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一. 哲學英文:

1, 請盡可能以直譯的方式中譯以下段落: (25%)

But if the mere fact that I can produce from my thought the idea of something entails that everything which I clearly and distinctly perceive to belong to that thing really does belong to it, is not this a possible basis for another argument to prove the existence of God? Certainly, the idea of God, or a supremely perfect being, is one which I find within me just as surely as the idea of any shape or number. And my understanding that it belongs to his nature that he always exists is no less clear and distinct than is the case when I prove of any shape or number that some property belongs to its nature. Hence, even if it turned out that not everything on which I have meditated in these past days is true, I ought still to regard the existence of God as having at least the same level of certainty as I have hitherto attributed to the truths of mathematics.

At first sight, however, this is not transparently clear, but has some appearance of being a sophism. Since I have been accustomed to distinguish between existence and essence in everything else, I find it easy to persuade myself that existence can also be separated from the essence of God, and hence that God can be thought of as not existing. But when I concentrate more carefully, it is quite evident that existence can no more be separated from the essence of God than the fact that its three angles equal two right angles can be separated from the essence of a triangle, or than the idea of a mountain can be separated from the idea of a valley. Hence it is just as much of a contradiction to think of God (that is, a supremely perfect being) lacking existence (that is, lacking a perfection), as it is to think of a mountain without a valley. (From: *Descartes: Selected Philosophical Writings*, Translated by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch, Cambridge, U.K. ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 1988)

2, 請以中文陳述以下段落中的主要論點。(25%)

[The motive of duty]

I will here pass over all actions already recognized as contrary to duty, however useful they may be with a view to this or that end; for about these the question does not even arise whether they could have been done *for the sake of duty* inasmuch as they are directly opposed to it. I will also set aside actions which in fact accord with duty, yet for which men have *no immediate inclination*, but perform them because impelled to do so by some other inclination. For there it is easy to decide whether the action which accords with duty has been done *from duty* or from some purpose of self-interest. This distinction is far more difficult to perceive when the action accords with duty and the subject has in addition an *immediate inclination* to the action. For example, it certainly accords with duty that a grocer should not overcharge his inexperienced customer; and where there is much competition a sensible shopkeeper refrains from so doing and keeps to a fixed and general price for everybody so that a child can buy from him just as well as anyone else. Thus people are served *honestly*; but this is not nearly enough to justify us in believing that the shopkeeper has acted in this way from duty or from principles of fair dealing; his interests

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required him to do so. We cannot assume him to have in addition an immediate inclination towards his customers, leading him, as it were out of love, to give no man preference over another in the matter of price. Thus the action was done neither from duty nor from immediate inclination, but solely from purposes of self-interest.

On the other hand, to preserve one's life is a duty, and besides this every one has also an immediate inclination to do so. But on account of this the often anxious precautions taken by the greater part of mankind for this purpose have no inner worth, and the maxim of their action is without moral content. They do protect their lives *in conformity with duty*, but not *from the motive of duty*. When on the contrary, disappointments and hopeless misery have quite taken away the taste for life; when a wretched man, strong in soul and more angered at his fate than fainted-hearted or cast down, longs for death and still preserves his life without loving it—not from inclination or fear but from duty; then indeed his maxim has a moral content.

To help others where one can is a duty, and besides this there are many spirits of so sympathetic a temper that, without any further motive of vanity or self-interest, they find an inner pleasure in spreading happiness around them and can take delight in the contentment of others as their own work. Yet I maintain that in such a case an action of this kind, however right and however amiable it may be, has still no genuinely moral worth. It stands on the same footing as other inclinations—for example, the inclination for honour, which if fortunate enough to hit on something beneficial and right and consequently honourable, deserves praise and encouragement, but not esteem; for its maxim lacks moral content, namely, the performance of such actions, not from inclination, but *from duty*. Suppose then that the mind of this friend of man were overclouded by sorrows of his own which extinguished all sympathy with the fate of others, but that he still had power to help those in distress, though no longer stirred by the need of others because sufficiently occupied with his own; and suppose that, when no longer moved by any inclination, he tears himself out of this deadly insensibility and does the action without any inclination for the sake of duty alone; then for the first time his action has its genuine moral worth. Still further: if nature had implanted little sympathy in this or that man's heart; if (being in other respects an honest fellow) he were cold in temperament and indifferent to the sufferings of others—perhaps because, being endowed with the special gift of patience and robust endurance in his own sufferings, he assumed the like in others or even demanded it; if such a man (who would in truth not be the worst product of nature) were not exactly fashioned by her to be a philanthropist, would he not still find in himself a source from which he might draw a worth far higher than any that a good-natured temperament can have? Assuredly he would. It is precisely in this that the worth of character begins to show—a moral worth and beyond all comparison the highest—namely, that he does good, not from inclination, but from duty.

To assure one's own happiness is a duty (at least indirectly); for discontent with one's state, in a press of cares and amidst unsatisfied wants, might easily become a *great temptation to the transgression of duty*. But here also, apart from regard to duty, all men have already of themselves the strongest and deepest inclination towards happiness, because precisely in this Idea of happiness all inclinations are combined into a sum total. The prescription for happiness is, however, often so constituted as greatly to interfere with some inclinations, and yet

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men cannot form under the name of 'happiness' any determinate and assured conception of the satisfaction of all inclinations as a sum. Hence it is not to be wondered at that a single inclination which is determinate as to what it promises and as to the time of its satisfaction may outweigh a wavering Idea; and that a man, for example, a sufferer from gout, may choose to enjoy what he fancies and put up with what he can—on the ground that on balance he has here at least not killed the enjoyment of the present moment because of some possibly groundless expectations of the good fortune supposed to attach to soundness of health. But in this case also, when the universal inclination towards happiness has failed to determine his will, when good health, at least for him, has not entered into his calculations as so necessary, what remains over, here as in other cases, is a law—the law of furthering his happiness, not from inclination, but from duty; and in this for the first time his conduct has a real moral worth.

It is doubtless in this sense that we should understand too the passages from Scripture in which we are commanded to love our neighbour and even our enemy. For love out of inclination cannot be commanded; but kindness done from duty—although no inclination impels us, and even although natural and unconquerable disinclination stands in our way—is *practical*, and not *pathological*, love, residing in the will and not in the propensions of feeling, in principles of action and not of melting compassion; and it is this practical love alone which can be an object of command. (From: Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals*, Translated by H.J. Paton, New York, Harper Torchbook, 1964) (斜體字為原作者所加)

二、哲學中文：

1. 請說明僧肇如何在以下段落中論證「物不遷」。(25%)

夫人之所謂動者。以昔物不至今。故曰動而非靜。我之所謂靜者。亦以昔物不至今。故曰靜而非動。動而非靜。以其不來。靜而非動。以其不去。然則所造未嘗異。所見未嘗同。逆之所謂塞。順之所謂通。苟得其道。復何滯哉。傷夫人情之惑也久矣。目對真而莫覺。既知往物而不來。而謂今物而可往。往物既不來。今物何所往。何則。求向物於向。於向未嘗[案：同嘗]無。責向物於今。於今未嘗[案：同嘗]有。於今未嘗有。以明物不來。於向未嘗[案：同嘗]無。故知物不去。覆而求今。今亦不往。是謂昔物自在昔。不從今以至昔。今物自在今。不從昔以至今。

(摘錄自：僧肇，《肇論》，〈物不遷論〉。註：此段落的標點符號未必正確，僅供參考。)

2. 宋儒周敦頤著有《太極圖說》一文。針對此文，有兩位古代學者分別詮釋其中太極的動與靜。請你扣緊以下兩種詮釋的原文，討論詮釋A與詮釋B之間是否存在差異？如果有，則兩者間的主要差異為何？(註：此段落的標點符號未必正確，僅供參考。)(25%)

周敦頤《太極圖說》全文如下：

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無極而太極。太極動而生陽；動極而靜，靜而生陰。靜極復動。一動一靜，互為其根。分陰分陽，兩儀立焉。陽變陰合，而生水火木金土，五氣順布，四時行焉。五行一陰陽也，陰陽一太極也，太極本無極也。五行之生也，各一其性。無極之真，二五之精，妙合而凝。乾道成男，坤道成女。二氣交感，化生萬物，萬物生生而變化無窮焉。惟人也得其秀而最靈。形既生矣，神發知矣，五性感動而善惡分，萬事出矣。聖人定之以中正仁義，而主靜，立人極焉。故聖人與天地合其德，日月合其明，四時合其序，鬼神合其吉凶。君子修之吉，小人悖之凶。故曰：「立天之道，曰陰與陽。立地之道，曰柔與剛。立人之道，曰仁與義。」又曰：「原始反終，故知死生之說。」大哉易也，斯其至矣！

詮釋 A:

太極之有動靜，是天命之流行也，所謂「一陰一陽之謂道」。誠者，聖人之本，物之終始，而命之道也。其動也，誠之通也，繼之者善，萬物之所資以始也；其靜也，誠之復也，成之者性，萬物各正其性命也。動極而靜，靜極復動，一動一靜，互為其根，命之所以流行而不已也；動而生陽，靜而生陰，分陰分陽，兩儀立焉，分之所以一定而不移也。蓋太極者，本然之妙也；動靜者，所乘之機也。太極，形而上之道也；陰陽，形而下之器也。是以自其著者而觀之，則動靜不同時，陰陽不同位，而太極無不在焉。自其微者而觀之，則沖漠無朕，而動靜陰陽之理，已悉具於其中矣。雖然，推之於前，而不見其始之合；引之於後，而不見其終之離也。故程子曰：「動靜無端，陰陽無始。」非知道者，孰能識之。

詮釋 B:

有無混一者，可見謂之有，不可見遂謂之無，其實動靜有時，而陰陽常在，有無無異也。誤解太極圖說者，謂太極本未有陰陽，因動而始生陽，靜而始生陰，不知動靜所生之陰陽，為寒暑潤燥男女之情質，乃固有之蘊，其網緼充滿在動靜之先，動靜者即此陰陽之動靜，動則陰變於陽，靜則陽凝于陰，一震巽坎離艮兌之生於乾坤也。非動而後有陽，靜而後有陰，本無二氣，由動靜而生，如老氏之說也。

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1. 試考慮下列主張：

如果決定論是真的，亦即：如果所有事件都遵循不變的法則，那麼我的意志也總是被我的內在性格和我的動機所決定。因此我的種種決定都是必然的而不是自由的。但如果是這樣的話，我對我的行為就不負有責任，因為只有當我能夠對我的種種決定的方向有所作為的時候，我才會對它們負有責任。但既然它們必然的源自我的性格和動機，我就對之無能為力。而且，我既沒有造就它們，也對它們沒有控制力：動機來自外部，而我的性格則是在我的生命過程中都一直在起作用的內在傾向和外部影響的必然產物。因此，決定論和道德責任是不相容的。道德責任預設了自由，亦即對必然性的擺脫。

上述推論過程可能是由一系列環環相扣的混淆所構成的。請指出這些可能的混淆，並消除它們。(25%)

2. 西方哲學中有多種解決身心問題 (mind-body problem) 的主張，例如身心互動論 (interactionism)、副現象論 (epiphenomenalism)、唯物論 (materialism)、唯心論 (idealism)、平行論 (parallelism) 以及機緣論 (occasionalism) 等。請分別說明這些理論的內容及理論上的困難。(25%)

3. 根據現象論 (phenomenalism)，對於外在世界 (external world) 或物體 (physical objects) 的敘述語句都可以轉換為對於感覺材料 (sense-data) 的敘述語句：

(i) 請問現象論上述轉換的工作會遭遇什麼困難？(12%)

(ii) 現象論的上述主張能否解決懷疑論 (skepticism) 對外在世界存在的懷疑呢？請試著站在懷疑論的立場，對現象論的上述主張提出質疑。(13%)

4. (1) 請說明亨培爾 (Carl Hempel) 的「烏鴉悖論」(the paradox of the Ravens) 及亨培爾自己的解決方法。(8%)

(2) 古德曼 (Nelson Goodman) 曾提出「grue 悖論」(the paradox of "grue")。「grue 悖論」的內容如下：

X 是 grue 色的，當且僅當：a. X 在公元 3000 年前是綠色的

(或：X 是綠色的，而且已被檢驗出是綠色的)，或是

b. X 在公元 3000 年後是藍色的

(或：X 是藍色的，可是尚未被檢驗出是藍色的)

(i) 請說明「grue 悖論」為何會被稱為 the new riddle of induction 的理由；(7%)

(ii) 下列是對於「grue 悖論」其中一種直覺上的解決方法：

只有當語句的述詞不是「時態述詞」(temporal predicate，即使用上受到時間限制的述詞)，這種語句才能是「像定律般」(lawlike) 的語句，也因此，這種語句用在 induction 中才不會產生問題。由此觀之，在「X 是綠的」或「X 是藍的」中，由於「綠」、「藍」不是「時態述詞」，因此這種語句用在 induction 中不會產生問題；相較之下，在「X 是 grue 色」中，由於 grue 是「時態述詞」，因此才會產生「grue 悖論」。

請問這種解法有何理論上的困難？(10%)

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(申論題每大題 25 分，注意時間分配，寫題號後直接分段回答，不必抄題目。)

- 一、關於「什麼是仁？」在《論語》一書中，孔子提供了各種不同的答案，如有時說是「愛人」，有時說是「克己復禮」，有時則以「己欲立而立人，己欲達而達人」為「仁」，或由「心」之「安不安」來說「仁」。依你的了解，孔子究竟是如何了解仁的？(8分) 他所了解的「仁」具備什麼特色？(4分) 「仁」與其他的德，如禮、智、恭、孝等的關係如何？(5分) 程明道〈識仁篇〉說：「醫書言手足痿痺為不仁，此言最善名狀。」表示由「痿痺麻木之為不仁」最足以表示「仁」之實義。你認為這說法是否和孔子所了解的「仁」相契應？(8分)
- 二、老子的「道」、「無」、「有」、和「玄」當如何了解？(12分)「道」又如何「生萬物」？(5分) 魏晉時代的道家人物所了解的「道」和老子的了解有無距離？舉一家為例加以說明。(8分)
- 三、哲學系畢業的學生不能不知道「我思故我在」這句名言，是法國哲學家笛卡爾說的，請問：
 1. 他是在怎樣情況下說出這句話的？結果這個自身十分清晰明白的觀念，是否就足以建立起理性主義的整個知識體系？
 2. 康德後來因為深受到經驗主義的懷疑態度衝擊，又是如何在所謂「哥白尼轉向」下重新調整，開啓批判哲學之路的？
- 四、請對下列三項問題作答：
 1. 請以「共相」(Universals) 問題敘述中世紀的唯名論 (nominalism) 與唯實論 (realism) 之爭，其與古代形上學存有思考的關聯。
 2. 簡要說明唯實論者 (realist)、心智概念論者 (conceptualist)、與唯名論 (nominalist) 對知識與存有問題，各有怎樣不同的見解。
 3. 何謂「奧坎的剃刀」(Ockham's Razor)？這對近代科學方法論的思考有何影響？