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**The Impacts of Class Differentiation and Cultural Construction on
Post-War Land Reform in Taiwan (II)***

by

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Introduction

The land reform had a great impact on Taiwan's society and its post-land reform developments. Economic and political conditions in the country changed with the implementation of land reform programs. About 43 percent of Taiwan's 660,000 farm families were affected by the reform measures, which produced a major improvement in peasant incomes. With higher yields and lower rents, the net income gain was 18 percent of total income in 1949 and jumped to 28 percent in 1952, 42 percent in 1955, and 44 percent in 1959 (Ho 1978, 169). With the reforms, both production and income spurred in the late 1950s, with income growing significantly faster. With the generation of a considerable surplus in the agricultural sector, the government sought to extract revenues to finance Taiwan's industrialization and economic development. The land reform and agricultural policies in the 1950s and 1960s were largely successful. Agricultural productivity and production increased and, in turn, incomes rose and inequality lessened in Taiwanese society. The agricultural sector supplied cheap food and helped to mitigate balance-of-payments problems through exports. It also provided a significant revenue to support later industrialization. Many researches, therefore, have been made to figure out the essence behind Taiwan's successful land reform story.

The discourse of Taiwan's successful land reform put effort on the actors of external forces --- the KMT (Kuomintang)-state and the US aid. Many researchers indicate that the success of Taiwan's land reform is because of the accuracy of governmental policies (Amsden 1985; Hsiao 1981, 1984; Hsiao 1953; Yin 1984). The KMT-state is the key factor to design and implement land reform. Since the ruling elite came from mainland China and did not have closed relations with Taiwan's landed-classes, they could institute policies without the interference from the local elite (Hsiao 1981; Huang 1995). However, one major reason for the passiveness of local elite was because they did not dare to speak out after the liquidation of 228 uprising in 1947, in which event thousands of Taiwanese elite were killed or sentenced to jail. In addition, the Sino-American Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction (J.C.R.R.) supported by the US also plays a key role in Taiwan land reform (Hsiao 1981; Huang 1995). As a result, the influential interpretations of Taiwan land reform are viewed as an epochal, one-time event caused primarily by external forces.

However, the objective of this research is to reexamine Taiwan's land reform experience from the vantagepoint of its domestic social origins. The agrarian class

relations and cultural construction in and after Japanese colonial period might have had some specific influences on the initiation of land reform in post-war Taiwan. This research would like to investigate what types of tenancy relations existed? Did these relations promote or prevent the emergence of deprived consciousness of tenant classes? Were these relations changing over the course of the pre-land reform period? To what extent did changing landlord/tenant relations lead to different patterns of social discourse about village social relations and social stratification? In the face of conflict and/or continuity in village social relations, what elements of a cultural tool kits (e.g. symbols) were used to fashion social identities that were revealed in collection action, everyday resistance, or passive quiescence? A perspective using collective behavior and social movement theory will be developed to analyze the land reform experience in Taiwan.

The research tries to answer the above questions through face-to-face interview with respectable senior and elderly persons in one selected location --- Luchu Township. Both landlords and tenants were chosen for interview. Researchers have designed interview protocol, and oral history is recorded in every interview. Related historical archives and academic literatures are also carefully examined. This current research is attempted to supplement the existing explanation for the story of Taiwan's land reform.

Theories of Social Movement and Three Dimensions of Power

Traditionally, the central problem in the study of social movements has been to explain individual participation in social movements. It was this task that social psychological theories originally set out to achieve --- to explain sudden increase in individual grievances and the appearance of social movements. The social movements of the 1960s in the west have reoriented research. A new theory formulated around the idea of social movements as forms of resource mobilization was formalized by Oberschall(1973), Tilly (1978), Zald and McCarthy (1979), Gamson (1975), and Jenkins (1979), among others. These new perspectives emphasized the continuities between movements and conventional institutional actions, the rationality of movement actors, the strategic problems confronted by movements, and the role of movements as agencies for social change. Specifically, these analysts argued that “movement actions are rational, adaptive responses to the costs and rewards of different lines of action.” Participation in a social movement is seen as inspired not by discontent or grievance, but by rational decision processes whereby people weigh the value of participation in terms of its ability to meet or

address their interests.

The assertion of rationality, which reflects the fact that this theory is influenced by neoclassical economics, is a cornerstone of this theory. According to Olson(1965), since social movements deliver collective goods, few individuals will "on their own" bear the costs of working to obtain them. He suggests:

The individual member of the typical large organization is in a position analogous to that of the firm in a perfectly competitive market, or the taxpayer in the state: his own efforts will not have a noticeable effect on the situation of his organization, and he can enjoy any improvements brought about by others whether or not he has worked in support of his organization.
(16)

This is the problem of "free-riders" who take advantage of the actions of groups or organizations, while minimizing their personal involvement. The main problem, according to Olson, is how organizations can induce participation. He suggests that participation hinges upon the benefits that individuals gain from organizations. From Olson's perspective, explaining collective behavior requires detailed attention to the selection of incentives, cost-reducing mechanisms or structures, and benefits that lead to collective behavior.

Resource mobilization analysts also use neoclassic economic concepts to explain social movements. The important work of Zald and McCarthy has sought to develop a common theory of social movements and conventional politics, emphasizing that movements have come to resemble conventional interest groups. Zald and McCarthy utilize concepts that have been devised to analyze contemporary business behavior and apply them to social movements, as well as interest group politics. Zald and McCarthy focus their research on movement organizations that by the mid-1970s have evolved into interest groups. They conceive potential members of a movement or interest group as consumers in a market. Individuals are depicted as selecting their group allegiances according to consumer choice models. This approach implies that individuals have multiple interests and that groups compete to express them.

In this regard, resource mobilization theorists also reply on pluralist model of political behavior. They assume that democratic political systems are open to the needs and interests of all elements of the population and that interests group competition determines political outcomes, including those related to social movement. In a classic work on American movements, Gamson (1975, 133) argues

that “pluralist theory is closely connected to the collective behavior tradition; it is the other side of the coin. Its actors are groups that engage in bargaining to achieve goals. The central process of pluralist politics is exchange.”

The concept of resource mobilization theory is employed by Popkin (1979) to explain revolution and agrarian unrest in Vietnam. The rational choice model developed by Popkin maintains that individual self-interest, not grievances to the structure of the capitalist world system, is the key factor to explain the emergence of social movement. Individual material gains are the major driving force for peasant behavior. According to Luong (1992, 11), Popkin “emphatically rejects the view that modern agrarian movements involve defensive reactions to the violation of precapitalist normative structures by the colonial and capitalist order.”

In Popkin's argument the incorporation of indigenous agriculture into the capitalistic world market, the establishment of the colonial regime, and the expansion of state power are not necessarily deleterious to peasants' welfare. The single-stranded relations of the market actually free peasants from dependence on monopolistic local lords. (Luong 1992, 11)

In order to induce peasants' participation in modern revolution movement, political entrepreneurs must offer selective incentives and concrete welfare improvements. These personal gains therefore are peasants' major considerations. Whenever peasants believe benefits are greater than costs, they definitely will join those rebellion activities. There are not any political restrictions for their participation in collective actions.

In addition to resource mobilization theory, the classical paradigm of social movements, dominant until the early 1970s, has been the social psychological theory. Associated with the Chicago school of social research, there are two major schools of this theory: emergent norms theory and relative deprivation theory. They distinguish two kinds of actions: institutional-conventional and noninstitutional-collective, and share the basic assumption that individual deprivation, breakdown in the social order, and ideology are important preconditions for the emergence of collective action.

Emergent norms theory was synthesized by Turner and Killian (1987). They define collective protest as “those forms of social behavior in which usual conventions cease to guide social action and people collectively transcend, bypass, or subvert established institutional patterns and structure (1987, 3).” Collective protest happens when the normative order or the social structures are no longer accepted as

guidance in conflict situations. People conduct symbolic communications to establish new social norms and act on them. Collective protest occurs in conjunction with an event, or series of events, for which the culture cannot direct actions of the people, or by a sudden disruption of some aspect of the existing social organization, combined with the necessity for action -- as when a disaster occurs. In general, Turner and Killian suggest that “widespread collective behavior arises out of the inadequacy of culture on the one hand and out of the failure of the social organization to operate on the other hand (1972, 412).”

Relative deprivation theory was employed frequently in the 1960s to explain one of the most active periods of protest in American history. Many social movement scholars used it to describe the occurrence of American urban civil disturbances. There are different versions of this theory. A relatively broad definition was employed by Gurr (1970) and Morrison (1973) who argued that relative deprivation entails the perception that individual achievements have failed to keep pace with individual expectations. James Geschwender (1964) uses a different definition. He employs the notion of a reference group, and indicates that relative deprivation is the perception that one's membership group is in a disadvantaged position relative to some other group. However, according to Gurney and Tierney, “a common thread in the literature is that relative deprivation is a perceived discrepancy between expectations and reality (1982, 34).” This discrepancy induces discontent or grievance which in turn combine to cause collective protest.

The argument of social psychological theory is different from the resource mobilization theory. The former indicates that the disruption of social structure and the emergent norm as the major factors for collective actions; in contrast, the latter make efforts on self-interest of those participants as the key explanatory power. In one sense, emergent norms theory has some coincidence with sociocultural system theory which paid attention to the clash between Western capitalism and indigenous noncapitalist social formations. Carol Smith (1984) indicates that political unrest involves a clash between Western capitalism as a sociocultural system and native organizational frameworks. James Scott (1976) also maintains that agrarian unrest can be viewed as the reactive response of the peasantry in a precapitalist social formation to capitalism and colonialism. In his moral economy model, Scott argues that the subsistence ethic is often violated in the context of the world market and the colonial state. Luong (1992, 15-16) then argues that “the expansion of Western capitalism and the establishment of European colonies lead to the violation of the subsistence ethic through the erosion of patron-client ties and the existing welfare

mechanisms in the relation between cultivators and noncultivators.”

In addition to resource mobilization theory and social psychological theory, Marxist theory focuses on the structure of conflict-ridden class relation. For example, the development of capitalism in the nineteenth century has strengthened the inequality class relations between core and periphery because of unequal change, according to Immanuel Wallerstein's (1979) world system theory. Class conflict and revolution erupted in the periphery, where most of proletarian class resides. Wallerstein (1979, 200) indicates that “the primary contradiction is between the interests organized and located in the core countries and their local allies on the one hand, and the majority of the population on the other.” In his research of agrarian unrest in the underdeveloped world that export agricultural products, Jeffery Paige (1975, 3) maintains

The expansion of the [agricultural] export sectors led to vast population movements, including the international slave trade, massive appropriations of traditional landowners, the creation of armies of agricultural laborers, and the replacement of traditional communal social ties with commercial market relations. The new forms of export agricultural organization created new social classes and destroyed old ones and introduced new pattern of class conflict.

Rebellion in the peripheral is therefore related to the structure of the capitalist world system. A new exploited class emerged in the peripheral and old structure stop direct peasants' activities--breakdown takes place and rebellion emerges.

According to the above theories, social movements might be emerged because of self-interest, cultural breakdown, or class differentiation. However, mass inequalities or breakdown of traditional values are not necessary causes of the rebellion; on the contrary, quiescence could be the answer. Class domination or cultural hegemony would prevent the powerless to utter or to sense of their grievances. Social movement or collective actions would not take place in this situation. According to John Gaventa (1980), it is important to examine power relationships between the powerful and the powerless.

In situations of inequality, the political response of the deprived may be seen as a function of power relationships. Power works to develop and maintain the quiescence of the powerless. Rebellion, as a corollary, may emerge as power relationships are altered. Together, pattern of power and powerless can keep issues from arising, grievances from being voiced, and interests from being recognized. (vi-vii)

Gaventa therefore contrasts three definitions of power: a one-dimensional approach which he labels pluralist; a two-dimensional approach which he associates with the Bachrach-Baratz critique of pluralism; and a three-dimensional approach which incorporates the critical theories of Lukes and Gramsci. It is necessary to examine three approaches to the study of power and arguing that each carries with it a particular understanding of political inaction in the face of inequality.

The pluralist idea of power was developed in American political science by Robert Dahl and Nelson Polsby. Dahl offers this definition of power : "A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do" (Qtd. in Gaventa 1980, 5). In the politics of a community, Polsby indicates that power may be studied by examining "who participated, who gains and loses, and who prevails in decision-making (Qtd. in Gaventa 1980, 5)." The key factor of pluralism in the definition of power, according to Gaventa (1980), is "a focus on behavior --- doing, participating (5)."

Gaventa labels this a one-dimensional approach because it confines the study of power to behavior. Structural, institutional and ideological factors are ignored or de-emphasized. This approach assumes three conditions of collective protest: a) people act upon recognized grievances, b) in an open system, c) for themselves or through leaders. Non-participation or inaction in this formulation is not in and of itself a political problem. Political inaction can be interpreted as reflecting a pervasive sense of satisfaction with the consequences or operations of a given political process. It can also reflect the absence of net benefits to participation, implying again that the system is performing well enough. Only modest gains are available and their realization is not worth the cost of collective action.

This interpretation of democratic behavior, including non-participation, is challenged by Gaventa: "A is thought to affect the action of B, but it is not considered a factor relevant to why B does not act in a manner that B otherwise might, were he not powerless relative to A (1980, 8)." The failure to consider relative power at the structural level instigated Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz and others to offer a two-dimensional approach to the study of power and collective action. Bachrach and Baratz, in a classic critique of pluralism, have argued that "power is exercised not just upon participants within the decision-making process but also towards the exclusion of certain participants and issues altogether (Qtd. in Gaventa, 9)." Exclusion occurs through the mobilization of bias in the political process. As one writer has

summarized:

Political organization, like all organizations, develop a 'mobilization of bias . . . in favor of the exploitation of certain kinds of conflict and the suppression of others. . . . Some issues are organized into politics while others are organized out.' And, if issues are prevented from arising, so too may actors be prevented from acting. The study of politics must focus 'both on who gets what, when and how and who gets left out and how'--- and how the two are interrelated. (Gaventa 1980, 9)

Bachrach and Baratz argue that the study of power must include consideration of the barriers to action upon grievances and must consider the structural and institutional obstacles (such as mobilization of bias and non-decision making) to effective action to redress grievances. When applied to resource mobilization theory, this criticism suggests that adherents oversimplify the problem. Effective collective action requires much more than organizational skill and political opportunity in the Bachrach and Baratz model. Disaffected groups must battle structural and institutional conditions that favor onto the political agenda questions and issues that are systematically left off because they threaten elite power.

A third definition of power is offered by Steven Lukes which roots power and its exercise in institutional, structural and ideological terms. Lukes defines the power relation as follows: "A exercises power over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to B's interests (Gaventa 1980, 11)." According to Gaventa, there are three circumstances, which can be identified as meeting this definition. First, A may exercise power over B by forcing B to do what B does not want to do through an ideological process of influencing, shaping or determining B's very wants. Second, the exercise of power may occur in the absence of observable conflict through the sublimation of political interests by ideological or other means. This results in a conflict becoming latent and creates a contradiction between the interests of those exercising power and the interests of those they exclude. Third, the exercise of power transcends the individualistic, behavioral confines of pluralism insofar as politics is itself a product of social forces and institutional practices. In each case, affecting governmental decisionmaking is likely to have little effect since the domain of political action itself has become dependent upon and constrained by institutional structural and ideological factors. In these circumstances, only direct confrontation in order to fundamentally change the structures and institutions of power can effectively address the problem.

Building on Lukes' definition of power, Gaventa argues that power and

powerlessness need to be viewed as interrelated and cumulative in nature. For example, the power of A can be strengthened by the powerlessness of B and, over time, the power of A in relation to B can become such that B becomes quiescent in the face of power. If, in the decisionmaking arena, B suffers continual defeat at the hands of A, B may cease to challenge A owing to the anticipation that A will prevail. But B's failure to challenge A allows A more opportunity to devote power to creating barriers to exclude participation of B (and others) in the future. In turn, this result may re-enforce the sense of powerlessness and allow institutional development of elite power and supporting ideologies which may be used to legitimate the power of the status quo. In the third-dimensional sense, then, power is understood as the sum of B's powerlessness and A's power, and the reenforcing effects of the one upon the other.

This three-dimensional approach to power allows us, according to Gaventa, to understand more accurately the challenge to social movements in their efforts to use protest as a means of changing the status quo. Full social participation in shaping the political character of a society depends upon the effectiveness of social movements in challenging hegemonic power, systemic bias and agenda control exercised by elite. Such a challenge is extremely difficult to mount and can explain why some citizens, especially the disadvantaged, are often unable to act collectively and successfully in the pursuit of their interests.

The three major social movement theories described above might be employed to explain the emergence of agrarian protests if there were some actions, which took place before the implementation of Taiwan's land reform. However, on the contrary, the three dimensions of power could elucidate why the tenants would like to keep silence and inaction no matter how serious they had been exploited. The second and third dimension of power could be denoted to as class domination and cultural hegemony, which probably caused the quiescence of Taiwan's tenants.

Historical Origin of Land Tenancy and the Formation of Class Differentiation in Taiwan

Historically, Taiwan was occupied by the Austronesian aborigines, who made their lives by fishing, hunting, and nomadic farming. They did not hold the idea of property ownership, and natural resources including land, water, and forest were all owned collectively by their tribe. All members of the tribe have right to use it. In the late seventeenth century of the transformation from Chinese Ming Dynasty to

Ching Dynasty, the Han Chinese started to emigrate from mainland China to Taiwan. Most of them came from China's southern provinces-Fujian and Guangdong, because they are very closed to this island and also there was serious population pressure in these two areas. Even though the Ching dynasty tried to prevent Han Chinese to move to this island, it was useless. Many Han Chinese came here to grow paddy rice and sugar cane. Irrigation systems were established, and the formerly hunting places became paddy fields. In addition, the idea of private land ownership was transplanted from China to Taiwan, and this was definitely not a smooth process.

The Han Chinese employed different ways to acquire the land, which was originally occupied by the aborigines. According to Huang (1981a), the Han Chinese basically used two ways to seize the land. One was to take it by force; the other was the peaceful approach. Many historical records indicated that Han Chinese used ferociously force to attack the aborigines and expelled them to the mountain areas. For example, Chou Chung-hsuan, the magistrate of Chu-lo county, in his report to his superior official said that “there were more and more Chinese refugees come to Taiwan. The land which used to be aboriginal deer field and hemp-grown farm was occupied by Chinese reclaimers or other refugees. As a result, there were very few land kept on the hands of aborigines (Huang 1957, 165).” Even with peaceful approaches, many injustice methods were used, which including cheating, stealing, high interest rates' loan, and etc. However, there were two ways worth for further review in order to know how the title of land was transferred to the hand of Han Chinese and how the land tenancy system was established in Taiwan. These two ways were: 1. the reclaimers' application to the imperial court for their open up a new farm plot (申請墾照) and 2. the aborigines holding the property right while the Han Chinese the tenants, the so called “Fan Chan Han Tien (番產漢佃)” which will be explained following.

According to Chang (1981, 70), many reclaimers who were the governmental administrators or have good relations with the government designated specific areas as virgin land and ask the government to give them licenses for farming. When the Ken-chao (patent of reclamation, 墾照) were issued, the reclaimers then recruited Chinese immigrants to cultivate those land. The reclaimers would receive the title of land when the farming was success and taxes were paid to the government. Chang (1981, 74) indicates that this is one important way to acquire property right in that period. Since the reclaimers usually were wealthy and powerful people they did not do farming jobs by themselves. They leased the land to other Han Chinese immigrants and the land tenancy system was therefore established.

On the other hand, in order to claim their right to the land, aborigines must contribute their land to the imperial court of Ching dynasty. It meant that aborigines must give up their sovereign right firstly. In return, the court then designated those lands to the tribe. Since there was no clear borderlines, Han Chinese immigrants continued to occupy the land, which were in the areas of aborigines' habitat. Many disputes and even bloody conflicts erupted between these two ethnic groups over the title of land. To prevent those social unrest, Ching dynasty asked the Han Chinese not to farm in the aboriginal areas which was beyond the governmental control --- an alert red line was drawn on the map to indicate the boundary. Those areas were formerly occupied by the “sheng-fan” (uncultivated aborigines), which was different from the “shou-fan” (cultivated aborigines). In addition, Ching dynasty also asked the Han immigrants not to buy farmland in the “shou-fan” areas. However, waves of emigrants from China did not respect this edict. Many paddy fields and agricultural farming activities appeared in both those restricted and “shou-fan's” areas, and the deer field disappeared. The aborigines could not catch deer or other animals as before. Huang (1981b, 33) maintains that under the pressure to pay taxes and to make a living, and to prevent Han emigrants' illegal occupation, the aborigines were forced to lease the land to the Han Chinese. This turned out to be the "Fan Chan Han Tien (番產漢佃)," which meant that aborigines had the property right and Han people were the tenants.

The reclaimers and the aborigines were called “yeh-hu” (業戶, landowner) and the Han tenants were called “tien-hu” (佃戶, perpetual tenant). However, the tenancy relations between the reclaimers and their tenants or between the aborigines and their Chinese tenants were different from common understanding, since the tenants owned the right to sell or to sublease its leased rights to any person, and the property owners could not say anything to it. Many deeds signed in the early Ching dynasty revealed that the Han tenants did have this right. Why the reclaimers or aborigines were willing to release their right to the tenants? This was probably that they must use this approach to induce Han emigrants to cultivate their wasteland for farming in the early settlement era (Chang 1994, 24). The ownership to the land then divided into two different property rights: one was the right to collect rents, and the other was the right to cultivate, to sublease the land or to sell their leased right to other tenants. The former right is owned by the reclaimers or the aborigines, and the latter right is controlled by the Han tenants. This is named as “I-Tien Liang-Chu (one field, two owners, 一田兩主),” which meant there were two owners on a cultivated land. The Han tenants therefore could sublease their land to others and

collected another rents. Eventually, there were three parties on a farmland. The aborigines or the reclaimers were called “Tatsu-hu (household of big rent, 大租戶)” since they leased the land to the original tenants and received the rent named as Tatsu (big rent). The original Han tenants were call “Shautsu-hu (household of small rent, 小租戶)” because they subleased the land to those who actually did the farming activities. The rents they received were called Shautsu (small rent). Ironically, the amount of Shautsu was much greater that the Tatsu. Normally, Tatsu was around one-tenth of annual yield of the agricultural land, and Shautsu was approximately four times of Tatsu (Table 1).

Table 1 : Net Income for the Tatsu-hu and Shautsu-hu Unit : Tann*/*Chia**

Grade	Land	Paddy land			Dry land		
		Prime	Medium	Poor	Prime	Medium	Poor
Shautsu		32.00	24.00	16.00	24.00	16.00	8.00
Tatsu		8.00	6.00	4.00	6.00	4.00	2.00
Tax		2.74	2.08	1.758	2.08	1.758	1.716
Net Income for Shautsu-hu		24.00	18.00	12.00	18.00	12.00	6.00
Net Income for Tatsu-hu		5.26	3.92	2.242	3.92	2.242	0.284

Source : Wang 1966, 65.

Note: *Tann is a weight measure equivalent to about 60 Kg.

* *Chia* is a measure of land in Taiwan, which is equivalent to 0.969917 ha or 2.3968 acres.

This three-level tenancy became a significant system in Taiwan during the Ching Dynasty. Under this system, Tatsu-hu did not have closed relations to their land since they could only receive the Tatsu, but, unfortunately, they should pay the tax because they owned the title of land. On the contrary, the Shautsu-hu were the true controllers of the land, and they could accumulate fortune much easier than the Tatsu-hu. As a result, Shautsu-hu gradually became men of wealth and influence in the local communities. Many aborigines even mortgaged their Tatsu right to the Shautsu-hu when they were short of money. However, it was a mortgage on the surface, but it actually was a business transaction since most of the aborigines could not redeem their Tatsu right back. According to Chang (1994), since the aborigines were gradually absorbed into the economic system of the Han people they would probably mortgage their Tatsu’s right to the Shautsu-hu whenever they had financial problems. The relation between the Tatsu-hu and Shautsu-hu had been transformed into mortgagers and financial supporters, and many titles of aboriginal land had been transferred into the Shautsu-hu' hands through this way.

Therefore, the Shautsu-hu became the center of Taiwan's private ownership of

land in the mid-nineteenth century (Tu 1993, 18). The tenancy relations were between the Shautsu-hu and their tenants, who paid around 40 to 50 percent of annual yield to Shautsu-hu. In addition to aborigines who gradually became the marginal class in Taiwan's Han society because of loss of land title, the class differentiation between the tenants and the Shautsu-hu or the Tatsu-hu was clear in the Han people society. Waves of Han emigrants competed with themselves and were willing to pay a great amount of rent in order to become the tenants. This class relation did not have big change not only in the Ching dynasty but also in the following Japanese colonial period.

One important characteristic of the right of Tatsu was that it could be separated and sold or mortgaged to different people. Many new Tatsu-hu emerged because of the transaction of the right of Tatsu. However, the new owners possibly did not know where the location and whom the tenants were of their land. Since the Shautsu-hu were the real controllers of the land the tenants did not necessary listen to the Tatsu-hu. Tatsu-hu maybe could not receive their rent in case of the tenants paid the Tatsu directly to them. The right of Tatsu became very complicated with the passage of time, and governmental revenue was seriously reduced because taxes of land were paid by the Tatsu-hu. In order to redress this situation, the first and also the last Governor Liu Ming-chwan of the Ching dynasty, proposed to change the land ownership system by making nullify and void of the Tatsu-hu. The title of land would transfer to the Shautsu-hu, who therefore should pay the tax according to his plan. However, Tatsu-hu strongly opposed this proposition because their interests could be hurt. Finally, a compromising common ground had been set that was the Shautsu-hu became the real owner of the land and should pay the land tax, but their payment of Tatsu could be reduced 40 percent. It meant that the Tatsu-hu could only receive 60 percent of their former Tatsu. This was famous "Chien Szu Liu Liu (Reducing Four and Keep Six, 減四留六)" policy implemented in the summer of 1889. However, even though Governor Liu altered the ownership of the land, the tenancy system did not changed at all. The purpose for this policy was basically to increase governmental revenues. The rent which tenants paid to the Shautsu-hu was not an issue at that moment. The class differentiation was kept as before.

Taiwan became Japanese colony in 1895 after the Ching dynasty had failed its battle to Japan in 1894. Taiwan was push into the capitalist colonial development in the period of Japanese occupation. Rice, sugar, tea, camphor, and timber were the most important economic productions, which were exported into Japan and the international markets. In order to induce Japanese capitalists to invest in Taiwan, the

colonial government started its infrastructure construction in Taiwanese. Governor Kodama conducted land surveying starting from 1898, which included investigation on the ownership, topographic survey, regulation on the Tatsu, and tax readjustment. It took six years to finish this job. Anybody who owned the title of land had been settled and made a record. In the same time, the colonial government asked the Shautsu-hu to report the Tatsu and the names of Tatsu-hu. A book of the name of Tatsu-hu and the amount of Tatsu had been accomplished.

Like Governor Liu in the Ching dynasty, the colonial government also wanted to eliminate the Tatsu-hu in order to increase tax revenue to the government. The government first promulgated the Tatsu's book to the public in December 1903 and asked the Tatsu-hu to confirm their right. Anybody who found any mistakes should have to apply for correction within 90 days. Otherwise, it would be confirmed as it was. Whenever there were applications for correction, the members of the investigation committee would investigate and made recommendation to the Governor, who had the right to make the final decision as to whether the correction would be made. After the confirmation of the ownership of Tatsu, the colonial government announced on May 20, 1904 to terminate Tatsu-hu' right and money compensation to them. The historically specific land ownership in Taiwan ---“I Tien Liang Chu(一田兩主) ” was finally altered. The Tatsu-hu disappeared, and the Shautsu-hu were the only owners to the land.

From the book of Tatsu-hu and money compensation, it was the first time to figure out the numbers of three parties: Tatsu-hu, Shautsu-hu, and tenants. According to Table 2, 39,799 people has the right of Tatsu; 300, 135 people as the Shautsu-hu. Since the total agricultural population was approximately 989,940 in 1905 the numbers of tenants were around 650,006. However, the number of Tatsu-hu and Shautsu-hu maybe double counted, the real numbers of tenants therefore should be higher than the above number. According to the governmental statistics in 1905, the number of tenant was 747,299 (Tu 1993, 50). Tu (1993, 39) therefore estimated that the tenant numbers were probably around 750,000 in 1905. The number of tenants therefore composed of around 76 percent of Taiwan's agricultural population.

Table 2 : Numbers of Tatsu-hu and amount of compensation

Regions	Numbers who own the right (person)	Numbers who owe the obligation (person)	Total (person)	Amount of compensation (yen)
Taipei	3,875	23,860	27,735	513,941
Keelung	804	10,547	11,351	82,277
Ilan	920	7,753	8,673	91,847
ShenKeng	350	3,955	4,305	16,517
Taoyuan	1,970	16,000	17,970	362,003
Hsinchu	1,966	12,139	14,105	210,054
Miaoli	2,256	16,216	18,472	135,707
Taichung	2,910	13,755	16,665	378,488
Changhua	8,932	32,487	41,419	758,163
Nantou	1,360	12,180	13,540	117,995
Touliu	3,333	28,902	32,238	217,754
Chiai	2,134	39,920	42,045	191,051
Yenshui	5,630	35,234	40,864	186,434
Tainan	389	6,877	7,266	45,514
Fanshuliao	613	2,933	3,546	36,632
Fengshan	1,127	20,548	21,675	201,359
Pingtung	1,218	16,742	17,960	232,297
Hengchun	9	87	96	1,437
Total	39,799 (37,617)	300,135 (292,334)	339,934 (329,951)	3,779,479

Source: Tu 1993, 38.

Notes: 1. Numbers inside the parenthesis mean that those related people who have right or obligation to Tatsu have reviewed the Tatsu's book within the time period of governmental promulgation.

2. "Numbers who own the right" includes those who have mortgage right toward the Tatsu.

In addition, the area of agricultural land increased from approximately 361,000 *Chia* to 777,000 *Chia* after the land surveying, accounting for 115% increase (Table 3). The annual tax rates in 1904 were also increased to 6-8% for the paddy field, and 5-7% for the dry farmland (Tu 1993, 50). Tax revenues therefore raised from 920,000 yen to 2,990,000 yen, the increasing rate was 225%. It was noted that the growth revenues in one year accounted for half of the compensation to the elimination of Tatsu.

Table 3 : Land Acreage and Revenues during Ching Dynasty and Japanese occupation in Taiwan

	Before Liu's Regulation	After Liu's Regulation	Before Land Survey	After Land Survey
Land Area (<i>Chia</i>)	70,000 ⁺	290,000 ⁺	361,000 ⁺	777,000 ⁺
Tax Revenue	180,000 ⁺ <i>Tael</i> "	690,000 ⁺ <i>Tael</i> "	920,000 ⁺ Yen	2,990,000 ⁺ Yen

Source : Wang 1966, 68.

Notes: 1. *Chia* is a measure of land in Taiwan, which is equivalent to 0.969917 ha or 2.3968 acres.
 2. *Tael* is an old Chinese unit of value based on the value of 36 gram silver.

Shautsu-hu became the only farmer-owners after the nullification of the Tatsu. The former three parties system then converted into two-level structure: farmer-owner and tenant. The proportion of farmer-owners, tenants, and half farmer-owners (who own and leased some land) was showed in Table 4. The class differentiation was clearly showed in this table. More than one-third of Taiwan's farmers in 1922-1940 was tenants. However, the combination of tenants and half farmer-owners accounted for around 70 percent of Taiwan's agricultural population. According to Table 5, the distribution of the land ownership was very imbalance: 64 percent of land owners occupied the land whose areas were lower than one *Chia*, a measure of land in Taiwan which is equal to 0.97 ha. And the total areas they own were accounted for only 15 percent of total agricultural land. On the contrary, 2.03 percent of land owners possessed the land whose areas were more than ten *Chia*. Ironically, the total areas they own were accounted for 36 percent of total agricultural land. The situation did not change in 1932 or 1939's survey, respectively.

Table 4 : Increase and Reduction of Farmers' Households in Taiwan (1922~40)

Unit: (1000 household , %)

	Farmers' Households				Percentage		
	Farmer-owners	Half farmer-owners	Tenants	Total	Farmer-owners	Half farmer-owners	Tenants
1922	116.7	111.5	157.1	385.3	30	29	41
1923	113.3	116.0	159.2	388.5	29	30	41
1924	114.3	116.1	159.8	390.5	29	30	41
1925	114.3	118.5	161.0	393.8	29	30	41
1926	114.6	119.3	161.9	395.8	29	30	41
1927	116.9	112.0	160.0	398.9	29	31	40
1928	118.3	124.5	162.7	405.5	29	31	40
1929	118.1	125.9	163.7	407.7	29	31	40
1930	119.5	126.4	165.4	411.4	29	31	40
1931	119.0	127.9	167.9	414.9	28	31	41
1932	132.2	119.3	152.4	404.0	32	30	38
1933	129.4	121.7	155.0	406.2	32	30	38
1934	130.1	125.0	156.9	412.0	32	30	38
1935	132.1	128.4	159.4	419.9	31	31	38
1936	132.3	134.1	161.8	428.1	31	31	38
1937	131.1	134.8	161.5	427.4	31	31	38
1938	130.2	135.6	158.7	424.6	31	32	37
1939	140.1	134.0	154.4	428.5	33	31	36
1940	137.4	134.4	158.2	429.9	32	31	37

Source : Tu, 1993, 252. Qtd. in *Annual Report of Taiwan's Agriculture*, 1933, 17; same as 1943, 8.

Table 5 : Distribution of ownership of Taiwan's farmland (1920)

Degrees of area (<i>Chia</i>)	Households of owners		Area owned by farmland owners	
	Households	Percentage (%)	<i>Chia</i>	Percentage (%)
Lower than 0.5 <i>Chia</i>	172,931	42.68	40,987	5.68
0.5~1.0 <i>Chia</i>	86,711	21.40	62,513	8.67
1.0~2.0 <i>Chia</i>	70,739	17.16	100,140	13.88
2.0~3.0 <i>Chia</i>	28,412	7.01	69,749	9.67
3.0~5.0 <i>Chia</i>	23,276	5.74	88,672	12.29
5.0~7.0 <i>Chia</i>	8,989	2.22	52,176	7.23
7.0~10.0 <i>Chia</i>	5,902	1.46	48,890	6.78
10.0~20.0 <i>Chia</i>	5,454	1.35	73,722	10.22
20.0~30.0 <i>Chia</i>	1,353	0.33	32,995	4.57
30.0~50.0 <i>Chia</i>	842	0.21	31,837	4.41
50.0~100.0 <i>Chia</i>	376	0.09	25,497	3.54
Higher than 100.0 <i>Chia</i>	196	0.05	94,072	13.06
Total	405,181	100.00	721,250	100.00

Source: Wang 1966, 79.

One important reason for the imbalance distribution of land ownership was because the colonial government helped the Japanese capitalists to occupy a great amount of Taiwan's agricultural land for the production of sugar. Taiwan's farmers became the tenants for the sugar corporations. In addition, in order to have Japanese emigrated into Taiwan, the colonial government also entitled a great amount of land to the retired Japanese officials. Wang (1966, 80) then maintained that it was around 120,000 *Chia* farmland under Japanese title, which accounted for 15 percent of Taiwan's agricultural land. The colonial government and Japanese capitalists then were responsible for the imbalance distribution of land ownership. Tu (1993, 265-6) also indicated that the Japanese capitalism was also blamable for the class differentiation in Taiwan's society. Two specific different farming styles emerged at that time: one was the small-scale paddy rice farming, the other was the large-scale sugar cane cultivating field.

In Table 6, leased paddy fields accounted for 69.12 percent of Taiwan's paddy field, and leased dry land occupied 47.68 percent of Taiwan's dry farmland in 1920. One more important figure should be noted was the rate of rent, the percentage of rental amount paid to the farm-owners to the annual production. In 1927, the

average rate of rent for prime two-crop farmland was 49.3, 43.2 for prime single-crop farmland, and 29.9 for prime regular dry farmland (Table 7). The rate increased in the 1937's governmental report: 54.38 for prime two-crop farmland, and 36.79 for prime regular dry farmland (Table 8). Many reasons could explain the differences of the rental rates. It could be the variance of land fertile; the competition among tenants, and etc.

Table 6: Owned and Leased Land in Taiwan

Average unit: *Chia*

Land Year	Paddy Land				Dry Land				Total			
	Owner Occupant		Leased Land		Owner Occupant		Leased Land		Owner Occupant		Leased Land	
	Area	%	Area	%	Area	%	Area	%	Area	%	Area	%
1920	104,342	30.88	233,466	69.12	184,975	52.32	168,580	47.68	389,317	41.84	402,046	58.16
1932	132,200	33.36	264,026	66.64	230,202	59.95	153,799	40.15	262,402	46.45	417,825	53.55
1939	207,613	38.71	328,770	61.29	165,150	52.07	152,029	47.93	377,762	43.67	480,799	56.33

Source: Wang 1966, 81.

Table 7: Farm Land Rental Rates in Taiwan in 1927

Region	Two-Corp Land			Single- Corp Land			Regular Dry Land		
	Prime Land	Medium Land	Poor Land	Prime Land	Medium Land	Poor Land	Prime Land	Medium Land	Poor Land
Average	49.3	49.1	49.4	43.2	43.8	44.6	29.9	27.7	27.1
Old Taipei	53.3	54.3	53.9	53.5	55.9	54.4	20.8	24.6	23.0
Old Hsinchu	50.7	50.6	50.6	42.0	44.3	40.5	24.6	23.2	20.1
Old Taichung	49.6	48.8	49.0	37.3	30.4	34.7	27.0	26.1	27.1
Old Tainan	43.5	45.0	46.0	42.8	43.9	46.6	33.8	33.9	34.6
Old Kaohsiung	45.4	44.1	45.8	41.3	43.4	40.0	37.4	27.0	23.6
Old Taitung	48.2	47.9	47.9	49.3	50.6	49.9	29.1	28.9	36.7
Old Hualien	42.3	42.6	42.3	50.4	50.0	50.0	14.0	14.1	16.1
The Penghus	-	-	-	-	-	-	35.5	33.6	26.0

Source: Wang 1966, 82.

Table 8: Farm Land Rental Rates in Taiwan in 1937

Region	Paddy Land			Dry Land		
	Prime Land	Medium Land	Poor Land	Prime Land	Medium Land	Poor Land
Average	54.38	48.20	43.31	36.79	35.04	26.66
Old Taipei	51.33	50.90	47.46	35.75	30.19	26.22
Old Hsinchu	54.99	53.89	53.88	34.89	30.22	19.13
Old Taichung	55.91	50.05	48.66	40.74	33.22	26.52
Old Tainan	57.66	42.93	42.18	43.53	41.10	33.63
Old Kaohsiung	48.56	44.39	41.41	35.67	34.80	34.22
Old Taitung	-	47.79	51.42	-	-	23.59
Old Hualien	37.31	45.62	42.69	-	19.03	15.31
The Penghus	-	-	-	-	50.01	39.66

Source: Wang 1966, 82.

Undoubtedly, the rates for rent were very high. In addition, there were many other requirements toward the tenants. For example, the tenants should pay an amount of down payment as security deposit in advance to the landlord. The tenants also should pay most of the rent in the first harvest of the two-crop farmland since not only the quality of rice at that time was better than the second harvest but also it was harvested in lunar June, just before the period of natural disaster --- typhoon. Therefore, the second harvest was very unstable, but the tenants and their families were mostly depended upon it for their living. On the contrary, tenants received very few protections. The contract of tenancy was decided per year, and it was mostly not signed in paper. The landlords then could easily remove tenants who did not obey to their requirements.

Why the landlord class could easily exploit the tenant class? Why the colonial government would like to support the inequitable land tenancy system in Taiwan? Tu (1993, 187-8) indicates that it is because of the historical tradition of Taiwan's land tenancy and the progress of merchandise characteristic of Taiwan's agriculture. The tenants usually composed of a large proportion of Taiwan's farmers since the Ching dynasty. The severe competition among them usually raised the rent. In addition, a new species of rice --- Ponlai rice --- was introduced into Taiwan from Japan in 1922, which greatly increased rice production and exportation. The rental rates raised because of the increase of production, and landlords at the same time enhanced their wealth. The tenants did not receive any relief because of the new species of Ponlai rice. At the same time, the Japanese capitalists released their land for the cultivation of sugar cane. The competition was severity among the tenants, which also increase

the rental rates.

Tu (1993, 191) also maintains that the preservation of Taiwan's land tenancy system is best to serve for Japan's benefits. Under the high rental rates, the landlords could receive a great amount of Ponlai rice and sell it in the market for profit. The rice was then exported to Japan for sale. Although the quality of Taiwan's rice was inferior to Japan and Korea's rice the maturity time of Taiwan's rice was different from them. Taiwan's rice could meet the period of insufficiency of Japan's rice market. The price of rice in Japan would not be raised up because of the supply of Taiwan's rice. Therefore, the colonial government and the landlords were seemingly stand together on the issue of the exploitation of the tenants.

Many disputes took place between the landlords and tenants, especially in the late 1920s. According to Table 9, major issues between them could be classified into three categories: the amount of rent, rental contract, and request of compensation of the improvement of cultivated land. It should be noted that many local Farmers' Cooperative Organizations (農民組合) had been established around Taiwan since 1923, and they protested against sugar cane mills' exploitation and the release of public land to Japanese retired officials. However, those ambitious activities were firstly inspired by the Cultural Association (文化協會), which was influenced by socialism in Japan and rebuked the imperial totalitarian control and seriously class exploitation. The Farmers' Cooperative Organization around Taiwan was finally formed in 1926, which provoked tenants' discontent about their social status. The peak of their protest against the colonial government and landlords was in 1927. Within those 431 disputes, 344 were directly under its guidance. The leftists in the Cultural Association invited some administrators of the Japan's Labor-Peasants' Party to visit Taiwan and made speeches around the island. Class-consciousness of peasants and struggling against the landlord class were their major remarks. Leaders of the Farmers' Cooperative Organization also traveled to Japan. There was a close relationships between Taiwan's Farmers' Cooperative Organization and Japan's Labor-Peasants' Party. This probably was one of the major reasons for the emergence of Taiwan's peasant movement during the 1920's and 1930's.

Table 9: Issues and numbers of the requirement from tenants in the tenants-landlords' disputes

Requirements		1924	1925	1926	1927	1928	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934
Reduce the amount of rent	Reduce the Rent (in money)	1	1	—	285 (232)	77 (46)	17 (2)	3	5	8	17	5
	Reduce the Rent (in paddy)	—	—	—	—	1 (1)	—	1	—	—	—	—
	Postpone the time of payment	—	—	—	1 (0)	5 (2)	—	—	—	—	—	—
	Reject to pay	—	—	—	11 (5)	—	—	—	—	—	5	4 (0)
	Rejection to raise the rent (in money)	—	—	1	53 (52)	12 (9)	3	1	—	2	1	6
	Rejection to raise the rent (in paddy)	—	—	—	5 (2)	—	—	—	1	—	—	1
	Total	1	1	—	355 (292)	94 (57)	20 (2)	5	6	10	23	16
Rental contract	Prolonging the contract	1	2	11	6 (5)	18 (10)	2 (2)	1	6	2	3	7
	Requiring the revival of contract	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	1	—	—
	Against the change of contract	—	1	—	—	1 (0)	—	2	1	5	3	4
	Against take back the land	1	—	—	49 (36)	—	2 (1)	—	3	6	9	16
	Excluding the intermediate	—	—	—	1 (1)	3 (2)	1	2	2	3	1	—
	Total	2	3	11	58 (42)	22 (13)	5 (3)	5	13 (1)	17	16	27
Asking com* for imp* of cultivated land	Asking fee for the open up of wasteland for farming	—	—	—	11 (6)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	Asking com* for equipment installed on leased land	—	—	—	2 (2)	8 (5)	1	1	—	1	—	1
	Asking com* for imp* of land	—	—	3	3 (2)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	Total	—	—	3	16 (10)	8 (5)	1	1	—	1	—	1
Others	2	—	—	2	7 (3)	—	—	—	—	1	1	2
Total	5	4	15	431 (344)	132 (79)	25 (4)	11	18	29	40	46	

Source: The Annals of Police Report of the Colonial Government 1989, 22-23.

Notes: 1. Numbers in the parenthesis means disputes supported and guided by the Farmers' Cooperative Organization.

2. Some numbers were probably miscalculated in this table. For example, the total disputes in 1926 should be 14; the total disputes of "reduce the amount of rent" supported by the Farmers' Cooperative Organization in 1927 should be 291; and the total disputes in 1928 and 1931 should be 131 and 19, respectively.

3. com=compensation; imp=improvement.

Threatened by those protests the colonial government tried very hard to organize yeh-tien-hui (業佃會) within every administrative districts in Taiwan, which was an organization consisted of landlords, tenants, and governmental officials. It was hoped that these organizations could help to solve landlords-tenants' disputes. However, yeh-tien-hui was not supported by the Farmers' Cooperative Organization because it basically only represented the interests of landlords and colonial government (Wang 1952, 40). For example, tenants' concerns about the high rental rates were not an issue at all in this organization. The Farmers' Cooperative Organization then asked tenants do not join the yeh-tien-hui. However, since the Farmers' Cooperative Organization was gradually controlled by the Taiwan's Communist Party after 1928, the colonial government decided to suppress its activities and arrest many of its elite. On February 12, 1929, many major representatives of it were arrested and sentenced to jail. It was a big set back to the Farmers' Cooperative Organization. In 1931, the colonial government further arrested members of the Taiwan's Communist Party, which caused the collapse of the Farmers' Cooperative Organization. Peasants' movements in Taiwan then could not survive.

The restoration of Taiwan to ROC after the World War II in 1945 did not change this situation. Taiwan was integrated into the Chinese economic system and seriously influenced by the price inflation of China. For example, the price of rice increased 12,000 times from August 1945 to December 1948 (Chen 1995). In addition to economic situation, political disorder was also severe because different political factions coming from China to take over Taiwan could not cooperate but struggle among themselves. Many of them came here to make a fortune. Taiwanese were despised and excluded from the political sphere. Taiwan was definitely not an important place for the KMT government when it battled with the Communist Party in China. It was China unification to be the most urgent goal in that era. Many resources were exported to China to support the KMT government, and the situation in Taiwan was worse and worse. Numerous Taiwanese were regretted to restore with China. It was probably the above reasons, which caused the emergence of the February 28 (228) uprising in 1947. Taiwanese demonstrated on the streets and attacked police stations and radio stations. Serious fights erupted between Taiwanese and mainlanders. Finally, military forces were dispatched from China to suppress the uprising, and thousands of Taiwanese were killed. Taiwan was totally under the authoritarian control after the event. It was difficult to hear voices or actions requesting or rejecting land reform within Taiwan's civil society¹ (Lee

¹ On June 20, 1947, the Taiwan Provincial Assembly summoned its third convention and only 3/5 of its

1993).

The land formerly owned by the colonial government, Japanese capitalists, or Japanese was all taken over by the new government and became the public land. Totally, there was 857,741 *Chia* cultivated land in the whole Taiwan after the restoration, and public cultivated land occupied 181,491 *Chia* (22%). There was around 160,000 households of tenants working on it. In order to improve the living condition of those tenants, the government planned to lease those public land to them since 1947, and the rental rate was only 25% of annual production (Chang 1994). Although some of the public land had been leased to the tenants, most of them were still kept on the hand of the state-owned Taiwan Sugar Company, which controlled approximately 120,000 *Chia* of fertile land. Tenants were very unpleasant toward this decision. However, this policy did not change because foreign exchange was urgent needed at that moment, and sugar produced by the Taiwan Sugar Company could help the government to reach this goal (Huang 1995, 101-130). In addition to the public land, tenants' relation with the landlords in the early period of Taiwan's restoration was less stable than in the colonial period (Hou 1988, 343). It was because of the instability of political and economic situations mentioned above.

Authoritarian Atmosphere, Landlords' Cooperation, and Taiwan's Land Reform

There were three steps for Taiwan's land reform between 1949 and 1953: (1) farm land rent reduction; (2) sales of public farm lands to tenant farmers and (3) compulsory purchase of private tenanted landholdings of landlords for resale to incumbent tillers. However, it is important to put efforts on the first step to reexamine the domestic environment for its implementation. The basic content of it is the 37.5% farm land rent reduction program. It means that "the farm rents to be paid by a tenant to his landlord shall not exceed 37.5 per cent of the total annual yield of the main crop on the tenanted land (Hsiao 1968, 98)." It is the same as the 25% farm land rent reduction program implemented in mainland China since the 1920s². Although the Executive Yuan of the national government in mainland China asked Taiwan to perform the 25% farm land rent reduction program in 1947³ and the

members could participate. Within those 12 assemblymen who did not join the conference, 7 assemblymen were either killed, arrested or under circular order for the arrest; 4 assemblymen were missing or to hide from trouble; 1 assemblyman was illness.

² The meaning of the 25% farm land rent reduction program is that it assumes rent paid to landlords is half of annual yield. Within those 50% of rent, the KMT and the government maintain 25% reduction and return it to tenants. Therefore, the landlords actually receive 37.5% of annual yield.

³ The order number is "tsung Erh Tzu Ti 10050 Hsun Ling (從貳字第 10050 訓令)." However, there did not have any regulated methods to implement the order at that time, which caused troubles to the

provincial government also gave its order⁴ to each administrative districts the reduction program did not comprehensively implemented⁵. The 37.5% farm land rent reduction program did not put in practice until Chen, Cheng became the Governor of the Taiwan Provincial Government since January 1949.

Many administrative orders related to the 37.5% farm land rent reduction program were instituted in the early months of 1949, for example, "The Rental Regulation for Private Cultivated Land in Taiwan Province" and its Bylaw. In addition to rent reduction, they asked landlords and their tenants need to have signed contracts, which also must register in township governments. The organizations of "Promotion Committee of the 37.5% Farm Land Rent Reduction" were established in Taiwan province, every county, and every township. These committees not only tried to calculate the standard amount of annual yield of main crop in each category and grades of the farmland but also dealt with the disputes between landlords and tenants. Nevertheless, it should be noted that those administrative orders were not recognized from the legislative unit - the Taiwan Provincial Assembly. The Assembly was in adjournment between December 1948 and June 1949, and it was in this period that the 37.5% farm land rent reduction program was instituted and put in practice.

It was also important to know that the "Farm Land Rent Reduction To 37.5% Act" was instituted in 1951, three years later after the implementation of the rent reduction program. It means those administrative orders concerning with rent reduction program did not have legal base⁶. According to article 110 of the Land Law promulgated on April 29, 1946,

Land rent cannot be higher than 8% of the land price. If the land rent is higher

county and city governments (Wang and Chang 1955, 52).

⁴ The order number is "Chen Wen 36 Nien Shu Min Ti Nei Tzu Ti 121 Hao (辰文三六年署民地內字第 121 號代電)."

⁵ Ping Tung City located in southern Taiwan probably was the only one to abide by this order.

⁶ Mr. Chang, who implemented the rent reduction program in 1949, recalled that Governor Chen, Cheng said that "the work of rent reduction was a job of revolution. To speak the truth, it did not have legal authority. The reason why we did it was according to the Executive Yuan's endowment of rights and obligations to citizens of the Taiwan province (1999, 177)." Since it did not have legal authority, Governor Chen's policies concerning with rent reduction program did not receive fully support from his successor, Governor Wu, Kuo-Chen, who took the position in December 1949. For example, Wu indicated in the conference of rent reduction that "it (rent reduction program) was very difficult to be implemented because it's legal bases were not solid (Chang 1999, 193)." However, since former Governor Chen was promoted to become the Premier and owned the political power, therefore, Wu's rejection did not count at all. But, Wu rejected to join the conferences of rent reduction program held by the Executive Yuan. He usually ordered Yen, Chia-Kan (Director of the Department of Finance) or Li, Lien-Chun (Director of the Bureau of Foodstuff) to join the conferences (Chang 1999, 193).

than 8% of the land price it should be reduced to meet the requirement. If the land rent is less than 8% of the land price it should not be changed. If the land price has not yet decided by the government then the suitable land price is the average land price among the latter three years.

However, the Executive Yuan put a "note" next to this article, it indicated that:

According to March 20, 1947 Executive Yuan Order "Tsung Erh Tzu Ti 10050 Hao Hsun Ling (從貳字第 10050 號訓令)" and March 15, 1947 National Government Order "Chu Tzu Ti 224 Hao Hsun Ling (處字第 224 號訓令)", the Highest Committee of National Defense in its No.223 standing conference decided that farm land rent handed over to landlords by tenants must still be regulated by 37.5% of the harvest of its main crops.

It is because of this note that the Taiwan Provincial Government regulated its administrative orders⁷. The above note was put in Article 2 of "The Rental Regulation for Private Cultivated Land in Taiwan Province," and became the legal foundation for the implementation of rent reduction program in Taiwan. However, some important issues were not arranged in the Regulation, for example, it was lack of the ordinance for the duration of the leasing contract. In the Implementation Plan of the 37.5% farm land rent reduction program instituted by the Taiwan Provincial Government, it indicated that the duration of the leasing contract was at least three years, and each county and city could decide the time period by themselves (Ho 1988, 377). Therefore, the duration of the leasing contract was different among counties and cities. Wang and Chang indicated that "it was three years in the northern part of Taiwan, five years in Kaohsiung and Ping-Tung counties (southern part of Taiwan), and six years in the Tainan, Chia-I, and Yun-Lin counties (1955, 72)." In 1951, many leasing contracts were due, and tenants were worried that their landlords would not sign contracts with them anymore. To resolve this dilemma, the Farm Land Rent Reduction To 37.5% Act was instituted by the government on June 7, 1951. It regulated that the duration of the leasing contract should not shorter than six years. If the duration of those original contracts signed in 1949 was lesser than six years it

⁷ However, the legal base of this note was challenged in 1947 by the former Taiwan Provincial Government, Taiwan Provincial Administrative Executive Office (台灣省行政長官公署). In its telegram to the Ministry of Land Administration of the Executive Yuan, the Taiwan Provincial Administrative Executive Office indicated that the Land Law did not regulate that farm land rent should be collected by 37.5% of the harvest of its main crops. Therefore, it said that "there are not legal bases for this regulation," and it suggested the Legislative Yuan change the second section of the Article 110 in order to correspond with the legal requirement. However, the Executive Yuan did not agree with its suggestion. (Summary of Taiwan's Laws and Regulations concerning with Land

should be prolonged to meet the requirement of the Act.

The illegal base of the 37.5% farm rent reduction program should be disputed by the Taiwan Provincial Assembly because it was authorized by the national government to have power to decide those administrative regulations issued by the Taiwan Provincial Government related to citizens' rights and obligations⁸. Therefore, it is interested to inquire the intention of those provincial assemblymen, not only because they were mostly big landlords in rural Taiwan but also they were social elite and their behaviors would have great impact to the society. Huang, Chao-Chin, former chairman of the Provincial Assembly, recalled that "when Chen Cheng decide to perform the 37.5% farm land rent reduction program and other land policies, many people predicted that he would meet force of resistance, especially from the Provincial Assembly since mostly assemblymen were renowned landlords (1965, 36)." Their benefits would be seriously curtailed because of the implementation of the rent reduction program. As a matter of fact, those assemblymen did not oppose to those policies at all; on the contrary, they openly supported land reform policies. On May 5, 1949, the Provincial Assembly issued a telegram, which called for the county and city councils to support the first step of the 37.5% farm land rent reduction program. According to Tung, Chung-sheng, "every county or city council announced its completely support to the rent reduction program. People were very impressed to their behavior. The council of the Tai-Chung County even supplied prize money to encourage the competition among each township under its jurisdiction (1949, 26)." In Taipei County, one famous councilman not only deleted his tenants' debt but also asked the government to carry out the reduction plan as soon as possible. The chairperson of the Ping-Tung city council was named as the "375 president" because he progressively suggested the Ping-Tung city to execute the rent reduction plan first around Taiwan. Finally, he successfully persuaded his colleagues in the city council to sustain the rent reduction program. In addition, he even sent telegrams to every county and city councils in Taiwan and suggested them to support the program.

The other phenomenon valued for noted was that it only took one month for the landlords to exchange signed contracts with the tenants. This activity started from May 1949 and ended in June 1949. Almost all leased farm land in Taiwan had a signed contract, which also registered in every township government in the same time.

Administration (I), 51).

⁸ It was according to Article 3 of the "Organizational Regulation of the Provincial Assembly," which was issued by the national government on December 5, 1944 (Cheng 1985, 90).

The efficiency of this work was marvelous! Some landlords even vigorously visited their tenants and asked them to sign the contract (Lee 1993, 252). Why the landlords, provincial assemblymen, and county and city councilmen behaved this way? Why they would like to sacrifice their benefit for the tenants?

Lee, Hsiao-Feng (1993, 252) explained that it was because of the authoritarian atmosphere at that period forced them to accept the rent reduction program. He explained that when Governor Chen, Cheng talked with the provincial assemblymen, he said that "I respect public opinion all the time. However, only the 37.5% farm land rent reduction programs can not be argued at all, please support it (Chiang 1967, 21)." Chiang (1967, 21) indicated that Chen's speech implied the implication of "diplomacy (or courtesy) before the use of force." It was important to know that Chen not only was the Governor of Taiwan Province but also controlled military force in Taiwan since he was the command-in-chief of the Garrison Command. The provisional government issued two orders to its county and city governments in 1949 and 1950, respectively. The major point of these orders was that landlords who seriously violated the 37.5% farm land reduction program should be arrested and delivered to the Garrison Command (Summary of Taiwan's Laws and Regulations concerning with Land Administration (II), 86-87). In addition, some news report could explain Chen's determination of the rent reduction program.

There was a time that local administrators felt depression because landlords were not willing to sign contracts with their tenants. At that moment Governor Chen visited Taichung area and he summoned local chief administrators and elite to have a conference. In the meeting, he said that "the 37.5% farm land rent reduction program must completely implemented. I believed there were some difficulties. I also believed that there were some people full of cunning and did not want to save their faces. But, I did believe nobody did not want to save their life." Because of this speech local administrators immediately solved the impasse. For example, one famous landlord instantaneously asked twenty persons holding his name stamps to visit his tenants and to seal the contract after he listened to Chen's speech. Afterwards, Governor further issued an order, which indicated that whoever disobeyed or obstructed the policy of rent reduction might be arrested and delivered to the Garrison Command. Landlords therefore abandoned their wait and see attitude and supported the exchange of the signed contracts with the tenants. (Qtd. in Lee 1993, 252-253)

There was another news report related to the implementation of rent reduction

program.

Some landlords did not support the rent reduction program because their income would reduce one-third. In the beginning, they did not abide by the orders, and just wanted to wait and see. They believed the government would talk a great deal about the rent reduction program with little or no follow-up action. To their surprise, the government did seriously execute its policy, and they were very afraid to know that landlords, who did not sign contract with their tenants would be arrested by the Garrison Command. At that moment, one truck driver was shot to death by the Garrison Command in Taipei because of traffic accident. Apprehensive for their safety, landlords were willing to sign contracts with the tenants at last. (Qtd. in Lee 1993, 253)

In addition, it was also very important to examine state of affairs at that moment, comparing with the timetable of the rent reduction program. The year of 1949 was a year full of chaos in China because of the defeat of the national government by the communist. Although the National Government did not move to Taiwan until December 1949 Taiwan was seriously influenced by the political turmoil took place in China long before that day. Within the period of the implementation of the rent reduction program some political events emerged at the same time. On May 1, 1949, the government performed households' examination in whole Taiwan, and around 1,500 people were arrested. On May 5, the government ordered all money exchangers of the black market terminate their business within one month. On May 20, the government proclaimed martial law, and people who obstructed peace and order of the society would have death sentence. Four days later, the government promulgated a new regulation for emigration. On May 27, according to the martial law, the Garrison Command instituted two regulations. One of them was "regulation to prevent the following illegal activities: to assemble a meeting, to form a union, to parade, to petition, to boycott classes, to stage a strike from workers, to close shops, and to go on strike." The other one was "regulation for newspaper, magazine, and publication." Accompanying with the impact of the 228 uprising, these new edicts certainly would create the authoritarian atmosphere to the landlords and force them to support the rent reduction program.

However, the social and economic status of landlords was seriously lessened even before the implementation of the 37.5% farm land rent reduction program. In a agricultural society based upon primary production, it is important to examine the land taxes and the approaches that the government control foodstuffs at that time. In

order to control foodstuff, the Taiwan Provincial Administrative Executive Office issued the Temporary Regulations for the Control of Foodstuffs on October 31, 1945, and established the Bureau of Foodstuff on November 1, 1945. It planned to copy the approaches used by the Japanese colonial government in the World War II period. In addition to households' consumption, all producers of foodstuffs should sell their residual foodstuffs to the government, which then distributed them to Taiwan's citizens. However, this approach did not success mainly because the purchasing price of rice was much lower than the market price, and the government did not have complete power as the Japanese colonial government has when it implemented the policy in World War II. The regulation was abolished on January 11, 1946, and rice was freed to sell in the market. But it was important to know that the government sealed and put away rice deposited in warehouses of farmers' association in the same time. Landlords were furious because the ownership of those rice was belonged to landlords, not the farmers' association.

It was also important to know that rice was in a condition of serious shortage because of war at that time. Bombing from the airplanes severely damaged the irrigation system. Labor forces in agricultural fields were dispatched to battlefields, and cultivated areas of rice were greatly reduced. In addition, farmers could not get fertilizers, which usually imported from Japan. In Table 10, the total cultivated land of rice in 1945 reduced to 502,418 hectare, and the total production of rice was 638,828 ton, which was 59.8% of its former year. It was estimated that 885,714 ton of rice was needed at least for Taiwan's people in 1945 (Yen 1993a, 83). There was 246,886 ton of shortage. The result was the increase of rice price, and it was really astonishing, for example, rice price in December 1945 was 10 times of its price in October 1945 (Yen 1993a, 87). However, this problem was even worse when the government abolished the Temporary Regulations for the Control of Foodstuffs in January 1946. And the seal and put away of rice by the government further induced high rise of rice price. According to Chen, it increased 84 times in Taipei city between February 1946 and August 1945, and 400 times between January 1947 and August 1945 (Table 11).

Table 10: Comparison of Cultivated Area and Production of Rice in Taiwan (1938-1947)

Year	Cultivated Area (hectare)	Production of Unpolished Rice (ton)	Average Production Per Hectare (kg)
1938	625,389	1,402,414	2,242
1939	626,131	1,307,391	2,088
1940	638,621	1,128,784	1,768
1941	646,927	1,199,006	1,853
1942	616,529	1,171,182	1,900
1943	610,051	1,125,804	1,845
1944	600,688	1,068,121	1,778
1945	502,018	638,828	1,273
1946	564,016	894,021	1,585
1947	677,557	999,021	1,474

Source: The Bureau of Foodstuffs of the Taiwan Province, *Statistic of Taiwan's Foodstuffs*, 1949, 2-3.

(Qtd. in Yen 1993a, 83)

Table 11: The Rise Index of Retail Price of Rice in Taipei City

Month & Year	White Polished Rice per Tai Chin (Dollar)	Index
August 1945	0.2	1
October 1945	3.6	18
November 1945	12.0	60
February 1946	16.8	84
April 1946	20.0	100
January 1947	80.0	400
December 1947	220.0	1200
December 1948	2,400.0	12000

Source: Chen 1995, 100-101. (Qtd. in Shih 1980, 737.)

On July 3, 1946, the government issued a new regulation, which indicated that taxes on agricultural lands should be collected by the real production (田賦征實), for example rice. The amount of land tax was decided by how many units of land tax (賦元) in the agricultural land. The total units of land tax were affected by the area and fertile of each parcel of land⁹. In addition, each unit of land tax (賦元) must accompany with 1.95 unit of land tax as the supplement tax. It was 3 kg of rice for a unit of land tax; therefore, it was 8.85 kg for 2.95 units of land tax (Hwa 1984, 612). Therefore, 8.85 kg of rice was collected for a unit of land tax in Taiwan in 1946. In addition, the government also decided to collect real production as rent from those public lands leased to citizens since the second harvest season of 1946. The government collected 5,074 ton of rice through the way of land tax, and 7,190 ton of

⁹ This is a land classification system inherited from the Japanese colonial period, and it has been implementing since 1944. Land has been classified into 11 categories according to their utilization, for example, rice paddy field, dry paddy field, fishery, and etc. Within these categories, there are many classes according to the fertilization of the fields and the net income derived from the land. For example, there are 26 classes of the rice paddy field, and the unit of land tax between the first and sixth class, which is usually named as the upper grade of agricultural land, is 50, 45, 40, 35, 31, and 27. And the unit of land tax between the seventh and twelfth class, which is usually named as the middle grade of agricultural land, is 24, 21, 18, 16, 14, and 12 (Lin 1999, 226).

rice through the rent of public lands in 1946, separately (Yen 1993b, 90). To compare these figures with the total production in 1946 the government seemingly could not control the supply of rice. Nevertheless, according to many news reports (Yen 1993b, 90-91; Chen 1995, 100), a great amount of rice was collected and exported to mainland China to support the national government, which caused seriously shortage of rice supply in Taiwan¹⁰.

Furthermore, the Taiwan Provincial Administrative Executive Office created a new tax for the county government on December 30, 1946, named public school foodstuffs (公學糧); and the government started to collect it from 1947. It collected 2.655 kg of rice for a unit of land tax (Hwa 1984, 614). The total amount for a unit of land tax therefore was 11.505 kg between 1947 to 1949. Immediately after the February 28 event in 1947, the government issued another regulation in July in order to further control foodstuffs; its name was the Regulation to Purchase Foodstuff in Taiwan Province (三十六年度台灣省收購糧食辦法). It included two major themes: (1) mandatory purchase of rice in related with the amount of land tax paid by each taxpayer (隨賦收購糧食); (2) mandatory purchase of residual rice toward those big landlords (收購大戶餘糧), and the definition of big landlord was landlords whose land tax was more than 1,000 kg of rice¹¹. The purchasing rates of residual rice were between 40% to 60%. The former approach was to purchase 12 kg of rice for per unit of land tax in addition to the land tax, and there was not supplement tax for this category (Article 7). In the latter approach, the amount of 1,500 kg of rice was approximately 10/98 of rent income of rice, according to article 10 of the Regulation. It also meant that landlords' rent income of rice was around 9.8 times of their land tax. Therefore, one big landlord received approximately 14.7 ton (1,500kg×9.8) of rice per year. According to statistics, the average rice harvest of one hectare was 1,474 kg in 1947. Therefore, the area of rice paddy belong to the landlord was approximately 20 hectare ((14,700 kg ÷ 1,474 kg) × 2), because the rent usually was around half of the rice harvest.

In 1947, for one unit of land tax, the government collected and purchased the following amount of rice: (1) 8.85 kg for the real production, (2) 2.655 for the public school foodstuffs, and (3) 12.00 for the mandatory purchase. The total amount was 23.505 kg, and it was not included the extra purchase toward those big landlords.

¹⁰ Rice was also smuggled into mainland China because of higher market price there. Many provincial assemblymen made several motions in 1946 and 1947 concerning with the shortage of rice and the sharply rise of rice price in Taiwan. They suggested the government to resolve this problem soon. (Cheng 1985).

¹¹ The definition of big landlord was modified by the Taiwan Provincial Assembly in July 1948. The

The total units of land tax of the 7th class of rice paddy field were 24, which is around the average amount. Therefore, the amount of rice submitted to the government was 564.12 kg per hectare, which consisted of 38.27.5% of rice harvest per year. Since land tax should be landlords' responsibility landlords therefore could only kept 172.88 kg of rice $((1,474 \text{ kg} \div 2) - 564.12 \text{ kg})$. It was clear that land tax at that time was very heavy, and landlords were not able to transfer tax burden to their tenants because of the implementation of the 37.5% farm land rent reduction program in 1949. This was the reason why the life of many landlords who owned small amount of land was in despair and wanted to redeem their lands and cultivate by themselves¹².

Nevertheless, in an era of serious inflation in 1947 and 1948 (Table 12), that land tax collected by real production, not by currency, meant that farmers received heavier burden. In addition, although the government used the word of "purchase" its price was much lower than the market. It could never catch the market price. The Governor even confessed that rice price regulated by the government was around 30-40% lower than the market price in the first harvest season of 1948 (Cheng 1985, 142). Therefore, landlords actually received double exploitation from the government (Liu 1992, 61).

Table 12: Index of Wholesale Price in Taipei City

	1937	1944	1945	1946	1947	1948	1949
January	100	460	2,360	4,223	16,195	106,959	1,514,073
June	100	460	2,360	9,164	35,064	154,542	13,214,952
December	100	460	2,360	12,555	97,462	1,111,364	

Source: Chen 1995, 102.

In respective to the mandatory purchase of residual rice toward those big landlords, according to Hwa (1984b, 630-1), 2,244 households were categorized as big landlords and they held 156,316 ton of rice. Within them, 595 households resided in the Taichung County; 504 households lived in the Hsinchu County. In order to shun from this regulation, those big landlords tried to divide their property into different owners, and the result was that they could not be classified as big landlords anymore. The government terminated this policy in 1953 since it caused many troubles. The total amount it purchased between 1947 and 1952 was 66,215 ton of rice, and the year of 1947 reached the highest amount, which was 37,779 ton¹³. Although the total amount it received through this way was not in a great quantity

amount of land tax was increased from 1,000 kg to 1,500 kg (Cheng 1985, 144).

¹² This was verified both by the Provincial Assemblymen's motion in 1949 (Cheng 1985, 157) and by interview of this research (# 10).

¹³ It was probably the definition of big landlord was modified in 1948. Please check former note.

there was an important implication for this policy. The timing for its implication immediately after the 228 uprising implicitly represented the government wanted to put down the class of landlords (Liu 1992, 61). Undoubtedly, the political and economic status of landlords was further deteriorated because of the implementation of mandatory purchase of residual rice. In the end of 1948, the political situation in mainland China was deteriorated, and the Taiwan Provincial Assembly (80% of its members were landlords) in its declaration maintained that

The government must move further ahead to control a great amount of foodstuffs in order to cope with emergency situations. For those small numbers of big landlords, they must recognize the political circumstances and understand that “if the nest is overturned there won’t be whole eggs left.” The big landlords must let everyone have a finger on the pie. (Qtd. in Cheng 1985, 146)

It is from the declaration to comprehend that landlords’ cooperation is also very important for the success of Taiwan’s land reform. The major reason for their willingness to collaborate with the government was because of intimidation from the communist revolution in China and those terrible experiences took place in Chinese landlords. Private properties were all confiscated, and many landlords lost their life in the social movement of class struggle. Many horrible stories were told in Taiwan. Meanwhile, the national government failed many battles with the communist in 1948, and the situation was even worse in 1949. Taiwan was situated in imminent danger. In order to protect themselves and to pursue their survival, the landlords did not have other choices but to cooperate with the government. Therefore, it could be explained that land reform policies implemented in Taiwan were to deter the communist’s revolution in China. Hsiao also maintains that

[U]nder the threat of the Chinese Communists who had pushed on to attack Taiwan, posing themselves as “land reformers,” the Nationalist government, after retreating from the mainland, seriously paid attention to the existing agrarian issues facing Taiwan’s agriculture. To forestall any such possibility the Nationalist government with General Chen Cheng as Governor of Taiwan initiated a land reform program in 1949. (1981, 46)

However, Governor Chen tried to persuade members of the Taiwan Provincial Assembly to cooperate with the policy, and most of those assemblymen were big landlords in Taiwan. He invited the chairman or the deputy chairman of the Assembly to join the top-ranking conferences in the government. In addition,

Governor Chen did have lunch every week with nine assemblymen, who were representatives of the Assembly when it was in adjournment. Huang, Chao-Chin, former chairman of the Assembly, indicated that Governor Chen revealed important policies in advance to those representatives, and he kept very good public relations with the Assembly. Why the assemblymen and landlords did not disobey the land reform programs? Huang explained that it was because "assemblymen were all dissuaded by Governor Chen in the lunch banquets held long before the implementation of land reform (1965, 36)." And, the communist revolution in China was a good reason to persuade the assemblymen.

Luchu Township

The research area of this project is the Luchu township, which is located at the northernmost region of the Taoyuan county and is next to the Taipei county. The Taoyuan township is on its western side, which is the place of the CKS international airport. On the southern area of it is the Taoyuan city, which is the site of the Taoyuan county government. Luchu is facing at the Taiwan Strait on its western side. Totally, there are 23 villages in Luchu township, and the total area of it is 7,550.25 hectare. One-third of the land is craggy terrain locating at the northeastern region. The other two-thirds on the southwestern side is plain suitable for agricultural activities.

Historically, Luchu area was named as Nankan She (南坎社), which was occupied by the aborigines people --- Pingpu tribe. Population here was few since land of Luchu region was not fertile enough and irrigation system was not fully developed either. However, Nankan was noted for its port, and it was one of the traffic nexuses in northern Taiwan. Many fishermen, seasonal farmers and traders coming from the coastal areas of Fukien and Kwangtung started to visit here since the sixteenth century. It was not until the Koxinga period (around 1665) that armies were stationed here and engaged in farming. Han emigrants then followed and stayed. In early Ching dynasty, government troops were placed here to protect local residents. Han people swarmed into Nankan again. Many reclaimers received licenses from the government and they recruited Han people to open up wasteland here for farming. The composition of Luchu's population was showed in Table 10, in which the Fukienese was the major population of this area. The "I-Tien Liang-Chu (one field, two owners) " system was employed. Some deeds in which the aborigines were yeh-hu (landowner) and Han people were tien-hu (perpetual tenant) were recorded in Luchu history. In addition, many ken-chao (patent of reclamation)

were also found.

Table 13: Number of Households and Population of Luchu Township in the Colonial Era

		Years													
		1921	1922	1923	1924	1925	1926	1927	1928	1929	1930	1931	1932	1936	
Jap*	Hou*	13	11	17	17	11	12	11	12	11	14	13	14	18	
	Pop	M*	14	13	25	22	17	20	22	24	20	22	19	24	34
		W*	12	13	16	14	20	15	19	20	21	24	18	19	21
		T*	26	26	41	36	37	35	41	44	41	46	37	43	55
Fuk*	Hou*	1,892	1,910	1,909	1,982	2,093	2,105	2,068	2,087	2,150	2,096	2,113	2,187	2,289	
	Pop*	M*	6,686	6,697	6,798	7,195	7,388	7,454	7,573	7,703	7,821	7,861	8,070	8,035	8,225
		W*	6,179	6,163	6,168	6,430	6,667	6,775	6,824	6,959	6,959	7,108	7,314	7,244	7,533
		T*	12,865	12,860	12,966	13,625	14,055	14,229	14,397	14,662	14,780	14,969	15,384	15,279	15,758
Kwa*	Hou*	74	77	84	76	77	82	84	94	90	85	95	88	103	
	Pop*	M*	282	295	343	227	323	321	311	321	340	369	370	388	436
		W*	268	259	345	212	280	249	269	268	297	310	370	399	400
		T*	550	554	688	439	603	570	580	589	637	679	740	787	836
Shou-fan	Hou*	35	32	34	34	23	29	27	33	29	29	34	27	31	
	Pop*	M*	86	91	107	92	100	85	84	92	89	81	89	84	85
		W*	42	45	36	38	43	31	37	46	43	41	43	56	42
		T*	128	136	143	130	143	116	121	138	132	122	132	140	127
Citizens of ROC*	Hou*	1												5	
	Pop*	M*	3	7	8	9	3	3	3	2	2	1	1	6	8
		W*		1	1	1	1	2	1	1	4	3	1	2	1
		T*	3	8	9	10	4	5	4	3	6	4	2	8	9
T*	Hou*	2,015	2,030	2,044	2,109	2,204	2,228	2,190	2,226	2,305	2,224	2,255	2,315	2,446	
	Pop*	M*	7,071	7,103	7,281	7,545	7,831	7,883	7,993	8,142	8,272	8,334	8,549	8,537	8,788
		W*	6,501	6,481	6,576	6,695	7,011	7,078	7,150	7,294	7,324	7,486	7,746	7,720	7,997
		T*	13,572	13,584	13,857	14,240	14,842	14,961	15,143	15,436	15,596	15,820	16,295	16,257	16,785

Source: Luchu Township Government 1995, 330.

Notes: Jap*=Japanese; Fuk*=Fukienese; Kwa*=Kwangtungese; Hou*=Households; Pop*=Population, M*=Man; W*=Women; T*=Total.; ROC*=Republic of China

Table 14: Classification of Land and Ownership of the Luchu Township in the Colonial Era in 1938
Unit: *Chia*

Owners, Land Classification, and Areas				
owners	Taxed land	No-taxed land (government own)	No-taxed land (private own)	Total
Paddy land	4,046.0973	26.6350	1.1579	4,073.8902
Dry land	684.8907	2.6335	0.8610	688.3852
Building Land	159.6451	0.2643	4.6224	164.5318
Mountain and Forest	1,188.8074	219.4538		1,408.2612
Mixed breed land	9.5774	0.2854		9.8628
Ponds and swamps		17.2689	436.6634	453.9323
Raw field		17.6072	290.5835	308.1907
Cemetery		9.2995	18.1499	27.4494
Road		0.2257	25.8820	26.1077
River		15.4982	15.2517	30.7499
Shrine and temple			0.6530	0.6530
Total	6,089.0179	309.1715	793.8248	7,192.0142

Source: Luchu Township Government 1995, 347.

This area was renamed from Nankan to Luchu in the Japanese colonial period. Total area in 1938 was 7,192.0142 *Chia* (7,415.08 hectare), including 4,073.8902 *Chia* (4200.25 hectare) of paddy field; 688.3852 *Chia* (709.74 hectare) of dry farmland; 1,408.2612 *Chia* (1,451.94 hectare) of forest, and etc (Table 11). In 1952, total area of private farming land of Luchu township was 4,628 hectare (Table 12). Most of the paddy land in Luchu was two-crop farmland. It should be noted that 63% of those farmland was cultivated by tenants. In the "37.5% Farm Rent Reduction Program" in 1949, landlords and tenants were mandatory to sign contracts in order to protect the tenants' rights. There were 2,420 contracts signed, which including 2,054 household of tenant, and 1,280 household of landlord. Since the total household of Luchu in 1949 was 3,868, the tenant households occupied 53% of the whole Luchu households at that year (Luchu Township Government 1995, 331). This rate should be a little higher since many landlords was afraid of losing their land and decided to terminate their rental relations with the tenants just before the implementation of land reform programs. In addition, landlords were not necessary reside in the Luchu township. Some absentee landlords dwelt at the city of Taipei and designated kuan-shih, agent of patent holders, to collect rent for them.

Table 15: Areas of private farming land and Units of land of Luchu township Unit: ha

Years		1952	1953	1954	1955		
Total	Area	Subtotal	4,627.9755	4,627.9755	4,627.9755	4,627.9755	
		Paddy land	4,009.4735	4,009.4735	4,009.4735	4,009.4735	
		Dry land	618.5020	618.5020	618.5020	618.5020	
	Units of land	Subtotal	11,256	11,256	11,256	11,256	
		Paddy land	9,475	9,475	9,475	9,475	
		Dry land	1,781	1,781	1,781	1,781	
Self-farming	Area	Subtotal	1,362.6799	1,362.6799	1,362.6799	1,362.6799	
		Paddy land	900.5488	900.5488	900.5488	900.5488	
		Dry land	462.1341	462.1341	462.1341	462.1341	
	Units of land	Subtotal	4,538	4,538	4,538	4,538	
		Paddy land	3,223	3,223	3,223	3,223	
		Dry land	1,315	1,315	1,315	1,315	
Lease	Area	Subtotal	2,494.5192	2,494.5192	2,494.5192	2,494.5192	
		Paddy land	2,376.1549	2,376.1549	2,376.1549	2,376.1549	
		Dry land	118,3613	118,3613	118,3613	118,3613	
	Units of land	Subtotal	6,095	6,095	6,095	6,095	
		Paddy land	5,654	5,654	5,654	5,654	
		Dry land	441	441	441	441	
Self-farming and lease	Area	Total	Subtotal	770.7764	770.7764	770.7764	770.7764
			Paddy	732.7728	732.7728	732.7728	732.7728
			Dry	38.0036	38.0036	38.0036	38.0036
		Self-farming	Subtotal	333.3799	333.3799	333.3799	333.3799
			Paddy	314.3707	314.3707	314.3707	314.3707
			Dry	19.0092	19.0092	19.0092	19.0092
		Lease	Subtotal	437.3965	437.3965	437.3965	437.3965
			Paddy	418.4021	418.4021	418.4021	418.4021
			Dry	18.9944	18.9944	18.9944	18.9944
	Parcels of land	Subtotal	623	623	623	623	
		Paddy	598	598	598	598	
		Dry	25	25	25	25	

Source: Luchu Township Government 1995, 347.

Class Domination, Cultural Hegemony, and Passive Quiescence

The class differentiation in Luchu township between landlords and tenants before

land reform was clear. In the interviews, many interviewees have indicated the hardship of tenants and the rich and powerful of landlords. Mr. Yu, Chairman of the Committee of Tenancy of the Luchu township, said that “landlords requested more than half of rice harvest per year, and they asked 70% of the rent in the first harvest and 30 % in the second harvest (#1).” Normally, the landlords asked around 40 to 45 Tann of rice harvest, and rice production was approximately 35-40 Tann per harvest. Therefore, the landlords received a great amount of rice per year and, on the contrary, the tenants were short of rice in and after April of next year. What they could eat was pickled vegetables. In addition to the high rent, the landlords also asked a great amount of security deposit. The amount of deposit is variance. Mr. Hsu said the amount was one hundred yen per *Chia* (#5). This price was approximately equal to 30 Tann of rice at that time. Since the harvest of rice was around 40 Tann per harvest, security deposit then almost equal to three-fourth of one rice harvest. How could tenants afford this amount of money? Many interviewees said that the tenants often had to borrow money from their relatives and friends in order to pay the deposit.

Some absentee landlords hired local residents as representatives to handle the lease of farmland and to collect rent. Mr. Lin said that “tenants must try their best to bribe those representatives; otherwise, the amount of rent could be raised (# 2).” Some other cases were that a few landlords leased their land to the head of tenants and delegated him the power to recruit tenants for farming. Therefore, in addition to the rent hand over to the landlords, those tenants also must give some commission to the head of tenants. Mr. Lin also indicated that the commission was around one Tann or two Tann of rice (# 2). Sometimes, tenants also must do some housework for the landlords. For example, when the landlords wanted to fix or remodel their homes, they would ask the tenants go to his home and inquired for suggestions. The real goal for the landlords was to ask the tenants to help. Mr. Su said that the tenants then would reply by that “asking the carpenter come, we will assist him.” There was no payment for the tenants when the job was done. What they received for their extra works was only some simple meals. In addition, Mr. Su said that if the tenants had beautiful daughter, the landlords probably would ask her to be his concubine. He therefore said that “there was not human right for the women, they were just like the merchandise, which could be sold at that time.” Mr. Su also told an old joke, which was that the landlords gave chicks for the tenants to feed and asked the adult chickens back. Mr. Su therefore said that the landlords were situated high above the tenants (# 10).

The leased contract was very unstable since the landlords could easily nullify it.

Most of the leases were based on oral contracts, and the content of the contract was very ambiguous. The time period of the lease tends to be short. Many interviewees indicated that August 15 of the lunar calendar every year was an important day for the tenants. The tenants could not farm the leased land for the next year if the landlords returned security deposit to tenants before that day. Mr. Yu said that some landlords were short of conscience, and they would cancel the contract whenever the tenants did not pay in full of their rent. The original tenants might be kicked out if some other peasants would like to pay higher rent to the landlords (# 1). In his memory, Mr. Lin said that the whole family of the tenants cried badly when they knew that they could not stay in the same place. The tenants then asked their relatives and friends for information about where else they could lease the farmland. Some tenants were therefore found to move to far away place (# 2). Mr. Yu said that the competition among peasants was very heated because peasants would like to add some rent in order to farm the productive farmland.

Had tenants ever tried to protest against the landlords? The interviewees all replied by "no." Mr. Yu said that if the tenants ever protest, they then could not cultivate the leased land any more (# 1). Mr. Huang said the tenants dared not to criticize the landlords, and there were no protests in the old days (# 3). Mr. Lin said that it was because the colonial government had strictly control of Taiwan's society and people were all very docile (# 2). The other Mr. Lee, who heard something about the Farmers' Cooperative Organization, said that the protesters would put into jail immediately if they had some disputes with the landlords because the colonial government stood together with the landlords. Why? Mr. Lee said that it was because the landlords paid tax to the government, and the colonial government preferred to protect the landlords (# 9). In addition, the tenants must receive some references in order to rent a parcel of land. The landlords' friends or relatives gave their references and the connections were built between the tenants and the landlords. The connections would be deteriorated or terminated if the tenants protest again the landlords (# 2).

Not only because of the powerless of the tenants but also because of cultural hegemony caused the inaction of the tenants. Even though the tenants were seemingly seriously exploited some interviewees said that there were some landlords who were very nice to the tenants. These landlords would agree the tenants' postponement of part of the rent because of natural disaster. Mr. Su said that his father asked him to be thoughtful to their landlords because the landlords would reduce a little rental fee (1 or 2 Tann of rice) whenever natural disasters took place.

In this case, the tenants must beg very hard for the landlords' forgiveness (# 10). Mr. Su also said that his father told him the relation between landlord and tenant was like the father and son (#16). Mr. Lin said that the tenants were all kind-hearted and they totally did not have the idea of protest when the landlords decided to raise the rent (# 7). Why the tenants were so nice and were willing to bear the hardship? Historical reasons probably might explain it. The tenancy system in Taiwan had been established for more than two hundred years and peasants were very accustomed to it. The class differentiation and exploitation among tenants and landlords were accepted. In addition, it seemingly that most of the landlords did not violate what Scott has maintained --- the "subsistence ethic." The transformation from the precapitalist sociocultural order to the colonialism and capitalism in Taiwan did not breakdown the norm of "subsistence ethic." Even though the live of tenants was very difficult they could still survive if they worked very hard.

In addition, the "Japanese spirit" could partly explain it, which meant that people not only abode by the law but also worked very industrious and frugal (Lee 1998). The colonial government had strictly controlled of Taiwan's society in the 1930s and especially, in the period of the World War II. Agricultural production and other important materials should all surrender to the government, which allocated them to the society. However, peasants usually would secretly keep some amount for their consumption. Whenever food was not sufficient for distribution, policemen would summon peasants to the police stations and used force to ask them to submit grains. People were therefore very afraid of policemen and the government and they would like to abide the colonial laws. However, Mr. Tsai said that the judicial system in the colonial period was fair and people were willing to obey it (# 10). To accept the law became an unquestionable principle and ideology in that era even though the laws were inclined to the landlords. Even today, some of the old generation in Taiwan was still very proud of their Japanese spirit.

The class domination and cultural hegemony caused the quiescence of the peasants in Luchu. The tenants did not even have the feeling of discontent to against the landlords. Supported by the colonial government, the landlords could easily receive a great amount of rent. No disputes between tenants and landlords had been heard for the interviewees of this research. The landlords possessed full power to decide the leased contract. In a society which agriculture was the major economic activities Luchu could be said to be controlled by the landlords in one sense.

Conclusion

Three dimensions of power argued by Lukes and Gaventa might explain the quiescence of the tenants in Luchu. Tenants were definitely not free to participate in the public decision-making since they were controlled by the second and third dimensions of power. Class domination in the second dimension of power further induced cultural hegemony and ideological influence, which caused the docile of the tenants. They recognized their social position as normal and did not have the feeling of grievances. As Gaventa indicates, power relation between the tenants and landlords (or between the powerlessness and the power) could be viewed as "interrelated and accumulative in nature," and "each dimension serves to re-enforce the strength of the other (22)". The quiescence of the tenants or the powerful of the landlords was a long time process of power operation in the Taiwan's history, and it could not be changed within a short period of time.

According to statistics, there were around 17,000 cases that tenants did willing to abandon their cultivated right and to return the leased land to their landlords. The government usually explained it by the threat and bribe from the landlords to their landlords. In addition, the government also accused the tenants because of their lack of education (Wang & Chang 1955, 160-1). However, the research found that some tenants were willing to return the leased land to their landlords because they believed that those lands should be belonged to their landlords even though they had signed leased contracts with their landlords (# 13, 16, 17, 20). Therefore, the tenants' behavior to return the leased land to their landlords between 1950 and 1951 could be explained through the hegemony of landlords.

In addition to the peasants' movements emerged in the late 1920s, it was difficult to find peasants' protest before the implementation of land reform policy. Agrarian unrest was almost unheard for the interviewees. Discontents from the domestic social origin could not be confirmed in the interview. Taiwan's tenants seemingly played conservative roles in the formation of land reform policy. The subsistence ethic seemingly had not been violated even the transformation from the precapitalist society to the colonial and capitalist society in Taiwan. Class-consciousness was not built either. The authoritarian control both of the colonial government and of the KMT state also played an important role to prevent the emergence of peasants' movements. However, the inequality between landlords and tenants supplied a good operating field for the KMT government to fulfill its land reform programs. In addition, the landlords did not have other choices but to cooperate with the KMT

government because of the intimidation from communist revolution in China. The implementation of land reform in one sense was to deter the communist's revolution. Above all, the authoritarian state, compliant landlords, and conservative tenants did consist of the successful story of land reform in Taiwan.

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