

量成果報告

治經濟到經濟政治(1/2) (A Dual Theory of Institutional
to Economic Politics)

evolutionary process of some important institutions, including their duration, magnitude, attribute, and scope. The study of the
the study of institutional change. Each institution under examination is a dual system. In this regard, this study examines the
economics and the system of economic politics.

勺)

ry of institutional change that analyzes the dynamic relations among politicians, businessmen, and bureaucrats. In this study,
h businessmen try to achieve their economic goals through political measures or activities. On the other hand, government is
eve their political goals through economic measures or activities. This study employs a specific institution (i.e. UPPITY) to
general background behind the theory can be briefly described as follows.

can greatly influence party, interest groups, and electoral politics. The nature of political economy rests on the reality that politicians and/or services are consistent with their interests (primarily high profits) in the economic market. To pursue their maximal interests in the political market. For example, they might directly (or send representatives to) participate in different political parties and political elite, or try to manipulate a public opinion that will serve their economic interests. Under ideal conditions, politicians act as economic mediators for businessmen, and direct bureaucrats to the economic objectives of businessmen.

These conditions cannot be met because politicians behave more than economic mediators in the political market. Politicians also want to succeed in the economic market. Politicians, for example, could be eager to establish their own reputation, credibility, and prestige. And in some cases, politicians engage in *political enterprise*. The nature of economic politics, therefore, rests on the reality that politicians expect those bureaucratic interests (primarily high fame) in the political market. Thus, they might directly (or send representatives to) participate in various activities for boosting local business and creating jobs (by urging government to do so), or try to outline an economic vision that in certain circumstances, politicians reversely apply various economic measures in the economic market. In other words, politicians

engage in various economic activities—building railroads and subways, stimulating economic growth, establishing social security and national transportation, upgrading education, designing policies for energy and environmental controls, and taxing to finance the vast economic goals are not frequently determined and identified by bureaucrats. Of course, educational bureaucrats might recognize that the goals of education. Nevertheless, they might not be able to decide or simply don't (want to) know *when, how much* and *how far* to do these things. Politicians are *constrained* and *weak* decision-makers. Very often, politicians might be able to economically and bureaucratic goals, consequently, are in line with the interests of politicians in the political market.

1 Discussions)

3 (UPPITY): Conventional wisdom, for example, fails to fully analyze the impact of giant financial and industrial corporations (3, 1985) has shown that the economic system of the United States is typified by the planning system and the market system. This study also analyzes the American economy and argued that the American economy has “centralized private sector planning.” This study also analyzes the economy of Taiwan. Specifically, this study contends that people in Taiwan live in a particular mode of centralized planning. This study defines the concept of **Public-Private Industry: Taiwan’s Yoke (UPPITY)**.

對象，經查證後發現：甲、乙、丙三人不僅為X公司的董事，且同時任職於Y公司，其中，甲、乙兩人係擔任Y公司的董事，丙則為Y公司的另一董事丁與Y公司的另一董事戊同為中國國民黨籍的公職人員（假設丁為國大代表而戊為立法委員）。再者，X、Y兩公司與此三公司的董事會席次。最後，X、Y兩公司亦同時為另外兩家未公開發行公司J、K之持投10% 以上之大股東。綜合分析交叉對應的空格中，以表1顯示之。分析之結果則以表2至表5顯示之。

表1: X、Y兩公司之連結關係對應表

Y公司	
2A (一級關係)	C (第三級關係)
B (二級關係)	3E+2F (第四級關係)

表2: 主控計畫體間的合作連結關係

	交通銀行股份有限公司	中國鋼鐵股份有限公司	遠東紡織股份有限公司	台灣水泥股份有限公司	永豐餘造紙股份有限公司	東雲股份有限公司
F	C(註2) 11E+4F	C(註3) 2E	2E+2F	C(註4) 7E+F	A* 5E	3E+F
A* B	10E+5F	2A* 7E+F	E+F	3E	E+F	2E
F		D(註5) E	3E+2F	C(註6) E	4E+F	4E
	D(註5) E		E	C(註7) 3E		
	3E+2F	E		3E+F	E+F	E
	C(註6) E	C(註7) 3E	3E+F		A* E	E
	4E+F		E+F	A* E		B 2E
	4E		E	E	B 2E	

泉英) 同時也是中華開發的董事長。

黨，故黨營事業集團與交通銀行經由黨務組織而產生聯繫。

黨，故黨營事業集團與中國鋼鐵經由黨務組織而產生聯繫。

國民黨中常會，其可參與黨營事業體系的運作。

中國鋼鐵為經濟部所轄的國營事業，兩者可透過行政機關而產生聯繫。

通銀行為國營企業，兩者可經由國民黨中常會而產生聯繫。

國鋼鐵為國營企業，兩者可經由國民黨中常會而產生聯繫

表3: 主控計畫體與上市公司的連結關係總表

相關資料 產業類別	個別產業所包含 的上市公司數目	產業中與狹義主控計畫體 有連結關係的公司總數及 所佔百分比		產業中與廣義主控計畫 體有連結關係的公司總 數及所佔百分比	
		總數	百分比	總數	百分比
食品百貨產業	40	16	40%	17	43%
水泥窯製產業	15	8	53%	8	53%
鋼鐵營建產業	57	29	51%	29	51%
汽車運輸產業	20	11	55%	12	60%
金融保險產業	44	37	84%	40	91%
塑膠化纖產業	48	21	44%	23	48%
造紙紡織產業	58	15	26%	20	34%
機電產業	36	17	47%	17	47%
電子產業	76	46	61%	46	61%
其他產業	31	5	16%	10	32%
合計	425	205	48%	222	52%

資料主要來源：整理歸納自經濟新報資料庫與證券暨期貨發展基金會圖書館線上資料庫

表4: 主控計畫體與上市公司之直接、政治連結關係

相關資料 產業類別	個別產業中 上市公司的 總數	產業中與主控計畫體有直接連結關係 (A 或 B)、政治連結關係 (C 或 D) 的公司總數及所佔百分比	
		直接連結 (A 或 B)	政治連結 (C 或 D)
食品百貨產業	40	4 (10%)	7 (18%)
水泥窯製產業	15	2 (13%)	1 (7%)
鋼鐵營建產業	57	12 (21%)	3 (5%)
汽車運輸產業	20	3 (15%)	5 (25%)
金融保險產業	44	13 (30%)	19 (43%)
塑膠化纖產業	48	3 (6%)	1 (2%)
造紙紡織產業	58	3 (5%)	3 (5%)
機電產業	36	7 (19%)	0 (0%)
電子產業	76	21 (28%)	1 (1%)
其他產業	31	3 (10%)	3 (10%)
合計	425	71 (17%)	43 (10%)

資料主要來源：整理歸納自經濟新報資料庫與證券暨期貨發展基金會圖書館線上資料庫

表5: 主控計畫體與上市公司之間接連結關係

相關資料 產業類別	個別產業中 上市公司的 總數	產業中與主控計畫體有直接 或政治連結關係的公司總數 及所佔百分比		產業中與主控計畫體所 建立的間接連結關係 (E+F) 之總數
食品百貨產業	40	9	23%	28(E)+6(F) = 34
水泥窯製產業	15	3	20%	24(E)+3(F) = 27
鋼鐵營建產業	57	14	25%	39(E)+8(F) = 47
汽車運輸產業	20	6	30%	20(E)+0(F) = 20
金融保險產業	44	27	61%	44(E)+10(F) = 54
塑膠化纖產業	48	4	8%	35(E)+6(F) = 41
造紙紡織產業	58	6	10%	41(E)+11(F) = 52
機電產業	36	7	19%	55(E)+8(F) = 63
電子產業	76	21	28%	89(E)+18(F) = 107
其他產業	31	4	13%	1(E)+0(F) = 1
合計	425	101	24%	446

資料主要來源：整理歸納自經濟新報資料庫與證券暨期貨發展基金會圖書館線上資料庫

Discussions: 在沿用並擴展 Munkirs (1985) 的制度分析後證實臺灣的經濟體系中的確存在一個影響力非比尋常之計畫部門。此研究所確認之臺灣經濟「主控計畫體」，其中的「黨營事業」集團與中華開發為民營企業，而交銀與中鋼則是國營企業，此一特殊之「官商合一」制度的型態，實際上構成

了「集權式的公、私部門統合計畫」的經濟計畫型態。在1998年底，與「主控計畫體」有連結關係的股票上市公司達205家，接近當時全部上市公司的一半（約48%）。而就產業別來看，「主控計畫體」與超過80%的上市金融機構及60%的上市電子公司有合作性的連結關係。另外就關係密切程度而言，「主控計畫體」亦與此二產業存有最高比例的直接（第一級或第二級）連結關係，顯現此一計畫部門於金融保險業及電子業的影響力最為深鉅。此一以「黨營事業」為首，在中國國民黨長期一黨專政下所演化形成之「官商合一」制度的經濟計畫模式，勢必將隨著中國國民黨於2000年總統大選的失敗結果而面臨相當程度的轉變，易言之，臺灣的經濟體系將迅即進入調整及轉型的過程。

10. 計畫成果自評 (Self-Evaluation)

- (1) 研究計畫中列舉所欲探討之「官商合一」制度 (UPPITY)，其中之部分研究成果已經發表於中央研究院中山人文社會科學研究所之《人文及社會科學集刊》。
- (2) 台灣之經濟體系已於2000年總統大選後進入調整及轉型的過程，對「官商合一」制度後續演變之探究將是一件刻不容緩的重要課題。

11. 參考文獻 (References)

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