureaucrats and elites have maximized short-term private interests instead of providing long-term public goods.¹⁶ The changing political opportunity structure has caused a basic realignment of relations between the state and society in favor of the former. The erosion of links between state and society undermines the process of state building and democratization. With a “hybrid” or “melded” regime, which combines personalized nature of authority relations with democratic elements, as some scholars have observed, Russia is still lingering between dictatorship and democracy.

The short-term purpose of building a strong state or maintaining regime’s stability should go hand-in-hand with the long-term goal of enhancing the quality of democracy. However, Russia seems to lack the stocks of social capital generated by a robust civil society to make democracy work.¹⁷ Drawing on recent research about civil society, we can define the level of the institutionalization of civil society in a modern liberal democracy with the following inter-related principles and criteria in terms of internal structure, external structure, and mediating fields: (1) internal structure, such as autonomy, adaptability, solidarity, financial independence, non-usurpation, and civility; (2) external structure, such as independent communication media, networks of consultation, rights and constitutionalism, the effective ally of international NGOs; and (3) the mediating fields, such as the interactions among civil society, political society, the state, and business. The above criteria and principles can also be seen as the building blocks or infrastructure of an institutionalized civil society. In the case of Putin’s Russia, to serve as a major bulwark against the possible tendency toward dictatorship by fulfilling the above requirements, a strong civil society will contribute to the mutual empowerment between the state and society.

¹⁶ Husky, “On the Future of the Russian State,” 119; and Paulin Jones Luong, “The ‘Use and Abuse’ of Russia’s Energy Resources: Implications for State-Society Relations,” in Sperling, ed., *Building the Russian State*, 41.

¹⁷ For details, see Yung-Fang Lin, “An Uninstitutionalized Civil Society in Post-Soviet Russia,” *Issues & Studies* 37, no. 5 (September/October 2001): 157-189.