

DIVIDED GOVERNMENT IN TAIWAN'S LOCAL POLITICS

Public Evaluations of City/County Government Performance

Chung-li Wu and Chi Huang

ABSTRACT

Divided government exists where different political parties control the executive and legislative branches in a political system. This has become a common feature of Taiwan's national and local political landscape. In the literature, scholars tend to disagree with each other concerning whether divided government leads to dysfunctional politics. This study attempts to shed some light on the issue by exploring the effects of divided government at the city/county level on the public's perceptions of their mayor/magistrate's performance in Taiwan. We take advantage of a 2002 survey of the public's evaluations of government performance and examine whether different forms of divided government affect residents' responses. Our findings indicate that residents in cities or counties under divided government express more negative views, although their party identification seems to be an important intervening variable in shaping their opinion.

KEY WORDS ■ divided government ■ government performance ■ party politics ■ unified government

Introduction

Divided government exists when both the chief executive and the legislators are elected separately and the executive's party is unable to control a majority of the seats in the legislative chamber. Unified government, on the contrary, implies that both the executive and legislative branches are under the control of a major political party. According to Sundquist (1988: 614), a democratic regime emphasizes the operating mechanism of party government – 'the political party as the indispensable instrument that brought

cohesion and unity, and hence effectiveness, to the government as a whole by linking the executive and legislative in a bond of common interest'. Under ideal conditions of party competition, the ruling party controls both the executive and legislative branches, while the opposition party plays a supervisory role. However, when there is divided government, since different political parties control the executive and legislative branches, the operation of party government is weakened, as the two political institutions are in conflict with each other. This certainly makes responsible and efficient government an unattainable goal (Cutler, 1980, 1988; Leonard, 1991; Sundquist, 1986, 1990).

Over the past decade, a burgeoning literature has examined the consequences of divided and unified government in the United States (cf. Alesina and Rosenthal, 1995; Alt and Lowry, 1994; Binder, 1999; Cox and Kernell, 1991; Fiorina, 1996; Mayhew, 1991; Rose, 2001; van Assendelft, 1997). Put simply, the focus of scholarly controversy has been on whether divided government has performed less well than unified government. For such an academic phenomenon, it might be fair to say that, as Brady (1993: 189) noted, '[t]he study of divided government has the potential to replace the realignment synthesis as the major paradigm. Voters' preferences expressed through elections, institutional structure, and public policy outputs are all presumably different in an era of divided government'. From the perspective of comparative politics, studies on divided government in American politics are of considerable value when applied to other countries.

As Taiwan has gradually been transformed from an authoritarian to a democratic polity, it has begun to experience the question of divided government at both the national and local level. In this study, we attempt to throw light on the issue by examining local politics. Toward that end, we first look at some trends in the development of divided government in Taiwan. Second, we review the literature that questions whether divided government leads to policy gridlock and stalemate, excessive constraints on the executive by the legislature and a hindering of the local executive's ability to implement governmental functions. Third, we make use of survey data on public evaluations of city/county government performance to compare the consequences of divided and unified government. Our findings indicate that the public has a higher satisfaction rate in terms of unified government than in relation to divided government. The evidence also reveals that the multiplicative terms of government forms and party identification are correlated with people's perceptions of government performance. In the concluding section, our key findings are reviewed, the limitations of this study are outlined and suggestions are made for future research.

Development of Divided Government in Taiwan

From the early 1950s to the mid-1980s, the Kuomintang (KMT) regime in Taiwan was characterized as an authoritarian one-party state with elements of totalitarianism in view of its comprehensive domination over the ruling mechanism (Tien, 1989; Winckler, 1984). In 1949, following its arrival in Taiwan – having retreated there as a result of the Chinese civil war – the KMT government embarked on an internal reconstruction programme, and during the 1950s built itself into a highly authoritarian party. Organizationally, all of the KMT's reform measures were designed to establish a democratic centralist leadership and to strengthen the party apparatus by consolidating its political control over the island. For decades, Martial Law and emergency decrees dominated Taiwan's political life, and included restrictions on the formation of new political parties, on the mass media, on freedom of assembly and expression, and on other opposition political activities. The control seized by the KMT was comparable to that of a Leninist-style state, but it differed in two distinct ways from the authority wielded by the Chinese Communist Party on the mainland in that it permitted private ownership and, more significantly, it institutionalized local elections (Cheng, 1989: 477–8).

The government initiated regular elections in the early 1950s with the objective of consolidating KMT rule at the grassroots level. Elections were limited to the local level, as national elections would have been a challenge to KMT legitimacy. Executive and council positions were only open to direct election at the township, city and county levels. As the socio-political circumstances changed, the KMT's grip on Taiwan began to show signs of relaxation in the early 1980s. The process of controlled liberalization and democratization culminated in the abolition of Martial Law in 1987, an event that established an arena for open electoral competition. This process reached its climax in 1996 when, for the first time, the electorate was allowed to elect the chief executives and the legislators at both the central and local levels directly.

The KMT, which had hitherto maintained its predominance with a monopoly of social, political and economic resources, was forced to compete with all kinds of opposition in a democratic milieu. Looking back at Taiwan's electoral history, we find that, prior to 1985, the KMT controlled over 80 percent of mayors and magistrates and held overall majorities on local councils, as indicated in Table 1. In general, non-KMT candidates tended to win two to four local executive posts. The only exception occurred in 1972, when the KMT won all available executive posts. In 1989, the first large-scale post-Martial Law elections were held. The opposition increased both its share of the vote and seats, winning seven out of the 21 positions up for grabs. In the years that followed, this trend continued, with non-KMT candidates winning eight posts in 1993 and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate Chen Shui-bian winning the Taipei

Table 1. Divided and unified local government in Taiwan¹

<i>Election year</i>	<i>Seats available</i>	<i>Unified government</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Divided government</i>	<i>%</i>
1950-51	21	17	80.95	4	19.05
1954	21	19	90.48	2	9.52
1957	21	20	95.24	1	4.76
1960	21	19	90.48	2	9.52
1964	21	17	80.95	4	19.05
1968	20	17	85.00	3	15.00
1972	20	20	100.00	0	0.00
1977	20	16	80.00	4	20.00
1981	19	15	78.95	4	21.05
1985	21	17	80.95	4	19.05
1989	21	14	66.67	7	33.33
1993	21	13	61.90	8	38.10
1994 ²	2	1	50.00	1	50.00
1997	21	6	28.57	15	71.43
1998 ²	2	0	0.00	2	100.00
2001	21	4	19.05	17	80.95
2002 ²	2	0	0.00	2	100.00

Notes: ¹ Taipei and Kaohsiung cities were upgraded to be municipalities under the jurisdiction of the Executive Yuan, in 1967 and 1979 respectively. Chiayi and Hsinchu cities became cities under the jurisdiction of Taiwan Province in 1982.

² Taipei and Kaohsiung city mayoral and council elections.

Sources: *The Summary of Election Statistics of the Republic of China* (in Chinese) (Taipei: Central Election Commission, various years); *The General Summary of the Election to County Magistrates and City Mayors* (in Chinese) (Taipei: Central Election Commission, various years).

mayoral contest in 1994. In the local council elections, though the number of seats won by the DPP and their share of the vote increased incrementally, the KMT maintained its advantage by holding a majority of the seats.

The 1997 elections turned out to be a critical watershed as the KMT suffered an unprecedented setback, winning only six executive posts. For the first time, the DPP received a larger share of the vote and won 12 executive posts, with three other posts being awarded to independent candidates. Nevertheless, in the local council elections held in early 1998, the DPP was unable to maintain the momentum of the previous year's elections. The KMT led all the other political parties in winning absolute majorities in terms of both votes and seats in the local city and county assemblies. In the 1998 year-end elections, the KMT regained the Taipei mayoral post, but it won less than half the seats on the Taipei city council. Although the KMT lost the Kaohsiung mayoral election to the DPP, it maintained its majority on the Kaohsiung city council. In the 2001 mayoral and magistrate elections, the KMT and DPP each captured nine of the 21 seats available, the newly formed People First Party (PFP) one, and independents two.

In the early 2002 races for the city and county assemblies, as shown in Table 2, the KMT gained a total of 368 of the 871 seats available, the DPP 147, the PFP 47, the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) seven and the New Party (NP) one, with the remaining 300 going to non-partisans. In the 2002 year-end elections, the KMT still retained the Taipei mayoral post and the 'pan-blue' camp (i.e. the KMT, PFP and NP) maintained a majority on the Taipei city council, while the DPP again won the Kaohsiung mayoral election and the 'pan-green' camp (i.e. the DPP and TSU) merely received a plurality on the Kaohsiung city council.

In short, the phenomenon of divided government is not a new feature of Taiwan's local politics. However, prior to 1997, divided government was the exception, with the KMT having for a long time controlled both the executive and legislative branches of the government in most localities. Over the past few years, by contrast, divided government has not only become commonplace at the local level, but since 2000 has also occurred at the central government level, with the presidency and the Legislative Yuan being controlled by different political parties. The changes in electoral politics between 1994 and 2004 are displayed in Table 3. Within the space of a

Table 2. Party share of seats in the 2002 city/county council elections

<i>City/county</i>	<i>KMT</i>	<i>DPP</i>	<i>NP</i>	<i>PFP</i>	<i>TSU</i>	<i>Independent</i>	<i>Seats</i>
Taipei County	27	16	0	7	2	13	65
Taoyuan County	27	6	0	8	0	17	58
Hsinchu County	16	3	0	0	0	15	34
Miaoli County	11	0	0	1	0	26	38
Taichung County	21	11	0	4	2	19	57
Nantou County	12	6	0	3	0	16	37
Changhua County	25	9	0	1	0	19	54
Yunlin County	20	5	0	1	1	16	43
Chiayi County	13	7	0	0	0	17	37
Tainan County	18	11	0	0	0	21	50
Kaohsiung County	20	13	0	3	1	17	54
Pingtung County	23	6	0	0	0	26	55
Taitung County	19	0	0	2	0	9	30
Hualien County	21	6	0	2	0	4	33
Yilan County	10	12	0	4	0	8	34
Penghu County	8	1	0	0	0	10	19
Keelung City	19	6	0	5	0	2	32
Hsinchu City	11	5	1	1	1	12	31
Taichung City	26	11	0	2	0	7	46
Chiayi City	7	3	0	1	0	12	23
Tainan City	14	10	0	3	0	14	41
Total	368	147	1	48	7	300	871

Source: *The Summary of Election Statistics of the Republic of China* (in Chinese) (Taipei: Central Election Commission, 2002).

Table 3. Summary of election statistics of Taiwan, 1994–2004

Year	Type of election	Votes (%)					
		KMT	DPP	NP	PPF	TSU	Others
1994	Governor	56.22	38.72	4.31	–	–	0.75
	Provincial Assembly	50.63	32.87	3.80	–	–	12.71
	Taipei City Mayor	25.89	43.67	30.17	–	–	0.28
	Taipei City Council	39.06	30.12	21.72	–	–	9.10
	Kaohsiung City Mayor	54.46	39.29	3.45	–	–	2.80
	Kaohsiung City Council	46.22	24.91	4.83	–	–	24.04
1995	Legislative Yuan	46.07	33.17	12.95	–	–	7.81
1996	President	54.00	21.13	14.90 ¹	–	–	9.98
	National Assembly	49.68	29.93	13.59	–	–	6.80
1997	City Mayor and County Magistrate	42.12	43.32	1.42	–	–	13.14
1998	City and County Council	48.35	15.81	3.06	–	–	32.78
1998	Legislative Yuan	46.43	29.56	7.06	–	–	16.95
	Taipei City Mayor	51.13	45.91	2.97	–	–	0.00
	Taipei City Council	40.02	30.95	18.60	–	–	10.43
	Kaohsiung City Mayor	48.13	48.71	0.81	–	–	2.35
	Kaohsiung City Council	45.24	26.90	3.85	–	–	24.01
	2000	President	23.10	39.30	0.13	–	–
2001	Legislative Yuan	28.56	33.38	2.61	18.57	7.76	9.12
	City Mayor and County Magistrate	35.15	45.27	0.17	2.36	–	17.06
2002	City and County Council	35.95	18.19	0.44	7.01	1.47	36.94
2002	Taipei City Mayor	64.10	35.89	–	–	–	–
	Taipei City Council	32.08	28.52	9.02	17.56	3.72	9.10
	Kaohsiung City Mayor	46.82	50.03	–	–	–	3.15
	Kaohsiung City Council	27.27	31.82	–	15.91	4.55	20.45
2004	President	49.89	50.11	–	–	–	–
2004	Legislative Yuan	32.83	35.72	0.12	13.90	7.79	9.64

Notes: ¹ The votes received by the independent candidates, Lin Yang-kang and Hau Pei-tsun; the New Party did not nominate its candidate for the 1996 presidential election and actually endorsed Lin and Hau.

² James C. Soong, former Governor and running as an independent, garnered 36.84 percent of the popular vote and Hsu Hsin-liang, former DPP Chair and running as an independent, shared only 0.63 percent.

Sources: <http://vote.nccu.edu.tw/cec/cehead.asp>; Election Information Databank, Central Election Commission, ROC and the Election Study Center, National Chengchi University.

decade, there has been a radical transformation in the electoral fortunes of Taiwan's major political parties. The data indicate that a gap is gradually opening up between voting patterns for executive and legislative posts and this is reflected in the growth of split-ticket voting. In 1996, the incumbent Lee Teng-hui won with 54.00 percent of the vote and enabled the KMT to maintain its ruling status. Four years later, the DPP presidential candidate Chen Shui-bian was elected with 39.30 percent of the vote. This ended half

a century of KMT control over the central government, but left it with a majority in the Legislative Yuan.

Having outlined the development of divided government in Taiwan's politics, the main objective of this study is to examine the consequences of divided government at the local level. The results of our analysis might be useful in shedding some light on the operation of divided government at the central level. Since American political science provides an abundance of studies on the consequences of divided government, it should serve as a useful reference for the analysis of divided government in Taiwan's politics.

Consequences of Divided Government

Whether or not divided government makes a difference is still a controversial issue in academic circles. A number of studies claim that divided government tends to lead to policy inefficiency and stalemate between executive and legislative branches (Binder, 1999; Coleman, 1999; Cutler, 1980; Leonard, 1991; McCubbins, 1991; Mezey, 1991; Sundquist, 1988; Thurber, 1991a, b; Thurber and Durst, 1991). While executive and legislative posts are determined in separate elections, there is a lack of unified leadership and this tends to lead to conflicting policy positions. Although some believe that divided government gives rise to policy stalemate and government inefficiency, this view has been challenged. It is also believed that divided government matches the major American constitutional principles: separation of powers and checks and balances. This corresponds with the voters' expectations and does not hinder policy formulation or governing efficiency (Fiorina, 1996; Jacobson, 1991; Menefee-Libey, 1991; Petracca, 1991). Therefore, divided government is not the root cause of the problem; instead, it becomes a scapegoat for government non-performance and poor management.

In order to examine the consequences in terms of policy outputs and processes, Mayhew (1991) analysed the relationship between the US presidency and its legislative branches between 1946 and 1990. He concluded that there is no major difference between divided and unified government, and that divided government does not lead to legislative stalemate or differences in policy results. In general, both the executive and legislative branches must be responsive to the demands and needs of society and their constituents. Consequently, even if they hold divergent ideological or policy positions, they must still cooperate to pass legislation.

Based on these conflicting viewpoints, the factors that influence the operation of divided and unified government remain contentious. From a comparative perspective, the question of whether Taiwan's divided local government leads to poor performance is worthy of scholarly attention. Indeed, assessing the differences between divided and unified government raises the question of how to measure the concept of 'government performance'. At present, there is still no consensus on the best means of measuring

the consequences of divided and unified government (Brady, 1993: 192; Fiorina, 1996: 85; Mayhew, 1991: 6–7; Sundquist, 1988: 633). The adoption of different measurements in various studies has resulted in conflicting conclusions with regard to the issue of divided government.

In this article, we use survey data on public satisfaction with local government performance to compare divided and unified government. There are two major reasons why we have selected this method. First, previous work has tended to focus on the elite levels, in particular on the interaction between the executive and the legislature. By contrast, in this article we focus on the mass level. We approach the question of government performance from a different perspective, as the smoothness of the operation of government is intimately linked to the public interest. Second, since public opinion is the basis of democracy, political leaders must seek the public's support at periodical elections. From the perspective of retrospective voting, the public's evaluation of government performance can have a formative effect on political attitudes and influence voting behaviour at the next election (Fiorina, 1981, 1984). Although the objective of this article is to analyse the operation of divided and unified government in Taiwan, it can also shed light on voting behaviour in Taiwan.

Based on the idea that distinct forms of government can influence the efficiency of governance, it is hypothesized that while the executive branch is unable to control a majority in the legislative chamber, the councils may excessively constrain the executive branch, create poor coordination between the two branches and hinder the policy implementation of local government. In light of these views, it is assumed that divided government tends to result in inefficiency of governance and consequently this is likely to affect the public's evaluation of government performance.

Data and Elements of the Model

The data used to evaluate influences on divided and unified government are obtained from the 'Survey Research on Public Satisfaction with County/City Government Performance and Media Use' project administered by the United Daily News' Survey Research Center conducted in December 2002. This was approximately one year after the local executives had been elected to office on 1 December 2001. The total sample size was 14,327 and covered 21 of Taiwan's cities and counties (not including Taipei City, Kaohsiung City and Fujian province's Kinmen and Lianjiang counties). The respondents were all 20 years of age or above and residents of the above-mentioned areas.¹ Appendix A presents the detailed survey information. Detailed descriptions of questionnaire wordings and the scale scores for the measures are presented in Appendix B.

In order to gain a further understanding of the factors that influence the public's satisfaction with local government performance, we construct a

model in accordance with the theoretical framework. For the purposes of this analysis, the dependent variables are the two items used to evaluate the government's performance, namely, 'public satisfaction with local infrastructure' and 'public satisfaction with the local executive's performance', each of which is a four-category ordered polytomous variable and includes the responses 'very satisfied', 'somewhat satisfied', 'somewhat dissatisfied' and 'very dissatisfied'.

To test for the contextual effects on the residents' evaluations of government performance, as shown in Table 4, the government-type variable encompasses six different categories: (1) KK unified government – with the KMT concurrently controlling the executive and holding a majority of seats in the legislature; (2) KP divided government – with the KMT controlling the executive and holding a plurality of seats in the legislature; (3) KM divided government – with the KMT controlling the executive but holding a minority of seats in the legislature; (4) DP divided government – with the DPP controlling the executive and the KMT holding a plurality of seats in the legislature; (5) DM divided government – with the DPP controlling the executive and the KMT holding a minority of seats in the legislature; and (6) IM divided government – with an independent controlling the executive and the KMT holding a minority of seats in the legislature.

Beyond the contextual effects, the literature on political attitudes leads us to hypothesize that public evaluations of government performance are a complex function of various other factors. In relation to this, some determinants of government-evaluation outcomes are considered. Individual-level variables, including gender, age, education, ethnicity and party identification, are taken into consideration as control variables. The reason for employing socio-demographic characteristics as explanatory variables is the presumption that an individual's social background conditions are central to the development of an individual's political attitudes, including his or her personal evaluations of government performance.

Table 4. Government typology classified by party labels of the local executive and legislative branches in 2002

<i>Executive</i>	<i>Legislature</i>		
	<i>KMT majority</i>	<i>KMT plurality</i>	<i>KMT minority</i>
KMT	Type 1	Type 2	Type 3
DPP		Type 4	Type 5
Independent			Type 6

Notes: Type 1: Taitung County, Hualien County, Keelung City, Taichung City.

Type 2: Taoyuan County, Hsinchu County, Taichung County, Yunlin County.

Type 3: Penghu County, Hsinchu City.

Type 4: Taipei County, Changhua County, Kaohsiung County, Tainan City.

Type 5: Nantou County, Chiayi County, Tainan County, Pingtung County, Yilan County.

Type 6: Miaoli County, Chiayi City.

Previous research has evaluated the connection between gender and political attitudes. Much empirical evidence has shown that men are more inclined to participate in political activities than women (Almond and Verba, 1963; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993). Milbrath and Goel's (1977: 117) explanation for the gender difference relates directly to political efficacy: 'What distinguishes male political participation rates from female political participation rates is the male's sense of political efficacy; men are more likely than women to feel that they are qualified to deal with the complexities of politics.'

The influence of age is also taken into consideration. In general, with age, individuals accumulate political information and experience. The available empirical evidence on this point indicates that individuals with more information about what the government is doing tend to be more active politically (Campbell et al., 1954, 1960; Conway, 1991; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993). By and large, political knowledge increases in each consecutively older group, through the 30s, 40s and 50s, and reaches a peak in the late 50s and early 60s. The ability to evaluate government performance among the oldest age group could decline primarily because these people are in poorer health.

Education is another important variable that is likely to be correlated with an individual's evaluation of government performance. There is considerable evidence consistently showing that people with higher levels of education are more likely to possess more information about government and politics than those with less education (Almond and Verba, 1963; Lipset, 1981; Stone and Schaffner, 1988). Working from the idea that educational attainment is related to political knowledge, it is hypothesized that individuals with higher levels of education are likely to be better able to understand the complicated nature of divided government, and acquire and retain more and better information that they might use for evaluations of government performance. Those with lower levels of education are less likely to have such understanding – and even have fewer experiences with government institutions such as higher education and therefore have limited understanding of bureaucracies and the limits of political leadership.

Ethnicity is widely regarded as an important variable in research on political attitudes in Taiwan.² Such research has shown that Mainlanders have attitude sets that are distinct from those of other ethnic groups (Moody, 1992; Shyu, 1998; Wachman, 1994). It is hypothesized that since there were only two Mainlander local executives (Taoyuan County's Chu Li-lun and Taichung City's Jason Hu) in December 2002, Mainlanders should therefore have lower levels of satisfaction in relation to local government performance. Tests for these ethnic effects, namely, the differences in the political behaviour of Taiwanese Minnans, Taiwanese Hakka, Mainlanders and the aboriginal people groups, are currently being conducted.

An individual's subjective psychological attachment, i.e. party identification, is taken into account as well. Party identification refers to how closely a person identifies with one of the major political parties. Previous research has shown that party identifiers have a greater degree of political interest

than those without any party preference (Conway, 1991; Milbrath and Goel, 1977; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993). Independents tend to be less concerned with politics, to have less political information, and to be less interested in political activities. Partisans, by contrast, are more involved and informed, and are more likely to talk about politics, to evaluate the outcomes of elections, to discuss political leadership, to evaluate government performance, and so forth. Based on the current system of political parties in Taiwan, six categories of party identification should be distinguished, namely, the KMT, DPP, PFP, NP, TSU and independent voters.

To test for the joint effects of five types of local government and five categories of party identification, 25 interactive variables are examined here (regarding the use of interactive variables, please refer to Huang and Shields, 2000). It is assumed that the test is based on whether different party-oriented residents evaluate the performance of opposite types of local government differently. Apart from the above-mentioned variables, 'region' is another factor shaping the individual's attitudes because of distinctive cultural and political characteristics. In order to examine the effects of regions on public evaluations of government performance, the 21 cities and counties covered in the analysis are coded dummy variables, respectively.

In the data-analysis process, we initially combine 21 original data units into a whole set. Since the sample size in each region consists of approximately 700 respondents, it is necessary to employ weighted aggregates to prevent the relative influence of each unit from being misrepresented. Each unit is multiplied by the 2001 eligible voter statistics in each city or county released by the government's Central Election Commission.

Discussion of Findings

As previously mentioned, the dependent variables 'public satisfaction with local infrastructure' and 'public satisfaction with the local executive's performance' that are used in the analysis are four-category ordered polytomous variables. With regard to the independent variables, all of them are categorical variables.³ As for the statistical models that are applied, we consider the dependent-variable attributes and adopt ordered logit analyses, using Stata 7.0 statistical software to analyse the data.

The results of the ordered logit estimates for public evaluations of local government performance are displayed in Table 5. On account of the large number of statistics related to the many city/county dummy variables, the table succinctly reports the F-test values to decrease the difficulty of readability. Taken as a whole, the results show that respondents residing in distinct regions do have different attitudes toward government performance. The results also reveal that, as hypothesized, two individual background characteristics – age and education – emerge as statistically significant in terms of explaining the public evaluations of government performance.

Table 5. Ordered logit estimates for the public evaluations of government performance

<i>Independent variables</i>	<i>Public satisfaction with local infrastructure</i>		<i>Public satisfaction with local executive's performance</i>	
	<i>B</i>	<i>s.e.</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>s.e.</i>
Cut 1	-2.506***	0.222	-3.596***	0.241
Cut 2	-0.563**	0.221	-1.727***	0.236
Cut 3	2.845***	0.224	1.751***	0.235
Gender (Male)	-0.673	0.390	-0.060	0.043
Age				
20 to 29 years	-0.021	0.083	-0.251**	0.090
30 to 39 years	-0.309***	0.077	-0.487***	0.082
40 to 49 years	-0.346***	0.075	-0.429***	0.079
50 to 59 years	-0.328***	0.077	-0.360***	0.080
Education				
Primary school or below	0.526***	0.081	0.613***	0.091
Junior high school	0.281***	0.071	0.390***	0.083
High or vocational school	0.123*	0.058	0.250***	0.071
Technical college	-0.032	0.066	0.059	0.079
Ethnicity				
Taiwanese Minnan	-0.273	0.169	-0.029	0.165
Taiwanese Hakka	-0.324	0.175	-0.045	0.174
Mainland Chinese	-0.178	0.178	-0.076	0.178
Party identification				
KMT	0.261	0.174	0.262	0.190
DPP	0.038	0.178	-0.396	0.212
PFP	-0.023	0.247	0.263	0.285
NP	0.323	0.840	0.494**	0.179
TSU	-1.232	1.089	-1.099	1.846
Government types				
KK unified government	0.158	0.155	-0.054	0.177
KK × KMT	0.176	0.205	0.405	0.224
KK × DPP	-0.343	0.216	-0.423	0.256
KK × PFP	0.323	0.278	0.146	0.323
KK × NP	0.616	0.955	0.188	0.248
KK × TSU	1.211	1.453	-0.502	1.942
KP divided government	-0.185	0.162	-0.134	0.172
KP × KMT	0.191	0.203	0.464*	0.220
KP × DPP	-0.189	0.214	-0.258	0.259
KP × PFP	-0.099	0.284	0.018	0.330
KP × NP			-0.270	0.218
KP × TSU	0.543	1.177	-0.180	1.906

Continued opposite

Table 5. Continued

Independent variables	Public satisfaction with local infrastructure		Public satisfaction with local executive's performance	
	B	s.e.	B	s.e.
Government types (<i>continued</i>)				
KM divided government	0.187	0.170	-0.484**	0.182
KM × KMT	0.543*	0.242	0.805**	0.259
KM × DPP	-0.348	0.268	-0.366	0.304
KM × PFP	0.398	0.324	0.173	0.375
KM × NP	0.134	1.136		
KM × TSU	0.904	1.270	0.881	2.035
DP divided government	-0.035	0.146	-0.123	0.171
DP × KMT	-0.474*	0.204	-0.903***	0.228
DP × DPP	0.436*	0.205	1.290***	0.240
DP × PFP	-0.151	0.281	-0.957**	0.327
DP × NP	-1.833*	0.931	-2.648***	0.338
DP × TSU	1.953	1.412	2.227	1.896
DM divided government	-0.057	0.157	-0.122	0.179
DM × KMT	-0.575**	0.207	-0.976***	0.229
DM × DPP	0.463*	0.205	1.139***	0.240
DM × PFP	-0.254	0.304	-0.918**	0.349
DM × NP	-0.026	0.977	-1.439	0.858
DM × TSU	1.250	1.209	2.074	2.226
City/county dummy	F = 9.60	$p < 0.0001$	F = 17.10	$p < 0.0001$
N	10,639		9,558	

Notes: * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$; two-tailed test of significance.

As the data show, age is a significant factor that is negatively associated with an individual's views of government performance. By and large, compared with the elderly (more than 60 years), young adults (20 to 29 years), young middle-aged (30 to 39 years), and middle-aged people (40 to 49 years and 50 to 59 years) tend to provide a relatively low degree of positive appraisals, especially in relation to the indicator for 'public satisfaction with the local executive's performance'. Likewise, the evidence reveals that educational attainment reacts distinctly to various items. Somewhat ironically, individuals with less education (primary school or below, junior high school and senior high or vocational school) are more likely to have positive evaluations of government performance than those with higher levels of education.

Contrary to expectations, some individual socio-demographic variables, namely gender, ethnicity and party identification, account for little variance in terms of public satisfaction with the government's performance. The coefficients of the variables are consistently weak and insignificant. Likewise,

as for the local government types, the analyses lend only minor support to the original hypothesis regarding the relationship between divided government and negative government-performance evaluations. By and large, those residents in cities or counties under divided government express more negative views of government performance. Nevertheless, with the exception of the impact of KM divided government on the variable 'public satisfaction with the local executive's performance', the other variables do not reach statistical significance. While this finding runs contrary to the previous research concerning the impact of divided government, the interactive variables related to government types and party affiliations exert an important influence on the dependent variables.

The results highlight that, under different types of local government, party identification has a significant effect on performance evaluations. In general, the 'pan-blue' supporters (especially the KMT identifiers) residing in the regions in which the KMT are in power tend to hold positive views, whereas the 'pan-green' followers are more likely to provide negative appraisals. By contrast, the 'pan-green' supporters (particularly the DPP identifiers) in the DPP-ruling counties and cities tend to provide positive evaluations. However, both KMT and PFP identifiers in those areas are more likely to react negatively toward government performance. This is to some extent in line with our hypothesis, in that it implies that party identification seems to be an important intervening variable in terms of shaping public opinion.

Conclusions

In the social sciences, one of the major challenges facing researchers is often not finding problems but rather explaining these phenomena. Divided government is no exception to this principle. In Taiwan's local politics, divided government has replaced unified government as the institutional norm, and the trend has encompassed the central government since 2000. Due to the theoretical and practical importance of divided government, this article reviews the foregoing literature and sheds some light on the influences leading to divided and unified government in Taiwan. In analysing a 2002 survey dataset, we examine the effects of local divided and unified government on the public evaluations of government performance.

To sum up, the empirical data have by and large confirmed the research hypothesis that residents of regions where government is divided tend to react negatively, although party identification seems to be an important intervening variable that shapes their views. Of course, in this study we only examine one aspect of the consequences of divided and unified government, i.e. public evaluations of government performance. Therefore the findings are not conclusive and further research is called for. In order to measure government performance, we suggest using different research methods, for example, content analysis and in-depth interviews. Emphasis should be

placed on the following aspects: the proportion of important legislation passed, the extent to which the budget has been reduced, the examination of supplementary budgets, the content and number of oral or written interpellations, executive leadership qualities, the executive's communication skills with the council, and mass media reports on the relationship between the executive and the council. These indices should help in terms of measuring the influences of these public evaluations on divided government and reveal the distinctions between the different forms of government.

In addition, the research design of this study is based on a cross-sectional analysis. We are of the opinion that longitudinal analyses, in which the units of analysis are selected with multiple measurement indices, should be of significant research value in comparing divided and unified government. In addition, the issue of split-ticket voting in Taiwan is also worthy of future research. Why has divided government become so commonplace and is it a long- or short-term phenomenon? Why is the DPP able to win executive posts, but not gain a majority in the assemblies? Is divided government the voters' intended objective to provide checks and balances or an incidental by-product? What factors lead to the high degree of split-ticket voting? To answer the above questions, we suggest using the existing theoretical framework to explain the motivation behind split-ticket voting and the causes of divided government in Taiwan. Clearly, there is still much potential for future research in this field.

Notes

Data analysed in this article were obtained from the 'Survey Research on Public Satisfaction with County/City Government Performance and Media Use', and we gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Tsu-cheng Chou, Director of the United Daily News' Survey Research Center in this respect. Any errors in the analysis or in the interpretation of the data are, of course, solely our own responsibility. We also thank the two anonymous referees and the editor of *Party Politics* for their constructive comments on an earlier version of the article.

- 1 The survey data were collected by means of telephone questionnaire interviews. To obtain the effective sample, systematic sampling was used to select the telephone households.
- 2 It is generally accepted that there are four ethnic groups in Taiwan; namely, the Taiwanese Minnans, the Taiwanese Hakka, the aboriginal people groups and the Mainland Chinese. The first two as a whole are referred to as 'Taiwanese' and the last as 'Mainlanders'. By definition, the term 'Mainlanders' refers to those who came to Taiwan from Mainland China after 1945 as well as their descendants.
- 3 In detailed terms, in relation to gender, male respondents are fixed as 1 and females as 0. For age, 20 to 29 years, 30 to 39 years, 40 to 49 years and 50 to 59 years are coded 1 and more than 60 years as 0. Regarding education, primary school or below, junior high school, senior high school or vocational school, and technical college are coded 1 and university or above as 0. For ethnicity, Taiwanese

Minnans, Taiwanese Hakka and Mainlanders are fixed as 1 and others as 0. As for party identification, we distinguish between those who identify with the KMT, DPP, PFP, NP and TSU and those with a specific party preference that are coded 1, while others are coded 0. With respect to types of local government, KK unified government, KP divided government, KM divided government, DP divided government and DM divided government are coded 1 and IM divided government is coded 0.

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Appendix A. Sample for the Survey on Public Evaluations of City/County Government Performance

<i>City/county</i>	<i>Sample size</i>	<i>Sampling error</i>
Taipei County	803	±3.5%
Taoyuan County	815	±3.4%
Hsinchu County	638	±3.9%
Miaoli County	606	±4.0%
Taichung County	801	±3.5%
Nantou County	614	±4.0%
Changhua County	811	±3.4%
Yunlin County	605	±4.0%
Chiayi County	618	±3.9%
Tainan County	819	±3.4%
Kaohsiung County	800	±3.5%
Pingtung County	703	±3.7%
Taitung County	623	±3.9%
Hualien County	600	±4.0%
Yilan County	619	±3.9%
Penghu County	601	±4.0%
Keelung City	600	±4.0%
Hsinchu City	616	±3.9%
Taichung City	802	±3.5%
Chiayi City	608	±4.0%
Tainan City	625	±3.9%
Total	14,327	

Appendix B. Questionnaire Wordings and Recoding for the Survey on Public Evaluations of City/County Government Performance

1. Generally speaking, are you satisfied with the local infrastructure of (City/County)?

(1) Very satisfied, (2) somewhat satisfied, (3) somewhat dissatisfied, (4) very dissatisfied. (Those with no opinion, answering 'don't know', or refusing to answer are rated missing value.)

2. Are you satisfied with the job performance of (City Mayor/County Magistrate's name)?

(1) Very satisfied, (2) somewhat satisfied, (3) somewhat dissatisfied, (4) very dissatisfied. (Those with no opinion, answering 'don't know', or refusing to answer are rated missing value.)

3. Could you tell me your age?

(1) 20 to 29, (2) 30 to 39, (3) 40 to 49, (4) 50 to 59, (5) above 60. (Those refusing to answer are ranked missing value.) (The category of 'above 60' is treated as a reference group.)

4. What is your level of educational attainment?

(1) Primary school or below, (2) junior high school, (3) high or vocational school, (4) technical college, (5) university or above. (Those refusing to answer are ranked missing value.) (The category of 'university or above' is treated as a reference group.)

5. Could you tell me your ethnic background? Taiwanese Hakka? Taiwanese Minnan? Or Mainland Chinese?

(1) Taiwanese Minnan, (2) Taiwanese Hakka, (3) aboriginal, (4) Mainland Chinese. (Those refusing to answer are ranked missing value.) (The category of 'aboriginal' is treated as a reference group.)

6. In our society, some people support the Democratic Progressive Party, some people support the Kuomintang, the People First Party, or the others. Could you tell me, which party do you support? [This means which party the respondent tends to support. If the respondent replies 'support none of them', 'hard to say', 'neutral', 'support all of them', 'don't know', 'not sure', or 'candidate-oriented rather than party-oriented', then follow up by asking: which party do you feel closer to?]

(1) Kuomintang, (2) Democratic Progressive Party, (3) People First Party, (4) New Party, (5) Taiwan Solidarity Union, (6) independents. (Those without any specific party preference, answering 'support none of them', 'hard to say', 'neutral', 'support all of them', 'not sure', and 'candidate-oriented rather than party-oriented', are collapsed and labelled as independents.) (Those with no opinion, answering 'don't know', or refusing to answer are rated missing value.) (The category of 'independents' is treated as a reference group.)

7. Respondent's sex?

(1) Male, (2) female. (The category of 'female' is treated as a reference group.)

CHUNG-LI WU, Associate Research Fellow, Institute of Political Science, Academia Sinica, received his MA and PhD from the University of New Orleans. His research interests focus on American politics (political institutions), comparative politics, urban and minority politics and international politics. He is the author of articles published in the journals *Party Politics*, *Journal of Black Studies*, *Asian Survey*, *China Report*, *International Relations of the Asia Pacific*, *Japanese Journal of Political Science*, *Southeastern Political Review*, *American Review of Politics* and several others.

ADDRESS: Institute of Political Science, Academia Sinica, 128 Academia Sinica Road, Section 2, Taipei 115, Taiwan. [email: polclw@gate.sinica.edu.tw]

CHI HUANG, a Chair Professor at National Chengchi University, received his BA and MA from National Chengchi University and his PhD from Indiana University. His research interests focus on political methodology and comparative politics, especially on survey research, quantitative methodology and voting behaviour. He has published articles extensively in international and Taiwanese political science journals. He is also co-editor (with Tun-jen Cheng and Samuel S. G. Wu) of the book (in English), *Inherited Rivalry: Conflict Across the Taiwan Strait* (Lynn Rienner, 1995) and co-editor (with Yung-min Hsu) of the book (in Chinese), *Level-of-Analysis Effects on Political Research* (Taipei: Weber, 2001). He is currently the chief editor of a Chinese-language journal, the *Taiwanese Political Science Review*.

ADDRESS: Department of Political Science, National Chengchi University, 64, Section 2, Zhi-nan Road, Wenshan, Taipei 116, Taiwan. [email: chihuang@nccu.edu.tw]

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