

科技部補助專題研究計畫成果報告 期末報告

南進！中國海上絲路及其與印度在南亞之戰略競賽

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計畫主持人：丁樹範
共同主持人：吳玲君

中華民國 105 年 10 月 17 日

中文摘要：作為中國戰略願景的一部分，由習近平領導的北京當局強調一個橫跨、涵蓋印度洋沿岸貿易中心的大海上絲路的重要性，這樣的戰略部署同時鑲嵌於其強勢的地緣政治、經濟背景之中。而這樣一個大海上絲路支配性結構的建立，也開始對印度構成挑戰，對於這個印度洋區域中最具戰略地位的國家。

大海上絲路的計畫，證實了長期處於地緣政治邊緣的南亞地區，正目擊一場可能改變區域戰略格局的競賽，如果冷戰時期的特色，是強權們對於南亞區域仁慈的忽視，當代的南亞區域的重要性則在亞洲、世界均逐漸加重。南亞區域下中國-印度日益強化的競爭關係，對於印度是一個重要的潛在消息，即是其可能在中國主導的地緣勢力中被邊緣化。中國『西進』策略的整併，幾乎與印度的『東向』策略衝突，且埋藏於雙方言辭的不確定性與模糊對雙邊均產生了嚴重的不安全感。

南亞安全的意象長期受到印度與巴基斯坦間的二元對立所宰制，而從1998年次大陸的核子試驗後開始有所進化，印度在連接安全架構與區域共識上有了更多的彈性，同時此區域開啟了來自中國的更多的誘因，戰略與經濟意義上的。這個計畫認為，由於地緣關係的因素，一個戰略上的悖論持續存在於印度作為南亞區域的核心支柱與強權的狀況下；而中國在此時快速侵入此區域，而期望在此過程中尋求打破印度的平衡而尋找新的支點。本研究將深入探討阿富汗與斯理蘭卡兩個案，這兩個案中可發現印度的影響力明顯的在中國影響力擴張的情況下下滑。

這個研究計畫的主要論點在於，藉由批判性論述分析的框架，定位中國-印度在大海上絲路這個支配性結構下的南亞競爭關係，並細緻化多重變數與決定性因素對此競爭關係的影響。

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This project argues that for long a marginal sphere in geopolitics, South Asia is now witnessing the beginnings of a rivalry that are altering the strategic landscape of the region. If the cold war years were marked by a benign neglect of South Asia by the 'superpowers' the current century is increasingly highlighting the centrality of the

region not only to Asia, but also the world beyond. The growing rivalry between China and India in the region has a powerful underlying message for India – it risks being marginalized within its own geographical sphere of dominance by China. China’s strategy of ‘Go West’ merges and almost clashes with India’s ‘Look East’ strategy and the uncertainties and ambiguities buried in the rhetoric on both sides generates ample insecurities.

The image of South Asian security has for long been dominated by the dyadic rivalry between India and Pakistan. Events in the sub-continent since the nuclear tests of 1998 have evolved in such a manner that India finds more flexibility in articulating a security framework that resonates more beyond the region, while the region opens up to inducements – strategic and economic – from China. This project argues that a strategic paradox exists in South Asia with India remaining the central pillar and regional superpower – owing more to geography – while China is fast making inroads into the region, hoping to off-balance India in the process and emerge as the new fulcrum. Two examples to be studied in detail are Afghanistan and Sri Lanka where a visible deterioration of India’s influence has been more than compensated by China’s expanding clout.

This project situates the arguments made by subscribing to a critical discourse analysis to locate the China-India rivalry in South Asia under the overarching frame of the Great Maritime Silk Road initiative to detail the multiple variables and determinants shaping this rivalry.

英文關鍵詞：Maritime Silk Road, Strategic competition, Critical Discourse Analysis,

科技部補助專題研究計畫成果報告

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科技部補助專題研究計畫成果自評表

請就研究內容與原計畫相符程度、達成預期目標情況、研究成果之學術或應用價值（簡要敘述成果所代表之意義、價值、影響或進一步發展之可能性）、是否適合在學術期刊發表或申請專利、主要發現（簡要敘述成果是否具有政策應用參考價值及具影響公共利益之重大發現）或其他有關價值等，作一綜合評估。

1. 請就研究內容與原計畫相符程度、達成預期目標情況作一綜合評估

X 未達成目標（請說明，以 100 字為限）

- 實驗失敗
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- 其他原因

說明：需要更多時間才能真正完成，且無法到巴基斯坦，和阿富汗訪問。

2. 研究成果在學術期刊發表或申請專利等情形(請於其他欄註明專利及技轉之證號、合約、申請及洽談等詳細資訊)

論文：已發表未發表之文稿 撰寫中 無

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本研究主要探討：在中國的一帶一路政策下，印度的反應。本研究以斯里蘭卡，巴基斯坦，和阿富汗為例。這三國從陸上和海上和印度為鄰，中國大陸和這三國的互動勢將影響印度。更何況，印度視自己為印度洋的霸權，中國的介入可能改變印度洋的權力結構。這也涉及在全球層次下，中國崛起如何影響國際權力結構。在南亞次大陸和印度洋，我們也可以做類似的觀察，從而在國際關係領域，特別是權力轉換和權力過渡(power transition)做出學術上的研究貢獻。

4. 主要發現

本研究具有政策應用參考價值：否 是，建議提供機關_____

(勾選「是」者，請列舉建議可提供施政參考之業務主管機關)

本研究具影響公共利益之重大發現：否 是

說明：(以 150 字為限)

(一) 計畫中文摘要和關鍵詞

摘要

作為中國戰略願景的一部分，由習近平領導的北京當局強調一個橫跨、涵蓋印度洋沿岸貿易中心的大海上絲路的重要性，這樣的戰略部署同時鑲嵌於其強勢的地緣政治、經濟背景之中。而這樣一個大海上絲路支配性結構的建立，也開始對印度構成挑戰，對於這個印度洋區域中最具戰略地位的國家。

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ABSTRACT

As part of its strategic vision, the leadership in Beijing led by Xi Jinping has emphasized the salience of a great maritime silk route straddling maritime entrepot regions comprising the Indian Ocean littoral. This strategic initiative has embedded within it strong features of geopolitics and geo-economics. The establishment of an overarching structure facilitating the great maritime silk route at the outset poses

challenges to India – the most strategically placed country in the Indian Ocean Region.

This project argues that for long a marginal sphere in geopolitics, South Asia is now witnessing the beginnings of a rivalry that are altering the strategic landscape of the region. If the cold war years were marked by a benign neglect of South Asia by the ‘superpowers’ the current century is increasingly highlighting the centrality of the region not only to Asia, but also the world beyond. The growing rivalry between China and India in the region has a powerful underlying message for India - it risks being marginalized within its own geographical sphere of dominance by China. China’s strategy of ‘Go West’ merges and almost clashes with India’s ‘Look East’ strategy and the uncertainties and ambiguities buried in the rhetoric on both sides generates ample insecurities.

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Report

Foreword

Parallel to its overland initiatives in promoting diversified new age silk routes, the leadership in Beijing led by Xi Jinping as part of its strategic vision, has emphasized the salience of a great maritime silk route¹ straddling maritime entrepot regions comprising the Indian Ocean littoral. In its 21st century version, the Great Maritime Silk Road is a geo-economic and geo-political initiative by a resurging China aiming to advance its national interests and invoking a peaceful milieu for establishing the same.

Being a vast region of around 7.3 million sq. kms this littoral comprises countries along the Andaman Sea, the Bay of Bengal, the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf apart from the eastern coastline of Africa. A proposed maritime silk route in the India Ocean littoral countries like Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives and Pakistan would not only include the construction of infrastructure to facilitate oceanic trade but also provide strategic ingress into a region that hitherto has the geographical stamp of India – long considered a rival to China in matters strategic especially in the Indian Ocean region.

The proposed research seeks to investigate the strategic rationale and implementation of China's Great Maritime Silk Road and the strategic competition it has encouraged between China and India – Asia's largest countries. To understand the impact the Great Maritime Silk Road would have on India, one has to delve deeper into the contexts and sub-texts of a region where India occupies the central axis.

For scholars of international relations and security studies, South Asia is perhaps the most complex geographical and geopolitical reality. No other region, in contemporary security, encompasses such a multiplicity of extant issues reflecting almost every conceivable security conundrum and worryingly, no other region remains as neglected from academic scrutiny and theoretical interrogation. Nuclear non-proliferation, terrorism, civil war, nationalism, ethnic separatism, religious fundamentalism, sectarianism, shoddy governance, stunted polities, impact of climate change etc. all make South Asia a fertile petri-dish where new problems emerge even before existing ones entirely reveal themselves. The lack of viable security frameworks knitting the region – in structural and discursive terms - and the absence of any multilateral initiatives from the region to address common economic and security issues are

glaring.

The vacuous attempts made by countries comprising South Asia in discussing security issues of common concern commence from perhaps the very arbitrary nature of the creation of states in this region by its former colonial overlord – Great Britain. South Asian elites identify the messy and violent creation of India and Pakistan in 1947 as a “trigger” for many problems haunting the region today. This however is a feint. It does not excuse the venality and reflexively distrustful leaderships comprising political/military/ bureaucratic elites of the states in the region from polarizing people and scheming newer intrigues to retain power and pelf.

Consequently, the people of South Asia have been effectively marginalized from comprehensively participating in global processes of change and technological development. It is a sad commentary on a region which development indices reveal to be a laggard in providing basic deliverables like education, health, access to water, roads and electricity. In other words, the 1.6 billion people of South Asia are prisoners of their region’s cartographic insecurities and sad hostages to bigotry, political insularity and the shockingly limited imagination of its vaunted polities.

The main thrust of the proposed project attempts to track a shift in the center of gravity in South Asian geopolitics – the growing importance of China to the region accompanied by a commensurate decline of India’s relative significance within the region. The vastness of the region makes it imperative to situate ‘locales’ and explain hypotheses motivating the proposed project. To substantiate the arguments, I have chosen Sri Lanka and Afghanistan as countries in South Asia where China’s influence has increased comprehensively in a limited time frame, and one that comes at the expense of India, being gradually sidelined. There are several hypotheses around which this project revolves:

Primary hypothesis

To Beijing, it must appear that India presents the frame of being hostage to the very region it is located in with little room to maneuver. If the strategic goals of the Great Maritime Silk Road were to succeed, it would keep India strategically isolated in its own region and act as a brake to India’s highly advertised geopolitical ambitions. It is difficult, yet not impossible to partially subscribe to this line of reasoning.

Secondary hypothesis

China’s visible outflanking of India in South Asia has a strong geographical element

to it, analogous to two latitudinal lines, with one being continental and the other, maritime. Excluding India, countries with which China shares land borders in South Asia, have witnessed an incremental rise in China's interactions and investments. A maritime component to this is evolving with China quickly usurping India's central role *vis a vis* island countries like Sri Lanka and Maldives.

Tertiary hypothesis

Beijing's imprimatur in South Asia reflects its growing interest in the region as a commercial highway and potential resource base that will benefit China's "Go West" strategy – its next stage of internal economic development that will include its western and south-western provinces that abut South Asia.

Background

The escalation of insecurity and the potential of recurring civil war in Afghanistan – a potent factor bound to increase as the NATO winds up its role – worries New Delhi as it had focused its Afghan policy primarily in the person of former President Hamid Karzai, who in turn was supported largely by the erstwhile Northern Alliance made up of largely of Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazara's – the principal minority ethnicities most opposed to a return of the majority Pashtun Taliban. With the Afghan constitution barring Hamid Karzai from seeking a third term, the main focus of Afghanistan's presidential elections in April 2014 revolved around former foreign minister Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai, a well-regarded technocrat with experience of having served at the World Bank. However, should there be escalated levels of violence in Afghanistan coinciding with both, the NATO's withdrawal and the new president emphasizing his political legitimacy, accompanied by political shenanigans by the political elite, India dreads the prospect of witnessing a patently unfriendly regime in power that is openly supportive of Pakistan. By not investing in creating durable institutions that would make a political transition in Kabul a seamless transition, Afghanistan's political class faces a "Catch-22" situation.

India in Afghanistan

India's relations with Afghanistan are "strong, vibrant and multi-faceted" with a formalized Strategic Partnership agreement covering "political & security cooperation; trade & economic cooperation; capacity development and education; and social, cultural, civil society & people-to-people relations." The anchor of India-Afghanistan bilateral relations is the Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) signed by both the countries during Hamid Karzai's visit to India in October 2011. But for the interregnum, when the Taliban was in power in Kabul, India has maintained close and

friendly ties with Afghanistan – a feature revealed by the genuine interactions between people. In the years after the eclipse of Taliban power in Kabul, India’s developmental assistance program for Afghanistan is around USD 2 billion – making it the 5th largest bilateral donor. India’s assistance to Afghanistan in improving its infrastructure has been noteworthy and has remained low profile. Despite several terrorist attacks targeting the Indian embassy in Kabul and consulates in Jalalabad and Kandahar, India has committed itself to engaging with the new Afghanistan that emerged after the Taliban ‘deserted’ power in Kabul in November 2001.

India’s development assistance to Afghanistan has four overt objectives. First, to provide humanitarian succor to a nation that has borne the brunt of a fratricidal civil war and consequent ideological radicalization of its politics with deep and worryingly irreconcilable ethnic schisms. Second, the economic diplomacy being practiced by New Delhi is aimed at inducing its private and public sector to invest in Afghanistan, especially its resources. Third, in New Delhi's calculations a 'stable' Afghanistan will be the bulwark of trade and investment opportunities for India with resource rich Central Asia. Fourth, New Delhi feels that engaging Afghanistan through development assistance and targeted investment will encourage the evolution of a *democratic Afghanistan* (italics mine) that will be a counter-weight to spreading extremism in the region. This last objective – of channelizing its soft power capabilities to people friendly initiatives like education, community development and capacity building - is directed apart from generating Afghan goodwill for India, towards the alternative Pakistan stands for, playing host to the Taliban post 9/11 and in keeping Afghanistan weak and fragile and to prevent its nemesis, India, from gaining an upper hand in Kabul.

From India’s long list of projects in Afghanistan, the most imaginative and strategic was the Zaranj-Delaram road. India’s construction of the 218 kms Zaranj-Delaram road in western Afghanistan has the objective of linking up with the Iranian port of Chabahar freeing land-locked Afghanistan from being dependent on Pakistan and especially Karachi port for trade purposes. This route also gives India more flexibility in trading with Central Asia with Iran as ingress and negating Islamabad’s permanent veto on a transportation corridor from India to Central Asia through Pakistan. In the SPA signed by both the sides in 2011, the most important aspect related to political and security cooperation with the two sides agreeing to establish a strategic dialogue by their respective NSA’s and India agreeing to “assist, as mutually determined, in the training, equipping and capacity building programs for Afghan National Security Forces.” In strategic terms, India’s leverage in Afghanistan has shades of an ongoing

institutional construction taking place, to the detriment of Pakistan and its proxies.

Political and institutional cooperation apart, a few puzzling questions do arise related to India's equations with Afghanistan: *Are India's genuine efforts at establishing a presence in Afghanistan successful or are they going to unravel once NATO withdraws and a slide to anarchy begins? Does India have a back channel to the Pashtuns, since no political 'arrangement' in Kabul is complete without this numerically larger ethnic group? At a time when even the U.S./NATO has identified sections of the Taliban they ostensibly are fighting as worthy of diplomatic engagement, does India have a Plan B?*

It is to be expected that the new government in New Delhi led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) will continue India's engagement with the new government in Afghanistan. Not being engaged with Afghanistan would damage New Delhi's credibility amongst ordinary Afghans and create space for Islamabad to pursue its volatile agenda of instituting a fragile and unscrupulous power equation in Kabul.

China in Afghanistan:

It is interesting to note that China's increased attention towards South Asia came after the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in 1998, and events following 9/11 when the NATO established a bridgehead in Afghanistan to drive out the Taliban. The two countries share a 76 km long border with the only direct entry/exit point being the Wakhjir Pass located at the northeast end of Afghanistan's narrow Wakhan corridor.

Three conspicuous factors influence China's relations with Afghanistan:

One, the prospect of its western flank hosting an inimical coalition of armed forces in the form of the NATO even in much reduced numbers post-2014 – a prospect not very comforting to Beijing at any time;

Two, the possibility of Afghanistan and its chronic internal instability becoming a fertile ground for extremists from Xinjiang to exploit for recruitment and training, and,

Three, the potential of Afghanistan's natural resources in the form of minerals and rare earths inviting large Chinese investments appear to have motivated Beijing to increase its involvement with Afghanistan in a post-Taliban setting.

Unlike India and its rather altruistic aims in providing Afghanistan with development aid, China's investments in Afghanistan are visibly exclusive to the economic realm with ongoing projects involving billions of dollars. To quote Ahmed Rashid: "Over

the last twelve years it (China) has provided barely \$2 billion in economic aid to Afghanistan—less than what a much poorer India has provided with many more enlightened projects.”

Chinese investments are mostly focused in telecom and natural resources. Huawei and ZTE, two of China’s largest telecom equipment manufacturers have a major presence in Afghanistan with the local network, especially 3G, being dominated by these two Chinese SOEs. China’s largest energy SOE, the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) has three oil blocks in Sar-e-Pul province with an investment of around USD 400 million. These are Kashkari, Bazarkhami and Zamardusa in the Amu-Darya basin that complement CNPC’s energy projects southeastern Turkmenistan. Although small in scale, it could be reasoned that these are extensions of Chinese SOEs large investments made in Turkmenistan. Other Chinese investments include a steel smelter in Kabul as also the copper mines of Mes Aynak, Logar province, located south of Kabul, being developed by two Chinese concessionaires, the Metallurgical Company of China (MCC) and the Jiangxi Copper Corporation (JCC) since 2007. The investment forked out by the MCC and JCC is estimated to be around USD 4.4 billion. When fully developed the Mes Aynak copper mines will be the world’s second largest inclusive of a coal fired power plant and a railroad.

To Afghanistan, the ‘staying power’ of China and its investments is crucial, and this means beyond 2014 when a new government takes over in Kabul. The challenge China faces is to have a working arrangement with all stakeholders in Afghan politics and not play favorites, to ensure their interests are not harmed. This aspect of staying the course to ensure that its interests are not harmed has made China even reach out to the Taliban. China’s primary worry since the early 1990s has been the possibility of Uighur militants using Afghanistan as a base to set up training camps and of late the necessity to protect its investments. Periodic incidents of violence in Xinjiang and China’s misgivings regarding the training received by Uighur groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan remain and during foreign minister Wang Yi’s visit to Kabul in February 2014, China laid out its concerns regarding Afghanistan as follows: "The peace and stability of this country has an impact on the security of western China, and more importantly, it affects the tranquility and development of the entire region."

China’s concerns regarding the need for a stable Xinjiang goes beyond the Afghan government and involves other stakeholders. According to Andrew Small writing in the Foreign Policy, China is in touch with the Taliban. Undoubtedly, China (unlike

India) is hedging its bets regarding Afghanistan post 2014.

A counter argument is, the deeper China gets involved in Afghanistan, the more it will have to learn to fend off international criticism of dealing with regimes not exactly known to be norm adherents – an accusation it has faced before. Even the NATO has had to constantly defend itself against allegations of subsidizing the return of the Taliban, since container trucks carrying military materiel from Karachi port in Pakistan have to lumber up the Khyber pass before entering Afghanistan through a ‘lawless’ zone that has remained beyond the control of Islamabad and Kabul and one where the Taliban’s writ runs. It is apparent that in Afghanistan, the post-2014 scenario, and independent of the presidential election results in 2014, would involve multiple power centers competing for scarce resources. The mineral rich geography of the country is an inducement to countries willing to invest, but one that could quickly turn sour should events spiral out of control.

As a strategic opportunity, the drastic downscaling of NATO in Afghanistan presents China an invitation to engage Kabul deeply – a variable independent of Islamabad’s agenda to influence relations. The visit by Zhou Yongkang, a politburo member during Hu Jintao’s time (currently under arrest in Beijing for corruption!) and Beijing’s former security chief to Kabul in September 2012 was evidence of the importance Kabul holds for China’s leadership. Zhou’s visit also firmed up Beijing’s involvement in Afghanistan by the offer to train and equip a select number of Afghan police forces and Beijing. China’s preference in building stand-alone bilateral relations with its neighbors could be construed as Beijing not premising its relations with Kabul through Islamabad. China’s increasing economic stakes in Afghanistan and the feasibility of building a transport corridor to Xinjiang would in its calculations tighten its own grip over that restive province and choke off sustenance to disillusioned Uighurs who have been accused of staging terror attacks in cities across China including Urumqi, Beijing and Kunming. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) could emerge as a possible institutional framework for Beijing to address its security concerns over Afghanistan with Kabul being an ‘observer’ in the grouping seeking full membership.

India and China are not alone in their dilemma regarding Afghanistan post-2014. On 20 February 2013, Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister Cheng Guoping, Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev and former Indian National Security Adviser Shivshankar Menon held a meeting in Moscow to discuss the Afghan situation. As part of a trilateral dialogue, it was notable for not including Pakistan and other

stakeholders. The India, China, Russia confabulations on Afghanistan are cause for worry to Islamabad, since China, its “all-weather friend,” had for long outsourced to it Afghan policy and this development indicates a rethink. However to conclude this section, it will be delusional to imagine China and India collaborating or even cooperating in formulating a new policy towards Afghanistan, with the departure of NATO in 2014. The two countries do not trust each other, nor have forged deep institutional linkages in their bilateral relations, and expecting them to collude in arriving at a political solution in a third country is wishful thinking. Adding to the absence of any evidence of constructive cooperation between China and India on Afghanistan is the election of a new government in New Delhi led by the nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) that is in the process of settling down to government responsibilities in New Delhi. While Beijing has dealt with an earlier dispensation of the BJP in the form of premier Atal Bihari Vajpayee from 1998 to 2004, the new premier, Narendra Modi, has yet to articulate whether India’s foreign policy is going to see calibrated changes after ten years of the Congress led coalition headed by Manmohan Singh was voted out of office in May 2014. Suffice to say, Indian foreign policy is not known for its abrupt shifts with a change in government and Narendra Modi is expected to continue established policy lines especially with regard to neighboring countries. The challenge New Delhi faces is a new Chinese strategy designed to orient commercial and infrastructure projects with China as the fulcrum. Does this sideline New Delhi is a prime motivating question this project seeks to answer.

Sri Lanka – A ‘Rising’ China and a ‘Waning’ India?

Sri Lanka offers a classic case in understanding the depth, intensity and long-term commitment of China towards a country in South Asia other than Pakistan. China’s recent success in becoming indispensable to Sri Lanka comes with a substantial price for India – its marginalization as a strategic power in Sri Lanka’s worldview and priorities.

The victory over the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in May 2009 by the Sri Lankan government was a turning point in the country’s violent history of internal ethnic conflict and engagement with the outside world. The ‘scorched earth’ policy the Sri Lankan government adopted to eliminate the LTTE without fear of any recrimination from the global community was only possible due to the diplomatic and military assistance provided by countries like China and Pakistan. As a veto card holder at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), China was assiduously cultivated by the Sri Lankan leadership during the final and extremely violent last

phase of the ethnic conflict. India's assistance to Sri Lanka during the terminal phase of the ethnic conflict in 2009 was of a covert nature with Sri Lanka's navy benefiting from intelligence provided by India to identify, intercept and destroy boats smuggling weapons to the LTTE bases in the island's northeast. India's policy on supplying arms and equipment to the Sri Lankan army was constrained by two mutually reinforcing factors – strong domestic pressure from the state of Tamilnadu where sympathies with the plight of the minority Tamils in Sri Lanka was strong; and, the global embargo on selling arms to Sri Lanka adopted by western countries owing to repeated human rights violations. Caught between these two powerful factors, New Delhi's policy towards Colombo in the last phase of the civil war (2007-2009) was one of drift and dithering. China reaped the benefits of India's policy stalemate and emerged as Sri Lanka's largest investor and second largest trading partner in less than a decade. The Strategic Cooperative Partnership signed in May 2013 between the two countries is a pointer to a changed equation in the way the island conducts its relations with external powers. The Strategic partnership follows the 'China-Sri Lanka All-round Cooperation Partnership of Sincere Mutual Support and Ever-lasting Friendship' proclaimed in 2005.

The list of Chinese infrastructure investments in Sri Lanka are indeed of a scale that appear to defy logic making New Delhi envious. It has been estimated that from 2007 to 2011, China committed USD 2.13 billion in loans to Colombo. During Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa's visit to Beijing in May 2013 – his sixth – China is stated to have “offered a fresh \$2.2 billion loan for infrastructure projects, especially for the northern express highway connecting the central highlands city of Kandy with the northern town of Jaffna at the cost of \$1.5 billion.” Colombo's deep water port is now host to an International Container Terminal, built under a 35-year build-operate-agreement and to be run by China Merchants Holdings (International) with a USD 350 million loan from the China Development Bank. China is also funding the construction of a 350 meter tall multi-functional telecommunication tower and entertainment center called *Nelum Kuluna* (Lotus Tower) on the banks of the Beira lake in Colombo. Much has also been written about the port of Hambantota (initially offered to India for development!) that has been constructed by companies China Harbour Engineering Company and Sinohydro Corporation. Astride the busy commercial shipping lanes of the Indian Ocean, China's readiness to involve itself in the Hambantota project is motivated by the much quoted “String of Pearls” strategy and in a practical sense ensures that it has access to vital shipping lanes, from a port in a country willing to display a ‘client tendency.’ The first phase of this ambitious project was completed in 2010 and cost USD 360 million – 85 percent of which was

funded by China and the rest by the Sri Lanka Ports Authority. The second phase of the project is estimated to coast around USD 750 million, and when finally completed will become South Asia's largest port. China Harbour Engineering Company (in a first) also constructed the Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport costing USD 200 million in Hambantota.

In a move designed to invite an Indian response, Mahinda Rajapaksa in his May 2013 visit to Beijing also initiated discussions regarding the launching of a telecommunication satellite in partnership with China's Great Wall Industry Corporation at a cost of USD 320 million. The amount ploughed in by China in Sri Lanka and the very scale of the endeavor has left New Delhi floundering for an answer or response. Post-conflict Sri Lanka-India relations have visibly cooled with the two capitals talking different languages on contentious issues. If India has been playing by the rule book and asking Colombo to devolve power and grant regional autonomy to the Northern Province dominated by Tamils, Sri Lanka's response has been to garrison the region and tighten control. New Delhi and Colombo have been at a different wavelength since the UN Human Rights Council adopted a resolution (which was eventually watered down) against Sri Lanka.

India had voted against Sri Lanka in 2009, 2012 and 2013 when the issue of human rights abuses and deliberate killing of civilians during the final stages of the ethnic conflict came up for discussion, while China had supported Sri Lanka. A course correction of sorts by New Delhi was in evidence when it abstained from voting against Sri Lanka in March 2014 when a US backed resolution seeking a probe into Sri Lanka's war crimes was passed by the UN Human Rights Council. India's volte face could also be interpreted as a reflection of its domestic politics since the Dravid Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) a Dravidian party with strong political roots in Tamilnadu had exited the Congress party led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) at the centre and New Delhi was signaling to Colombo its flexibility and not the coalition constraints it had exhibited earlier to retain an ally from the southern state of Tamilnadu that espoused the cause of minority Tamils in Sri Lanka.

The consequence of Colombo's strategic orientation towards China has reciprocity woven into it. China's support ensures that criticism of Colombo at the UNSC and other multilateral forums will always be watered down, while in return, Colombo will strongly argue for a more robust role for China in South Asia and especially in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). The SAARC, amongst regional multilateral forums, is not known to be a qualified success, and perhaps,

Colombo hopes to play off China's infectious dynamism into a SAARC dominated by India.

India's policy on Sri Lanka post 2009 has been one of 'quiet diplomacy' in troubled times! It provided humanitarian assistance to the Internally Displaced People (IDP) in the conflict theatre and also supplied construction materiel and agricultural implements to IDPs. India has also undertaken to support a program to reconstruct 50,000 houses in northern Sri Lanka at a cost of USD 270 million. On the trade front, India remains Sri Lanka's largest trading partner with bilateral trade exceeding USD 4 billion in 2012. In 2011, bilateral trade was to the tune of USD 4.86 billion. The India-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement signed in March 2000 has been responsible for this commercial engagement between the two countries.

Unlike Chinese investments in Sri Lanka which are mostly by state entities, and have to do with infrastructure and grandiose architecture, India has cumulative investments of over USD 800 million in areas as diverse as retail petroleum, telecom, hospitality & tourism, health sector, real estate, IT and food processing. Most Indian investments in Sri Lanka are by private entities and companies like Tata's, Airtel, L&T, Ashok Leyland and Taj Hotels. The notable Indian SOE operating from Sri Lanka is the Indian Oil Corporation (IOC), which operates partly an oil tank storage farm interestingly called the China Bay Tank Farm.

Beijing's involvement in Sri Lanka has coincided with an upward swing in political authoritarianism camouflaged as being necessary for democratic expediencies. Sri Lanka presents a tangible case study in this aspect. Victory by Colombo in its long running ethnic conflict with the Tamils represented by the erstwhile LTTE, has led to the 'manufacturing of consensus' in favor of Mahinda Rajapakasa (and his brothers and extended family!) to subvert long institutionalized procedures of moderation to one where the persona of a 'leader' looms large over a nation that was known for the durability of its democratic institutions irrespective of ethnic and religious tensions. A triumphalism of the majority over the minority has manifested itself into Sri Lankan polity with a Derridian "auto-affection" taking over and political space overwhelmingly dominated by the echoes of the 'victorious' constantly reiterating the hard won unity of the nation. By voting against Sri Lanka at the UN Human Rights Council and also dithering in supplying arms to Colombo during the last stages of the conflict with the LTTE in 2009, Sri Lanka's current political leadership is convinced that sidelining India makes for a good strategic decision. Rewarding China which had no qualms in satisfying Colombo's military requirements at short notice also ensures

that at the highest levels of the UNSC there is a patron who can dilute and stymie initiatives to censure Sri Lanka.

Literature Review

“As long as India remains more concerned with consolidating national power aspirations than developing the norms and institutions of global governance, it will remain an incomplete power, limited by its own narrow ambitions, with material grasp being longer than their normative reach. India should make a deliberate effort to learn how to shift its default foreign policy mode from the universal multilateralism of the weak of yesteryear, to norm-advancing selective coalitions of the influential as the diplomacy of the future.”

From Ramesh Thakur’s quote above it is to be inferred that the stark reality of India’s strategic engagement and postures remains the need to decide what it wants...rather than waiting for events to unfold and bypass it’s “tryst with destiny.”

I begin by laying out the proposition that were the China-India bilateral to be seen as a frame accommodating varying scenarios, it is palpable that in the early part of their relationship, their respective foreign policies had overt characterizations shaded with an ideological lens. Intriguingly, before reaching out to each other – as newly independent neighboring states – the two countries initially were keener to announce their new found independence to the wider world, especially in Southeast Asia and Africa.

For India, freed from the yoke of colonialism, the world order presented a challenge – existential, structural and discursive – with the presence of a Western bloc led by the United States and a military alliance exemplified by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and an Eastern bloc led by the Soviet Union, comprising its satellite states from Eastern Europe in an alliance called the “Warsaw Pact.” Resisting the urge to join either bloc and calculating that its priorities of domestic development necessitated not participating in either, India opted for a policy of “non-alignment” which became a pulpit from which declamations could be made about the polarized world order in the post-world war setting. The illusory path chosen by India to redefine realpolitik had its adherents and camp followers for a short duration, before the reality and inchoate nature of the quasi-alliance being stitched emerged. China, on the other hand, presented a contrasting study. It was firmly a member of the ‘socialist

camp’ and invoked the “lean to one side” policy in its initial years, before highlighting the “Bandung spirit” from 1955 onwards for a couple of years and then gravitating towards a semi-isolationist and increasingly radical and revolutionary stance from the late 1950s until rapprochement and a beneficial strategic accommodation with the United States in the 1970s. In comparison, to China’s rocky oscillation and periodic ‘shifting frames of ideology’ in its foreign policy, India’s adoption of the Non-Aligned Movement, as a vehicle to promote its foreign policy values, seemed to be an ideology following a linear pattern, until the early 1990s.

For Beijing there are several perceptions of India and its role in South Asia, but a clearer picture emerges in a post 1998 setting, after India (and Pakistan) tested nuclear devices. To Zou Yunhua, India’s nuclear capability is to be seen as a “prerequisite for attainment of world-power status as well as the needed VIP ticket (sic.) for admission to the UN Security Council.” From a Chinese viewpoint, India’s nuclear tests were to balance China’s nuclear capabilities and send Beijing a message that a repeat of 1962 would not be possible. Further, Chinese scholars do not hesitate to label India’s global ambitions as being reflective of a “superpower complex.” The language of ‘framing’ India in strategic terms does appear to gravitate in the direction of considered skepticism bordering on condescension.

Undoubtedly, for any well-informed strategic analyst in Beijing, India looms large in South Asia dwarfing the region by its sheer geographical size, centrality in historical, political, economic, sociological and cultural terms. At the policy level, however a dichotomy appears with Beijing reflexively inclined to dismiss and even degrade India as a ‘regional power’ – as it does often – and spare no effort in keeping India to the margins of forums like the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the East Asian Community (EAC) in Asia and other multilateral groupings bringing Asian countries together.¹⁸ Beijing is also indifferent, for instance, to India’s claims to a permanent seat on the UN Security Council and its behavior at the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) that granted a waiver to India in 2008 to import enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technology (ENR). It surprised India and other countries when Beijing reacted rather churlishly, by issuing a *demarche* when India in concert with Australia, Japan, Singapore and the United States jointly held naval exercises in the Bay of Bengal in 2007. These behavioral traits by Beijing reinforce policy makers in India to conclude that China will not countenance the emergence of India as a ‘rising power’ in its own right...even within its own geographical sphere.

Independent of China’s attempts to degrade India a notch by parsing it a regional

power is the recognition that India is indeed a presence in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). China's outreach into the IOR through the initiation of the Great Maritime Silkroad is *not* (italics mine) going to be a smooth affair with the Indian navy rapidly taking counter measures to ensure that Beijing does not succeed to marginalize New Delhi in its maritime domain. Apart from its publicized aim of equipping itself with three fleets and attaining second strike capability, the Indian navy has the flexibility to partner and cooperate with other powerful actors' navies from time to time – an option that China does not have.

With the strategic considerations described above playing an influential role in China-India relations, the narrative over the Great Maritime Silkroad shifts to detailing two case studies for the proposed project –Afghanistan and Sri Lanka (also to be seen as continental and maritime latitudinal lines) to compare and contrast, China's growing influence with India's relatively lessening one.

Methodology

Adopting a critical tone, the proposed project examines in detail the manner in which China has expanded its influence in South Asia and the gradual strategic/geopolitical reverse India faces in the region. The introduction of the Maritime Silk Road is the beginning of the creation of a new security architecture that encompasses the relatively ignored and sidelined regions of Asia into a framework that Beijing seeks to preside over.

It must be highlighted that the contemporaneous nature of this proposed project precludes an over-emphasis on the factors leading the two countries towards a path of conflict in 1962, the hemorrhaging of which influences, informs and reiterates perceptions of each other to date. Staying the course of undertaking a critical academic evaluation of the topic, the proposed project strives to stimulate academic debate on the subject.

Consistent criticality is an inescapable part of International Relations (IR) and the “complex, dynamic and constantly changing” environment makes IR a critical arena.²¹ The proposed project subscribes to a fresh and innovative theoretical premise – Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA).

CDA is a type of discourse analytical research that primarily studies the way social and political power, dominance, and inequality are enacted, reproduced, and resisted

by text and talk in the social and political context. This line of reasoning leads us to a fundamental question - What are the principles or governing tenets of CDA?

In general, CDA as a school or paradigm is characterized by a number of principles: for instance since empirical prisms form the base of enquiry, all approaches are problem-oriented, and thus accommodate the interdisciplinary and the eclectic. Significantly CDA is characterized by the innate need to de-mystifying ideologies and the semantics of power construction through the systematic and reproducible investigation of semiotic data (written, spoken or visual). Subscribers to the CDA approach attempt to “make their own positions and interests explicit while retaining their respective scientific methodologies and constantly remaining self-reflective of their own research process.”

CDA itself comprises ‘discourse’ as the general idea that language is structured according to different patterns that personalities / institutions / and governments policy utterances follow when participate in different domains of social life, familiar examples being the narratives and structures complementing strategic discourse and political discourse. ‘Discourse analysis’ is the analysis of patterns that reveal ‘power’ and ‘ideology’ – that often accompany the concept of discourse. Language here plays the role of communication and agency explaining states’ articulation of national interests and objectives as also the wherewithal to implement the same. The Maritime Silk Road comes across here as a mix of political ideology, national interests, and a vehicle to announce a strategy with geopolitical underpinnings. CDA interprets language as a ‘machine’ that generates, and as a result constitutes, the social world. This also extends to the constitution of social identities and social relations. It means that changes in discourse are a means by which the social world is changed. CDA provides theories and methods for the empirical study of the relations between discourse and social and politico-cultural developments in different social domains.

CDA structures the empirical enquiry into the research problem thus:

1. By enquiring into the socio-politico-cultural processes motivating a decision on foreign policy.
2. By teasing out the ‘constitutive’ and ‘constituted’ in a discourse.
3. Undertaking an empirical analysis of the language used in communicating foreign policy objectives and the social bases of the same.
4. Understanding the ideological thrust of a discourse, and,
5. A critical appraisal of the research problem on hand.

CDA therefore does not, therefore, understand itself as politically neutral (as

objectivist social science does), but as a necessary critical approach aiming to uncover the role of discursive practice in the maintenance of unequal power relations.

Intrinsic to the running theme of criticality in the paper is the adoption of ‘frame’ as a conceptual structure to facilitate the perceptions and analyses of a particular issue. If South Asia were to be seen as a ‘frame’ the geographical axis and dependent variable is India. Yet if the region were to be seen in an expanded context -geographically – the ‘frame’ alters to become a ‘meta frame’ and accommodates a newer reality in the form of China as an extraneous/control variable taking into account contemporary developments at the strategic realm.

Discursive processes in South Asian security are aware of the changing dynamics of the region and are part of a process that seek to engage and identify patterns, approaches, traits and symbols that go into creating an “institutional - constructivist meta frame”²⁶ to identify sets of evolving social realities and juxtapose these with the inadequacies and limitations of institutional capacities to constrain or absorb newer variables. In other words, the “framing effects” focus “attention on specific dimensions (explanations) for understanding issues...” and connections between issues begin to influence discourse. It is here that ‘norm entrepreneurs’ are able to ‘frame’ normative ideas that resonate with audiences, with ‘framing’ being an intrinsic part of successful persuasion. A ‘frame’ captures the particularities of a development at a moment amplifying the characteristics embedded within. The strategic processes of action and structural reflexes to consequent developments enhance the ‘framing’ of the issue providing a layered narrative – an approach that best captures the inter-linkages of security issues in South Asia.

The proposed project is aimed at arriving at a ‘framing’ of the geopolitical transition taking place in South Asia under the evolving architecture of the Maritime Silk Route, comprising a thorough analyses of Chinese and Indian interests in Afghanistan and Sri Lanka.

Finding

The title of this project is one of those very rare instances where the subject of research enquiry lives up to its expectations. China’s Great Maritime Silk Road has indeed led to the beginnings of a strategic competition that has no parallels in contemporary international relations and international geopolitics.

I list below some of the findings:

One, the Great Maritime Silkroad has the potential of being a ‘game-changer’ as regards International Relations in southern Asia and encompasses in its wake regions hitherto relegated to the margins of an increasingly globalized world into an orbit of commercial linkages.

Two, the Great Maritime Silkroad is to be conflated at two distinct levels – China’s domestic impulses driving economic growth facing stagnation and the international environment being made conducive to receive the economic surplus China has been producing.

Three, by ostensibly attempting to stitch together a disparate region using the oceans as a determinant, China is attempting a seaward initiative reflecting the ethos spelt out by Halford Mackinder in his ‘Heart of Asia’ thesis. Mackinder however, described inner Asia as a pivot of world security in the early 1900s while China is attempting to make the oceans a ‘pivot’ in the Great Maritime Silkroad, and looking at the future.

Four, China’s rapid attempt to establish the Great Maritime Silkroad comes at a time when the United States has made initial moves in creating a ‘pivot’ in Asia and it is the interpretation of the writer of this report that the Great Maritime Silk Road is an initiative spelt out as a response to efforts taken by the United States in putting together an initiative that has the unstated objective of constraining China in strategic terms.

Five, the Great Maritime Silkroad has found adherents and detractors in equal measure in the region of focus – South Asia – and none exemplifies this better than India and Pakistan, two constantly antithetical states.

Six, by locating one of the most important hubs of the Great Maritime Silk Road in Gwadar, Pakistan, the Great Maritime Silk Road is to the Indian strategic community an attempt to quarantine India by rewarding Pakistan, which by all accounts is a state finding negative mention for actively encouraging and sponsoring groups celebrating terrorism as a means to settle outstanding grievances – with India primarily and arrest the attention of the rest of the world as regards the nuisance value it possesses.

Seven, by linking the almost USD 50 billion investment of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor to the Great Maritime Silk Road, China – to Indian analysts – is

planting the seeds of instability in a region which historically has been unsettled and has been host to myriad grievances – tribal, ethnic, political and economic.

Eight, co-terminus with the initiation of the Great Maritime Silk Road and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, the entire stretch of the proposed corridor has come alive with security concerns.

Nine, by routing the corridor through disputed Jammu and Kashmir, China has taken a gamble in anchoring its economic plans for the region by outsourcing security to a client state like Pakistan.

Ten, the disputed nature of Jammu & Kashmir and the loud campaigns carried out by Pakistan at international forums to seek its forceful amalgamation with itself has encouraged violence as a tool of political articulation and manipulation of facts on the ground.

Eleven, having run roughshod over Indian claims to Jammu & Kashmir in their entirety, China has upped the ante by defending the violence unleashed by non-state actors on Indian soil, and this has encouraged New Delhi to up the ante. China's stalling the censuring of individuals and groups based in Pakistan with proven track record of terrorist acts conducted on Indian soil with the active connivance of the Pakistani state at forums like the UNSC are inexplicable and cast shadow and doubt regarding Beijing's intentions.

Twelve, moving beyond Jammu & Kashmir, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor for the most part traverses through the rugged terrain of Baluchistan province in Pakistan before terminating at Gwadar. This province has been host to several violent movements seeking independence from the state of Pakistan that is seen as a colonial oppressor by the locals.

Thirteen, the very location of Gwadar port in Baluchistan province and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor going through this geographical spread has acted as a fillip to domestic actors fighting the state. What to Beijing, is an attempt at creating an economic stimulus, is to some an act of trespass, trampling upon multiple identities.

Fourteen, even if Beijing were to commit more than USD 50 billion in creating infrastructure regarding the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, a salient point worth

examining is whether the investments are going to generate returns commensurate with the efforts?

Fifteen, investing in a region with multiple contestations is only going to make the rate of returns minimal and expensive. If Beijing is seeking to bypass the fears generated by an American inspired 'pivot' the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is going to be an expensive proposition with uncertain outcomes.

Sixteen, China's Maritime Silk Road has led to a decline in the bilateral equations between New Delhi and Beijing reinforced by the visible tilt the latter has towards Islamabad.

Seventeen, New Delhi's discomfiture towards Beijing is not related to the Maritime Silk Road, but the snubbing it has received from Beijing in pointing out the less than desirable credentials of its belligerent neighbour – Pakistan.

Eighteen, New Delhi's seeking to establish deeper relations with Beijing have met short shrift from institutions in Beijing that perceive New Delhi as cosy to Washington – another consequence of Beijing's Maritime Silk Road and its ramifications for the region.

Nineteen, New Delhi has irrespective of the political party in power cultivated Washington since the nuclear tests in 1998 and arrived at a position where it has gravitated towards positions taken by Washington on global affairs inimical to China. For instance, the South China Sea disputes have witnessed a unique coming together of Washington and New Delhi, not appreciated by Beijing.

Twenty, the Maritime Silk Route, while laudable as an economic idea falls short as a strategic construct owing to the disparate nature of the countries and regimes involved. There is no commonality defining the principle reason for this very laudable initiative from Beijing – albeit Chinese interests in exporting its surplus.

Prognosis

Beijing has taken a very calculated gamble in promoting the Maritime Silk Road as a panacea spreading 'peace' and 'prosperity' in a part of the world where both are unknown.

The Maritime Silk Road, as a laudable idea could largely become redundant owing to factors beyond the comprehension of Beijing – local contestations of legitimacy, ethnicity, geography and history.

Anchoring the success of the Maritime Silk Road through one land corridor – the China/Pakistan Economic Corridor – invites the attention of regional and extra regional powers to play spoilers. New Delhi for one has upped the ante regarding the province of Baluchistan and the contestations it has with Islamabad in the last one year specifically.

Harsh though it might be, this largesse from Beijing is not going to yield dividends economically, as geopolitical aspects are beginning to cast a much larger shadow on the whole idea escalating the cost and time. This very feature could end up haemorrhaging Beijing in the long run.

Lastly. The whole idea of Maritime Silk Road appears conflated with the image of the current leadership in Beijing as represented by Xi Jinping. Will Beijing persevere with this idea in a post Xi Jinping leadership? Or, is this whole idea akin to the metaphors inspired by the fictional ‘Three Musketeers’ charging at a windmill?

科技部補助計畫衍生研發成果推廣資料表

日期:2016/10/17

科技部補助計畫	計畫名稱: 南進! 中國海上絲路及其與印度在南亞之戰略競賽
	計畫主持人: 丁樹範
	計畫編號: 104-2410-H-004-100- 學門領域: 國際關係
無研發成果推廣資料	

104年度專題研究計畫成果彙整表

計畫主持人：丁樹範			計畫編號：104-2410-H-004-100-			
計畫名稱：南進！中國海上絲路及其與印度在南亞之戰略競賽						
成果項目			量化	單位	質化 (說明：各成果項目請附佐證資料或細項說明，如期刊名稱、年份、卷期、起訖頁數、證號...等)	
國內	學術性論文	期刊論文		0	篇	
		研討會論文		0		
		專書		0	本	
		專書論文		0	章	
		技術報告		0	篇	
		其他		0	篇	
	智慧財產權及成果	專利權	發明專利	申請中	0	件
				已獲得	0	
			新型/設計專利		0	
		商標權		0		
		營業秘密		0		
		積體電路電路布局權		0		
		著作權		0		
		品種權		0		
		其他		0		
	技術移轉	件數		0	件	
		收入		0	千元	
	國外	學術性論文	期刊論文		0	篇
			研討會論文		0	
			專書		0	本
專書論文			0	章		
技術報告			0	篇		
其他			0	篇		
智慧財產權及成果		專利權	發明專利	申請中	0	件
				已獲得	0	
			新型/設計專利		0	
		商標權		0		
		營業秘密		0		
		積體電路電路布局權		0		
		著作權		0		
		品種權		0		
其他		0				

	技術移轉	件數	0	件	
		收入	0	千元	
參與計畫人力	本國籍	大專生	0	人次	
		碩士生	2		
		博士生	0		
		博士後研究員	0		
		專任助理	0		
	非本國籍	大專生	0		
		碩士生	0		
		博士生	0		
		博士後研究員	0		
		專任助理	0		
其他成果 (無法以量化表達之成果如辦理學術活動、獲得獎項、重要國際合作、研究成果國際影響力及其他協助產業技術發展之具體效益事項等，請以文字敘述填列。)			文章在撰寫中，尚未在會議，期刊，或專書發表		

科技部補助專題研究計畫成果自評表

請就研究內容與原計畫相符程度、達成預期目標情況、研究成果之學術或應用價值（簡要敘述成果所代表之意義、價值、影響或進一步發展之可能性）、是否適合在學術期刊發表或申請專利、主要發現（簡要敘述成果是否具有政策應用參考價值及具影響公共利益之重大發現）或其他有關價值等，作一綜合評估。

1. 請就研究內容與原計畫相符程度、達成預期目標情況作一綜合評估

達成目標

未達成目標（請說明，以100字為限）

實驗失敗

因故實驗中斷

其他原因

說明：

需要更多時間才能真正完成，且無法到巴基斯坦，和阿富汗訪問。

2. 研究成果在學術期刊發表或申請專利等情形（請於其他欄註明專利及技轉之證號、合約、申請及洽談等詳細資訊）

論文： 已發表 未發表之文稿 撰寫中 無

專利： 已獲得 申請中 無

技轉： 已技轉 洽談中 無

其他：（以200字為限）

文章在撰寫中。

3. 請依學術成就、技術創新、社會影響等方面，評估研究成果之學術或應用價值（簡要敘述成果所代表之意義、價值、影響或進一步發展之可能性，以500字為限）

本研究主要探討：在中國的一帶一路政策下，印度的反應。本研究以斯里蘭卡，巴基斯坦，和阿富汗為例。這三國從陸上和海上和印度為鄰，中國大陸和這三國的互動勢將影響印度。更何況，印度視自己為印度洋的霸權，中國的介入可能改變印度洋的權力結構。這也涉及在全球層次下，中國崛起如何影響國際權力結構。在南亞次大陸和印度洋，我們也可以做類似的觀察，從而在國際關係領域，特別是權力轉換和權力過渡(power transition)做出學術上的研究貢獻。

4. 主要發現

本研究具有政策應用參考價值： 否 是，建議提供機關（勾選「是」者，請列舉建議可提供施政參考之業務主管機關）

本研究具影響公共利益之重大發現： 否 是

說明：（以150字為限）

本研究純屬國際關係之學術基本研究，雖是探討印度如何因應中國的一帶一路政策，特別以斯里蘭卡，巴基斯坦，和阿富汗為例，但是，其涉及權力移轉(power transition)之探討：印度如何維護其在印度洋的傳統霸權地位。