

行政院國家科學委員會補助專題研究計畫成果 報告

在西拉和查理德斯之間--布蘭登之規範的現象主義
In Between Scylla and Charybdis -- Brandom's Normative
Phenomenology

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執行期間： 民國 90 年 8 月 1 日至民國 91 年 7 月 31 日

計畫主持人：國立政治大學哲學系助理教授 林從一

計畫參與人員：國立政治大學哲學系博士生 王靈康兼任助理

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一、 中英文摘要

(一) 中文摘要

本研究的標的是布蘭登關於規範性的理論，因為它是布蘭登語意理論的主要基礎之一。布蘭登在 MIE 中提倡語意的推理理論(semantic inferentialism)，而該理論是立基於規範的實用主義(semantic pragmatics)。後者主張：語意概念必須要以關於人們的踐行(practice)的概念以及規範性的概念加以說明。簡言之，語意概念必須要以社會踐行中所隱含的規範(norm)加以說明。而布蘭登進一步認為要理解規範性概念，我們只能訴諸規範性概念，易言之，規範性是最基本的、不可化約的。布蘭登關於規範性的理論稱為規範的現象主義。規範的現象主義主張，我們的規範態度(deontic attitudes)以及管控(govern)我們的規範態度的踐行，制定(institute)了規範的地位(deontic statues)。更清楚的說，客觀的規範是藉由那些管控對規範態度的記分(score keeping)的踐行所制定。我們的問題是，一個以規範態度為基本概念的規範理論如何能說明規範的客

觀性？本研究發現或證明布蘭登對規範的客觀性所提出的證明是無效的，事實上，本研究指出，以布蘭登的證明方法，我們可以證明他的規範的現象主義將使規範的客觀性喪失。這個結果呈現出，布蘭登的語意理論存在著嚴重的缺失。本研究的成果主要受限於"On Brandom's Objectivity Proofs"一文中，並發表於 *Conference on Neo-Pragmatism*, Institute of European and American Studies, Academia Sinica, Taipei, August 26, 2001。

關鍵詞：布蘭登、規範的現象主義、客觀性

(二) Abstract

The main purpose of the research is to explore Robert Brandom's normative phenomenalism. I am mainly concern with its basic idea that our deontic attitudes and the practices that govern our deontic attitudes institute deontic statues. More specifically, I am try to make it clear and then evaluate his idea that objective norms are instituted by the practices that govern the score keeping

practices on deontic attitudes. Our question is then this: How can an account based on the concept of deontic attitudes be able to explain the objectivity of norms? How can such an account be able to trade in with an account of deontic statuses without secretly introducing circularity. My research has the following observations. The deontic scorekeeping model that Brandom utilizes to show how deontic attitudes can institute norm shows only that in *every scorekeeping perspective* there is always a possibility of subjective/objectivity distinction. In short, it only shows that Brandom can account for a kind of perspectival objectivity. However, I demonstrate that Brandom fails to account for the more substantial objectivity conviction that our attitudes are about things transcend our attitude in the sense that *we might all be wrong* about how things are. My observations are spelled out in detail in "On Brandom's Objectivity Proofs", a paper presented at *Conference on Neo-Pragmatism*, Institute of European and American Studies, Academia Sinica, Taipei, August 26, 2001.

Key words: Brandom, normative phenomenalism, objectivity

二、緣由與目的

布蘭登(Robert Brandom)的 *Making It Explicit*(MIE)的主張繼承並實質發展「維根斯坦」的意義的使用理論和 Wilfrid Sellars 的意義的推理理論

(Inferential Theory)的主要想法，並且至少為它們所遭遇的一些困難提供了可能的解決之道，然則由於對該書的系統研究實屬缺乏，本研究之目的即在於彌補這個缺口。本研究藉由參與中研院歐美所中長程計畫中「新實用主義」研究小組對布蘭登思想一年餘的討論，獲益甚多。

三、結果與討論

The problem we counter and the result we have are the following. In his *Making It Explicit* (1994), Robert Brandom advocates the view that semantic contents in general can and should be explicated by means of various structures exhibited by the social practices of *taking*, or *treating* linguistic practices as correct or incorrect. Brandom believes these content-conferring structure must be *inferentially* articulated, since the content of a linguistic expression just is the proper inferential role that speakers take it to have in social justificatory activities.

Brandom recognizes that one of the most serious conception challenges facing his pragmatics is the need to accommodate the objectivity conviction that our attitudes are answering to things that transcend our attitudes, at least in the sense that we might all be wrong about them. (137) He takes the challenge so seriously as to offer a 'proof' in the breath-taking chapter 8 of the book to demonstrate that his account does not

force upon itself the consequence that $(p)[(S) (S \text{ claims that } p) \rightarrow p]$, dubbed the *No Communal Error Condition* (hereafter, *NCE*). (602) (Brandom is proud of that he is the first one ever able to offer such a proof. (Brandom 1997: 200-201)). I argue in my paper "On Brandom's Objectivity Proofs" that Brandom's proof fails, and that both (*NCE*) and an even more undesirable consequence, the *No First-Person Error Condition*, $(p) [(I \text{ claim that } p) \rightarrow p]$, when adequately modified, result from his normative inferential pragmatics.

However, it has to be admitted that to secure my demonstration that Brandom fails to establish the objectivity of thought and talks, we have to give a general survey on his account of the representation dimension of thought and talks. I have not discussed the account in my paper just mentioned. It is my intention in another paper to give a detail story of it.

四、計畫成果自評

The paper "On Brandom's Objectivity Proofs", the production of

this research, has very good receptions from different corners. Many have suggested for its publication when it is ready in wordings. Currently, I am picking up some loose lines of the paper and preparing to submit it to *Analysis* or *Philosophical Reviews* by the end of the year. I observe that there is no one yet in the market having the same or similar idea with mine, and that there is no other article having a criticism on Brandom's concept of objectivity with the same decisive force of my criticism.

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