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政黨投票行為之跨國比較

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中文摘要

本計畫比較美國、英國、日本及台灣的選民投票行為，預期在不同的選舉制度及政府結構的國家會發現不一樣的政黨認同對投票的影響。本計畫發現政黨認同在控制議題以及候選人評價的情況下，在這四個國家均有顯著的影響力，尤其是仍然採用單記不可讓渡複數選區制的台灣。這個研究証實了政黨認同不因國家的不同而減少其影響。

關鍵詞：國會選舉、投票行為、選舉制度、政府結構

Abstract

This research compares voting behavior in the US, Britain, Japan, and Taiwan. The assumption is, according to previous researches, the effect of partisanship on voting behavior varies with different electoral systems and government structures. The investigator finds that partisanship has a great deal of impacts on voting behavior in all of those four countries, controlling for candidate evaluations and issue positions. The empirical evidences suggest that the influence of partisanship is consistent across different countries with various government structure and electoral systems.

Keywords: congressional elections, voting behavior, electoral systems, government structures

Introduction

In the course of the development of political science, voting studies have been undoubtedly one of the major research topics. In the 1960s, the scholars at the University of Michigan characterized the voting decision process as a funnel of causality in which partisanship is the most important long-term force. Partisanship acts like group identification, such as religion and social class. People generally remain loyal to their party regardless of policy or leader change, thus party attachment is fairly stable across elections. Party identification also colors people's perceptions of issues and candidates. Short-term forces, like candidate perceptions and issues, are proximate to voting choice (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes, 1960; Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes, 1966). Although candidate evaluations and issue positions are more proximate to the voting act than is partisanship, party identification has a direct and an indirect influence on vote choice (Niemi and Weisberg, 1993). Therefore, partisanship anchors an individual's voting choices in the long term, which allows researchers to isolate short-term factors and short-term variables, and to identify the aggregate trend of voting choice (Converse, 1969; Beck, 1986). On the other hand, candidate evaluations and issue positions vary with time; voters may favor one party in one election and the other in another election (Stokes, Campbell and Miller, 1958; Stokes, 1966). The classical Michigan model is graphed in Figure 1.

(Figure 1)

In this model, party attachment is a long-term force exogenous to candidate evaluations and issue positions. People can identify themselves as one party's supporters despite they vote for the other party due to the candidate or issue positions. People can respond to short-term forces election by election, but their party attachment is strong enough that they vote along with their party identification when they see no difference between candidates (Niemi and Weisberg, 1993). Normally people would vote for their favorite party unless there is an appealing candidate or a special issue that pushes people to deviate from their party loyalty. In this regard, the classical model can be called "party voting theory."

Every nation is a context, and studying a country entails contrasting one context with another (Kohn, 1987). The theoretical significance of theory can be tested through comparative descriptive statements or a sophisticated model (Przeworski and Teune, 1970). If partisanship dominates voting behavior across boundaries, we will be confident of the generalizability of party voting theory. If the extent to which partisanship affects voting choice depends on the context, we can claim that party voting only exists in certain contexts and that, more importantly, political institutions constrain political behavior (Asher and Richardson, 1977).

The stable American two-party system contributes to the long-term party identification, and the presidential system encourages the exchange of interests between the president and congressmen, which leads to the candidate-centered campaign in both presidential and congressional elections. The declining partisanship and party image starting in the 1960s should be considered as the constraint of context. On the contrary, comparative research on political parties has already shown that government structure and election systems condition party development (Schattschneider, 1942; Epstein, 1967). Samuels (2002), therefore, maintains that the presidential system imposes "vote-seeking" incentives on political parties, which leads to a candidate-centered campaign. Therefore, it

is of importance to examine voting behavior across different countries.

The research hypothesis is that voters under different institutional arrangements would have same level of propensity to vote along with their partisanship. The level of party voting refers to the propensity that partisanship determines election choices in the national election. The implications of this research will be directed toward the validity of party voting theory.

Research Design

This project is aimed to look into the influence of partisanship on the choice of parties in several countries, which are arrayed by the number of seats in the district. Because the single-member district systems allow one party to nominate only one candidate, voters would emphasize party labels instead of candidate characteristics or constituency interests. On the contrary, the multi-member district systems tend to have more than one candidate from one party, which induces intra-party competition and weakens the influence of party label. The mixed type of both systems is expected to have moderate impact of partisanship on the voting decision.

Using multi-member districts, Taiwan, Japan before the 1994 electoral reform, and Korea before 1988 are expected to have the minimal party voting. Mexico and Japan after 1994 are expected to have moderate showing of party voting, because voters can vote in single-member districts and proportional representation districts. The US and Britain use single-member districts that ensures the high level of party voting.

The primary goal of this project is to collect survey data of Taiwan, Japan, Korea, Mexico, the US, and Britain. Due to the difficulty of data collection, however, only survey data of Taiwan, Japan, Britain, and the US are analyzed. The comparison of cross-national data reveals that party voting theory applies to countries other than the US.

Findings

The congressional elections of the US are used to have low rate of incumbent

turnout. Scholars therefore suggest that candidate evaluations play an important role in the elections (Hinckley, 1981; Jacobson, 1997). In this regard, it is expected that party voting theory does not apply to the case of the US congressional elections. The dataset from the 1998 National Election Study is analyzed.

Table 1 displays that partisan strength (strong identification with the Democratic Party is coded 7) positively affects the probability of voting for the Democratic Party. Nevertheless, the difference in candidate evaluations simultaneously influences the likelihood of the Democratic and the Republican vote. Issue positions on big government and individualism are not significant at all. Ideology affects the likelihood of voting for the Democratic Party; the more liberal the respondent is, the higher probability he votes for the Democrats. Economic evaluation is not an important predictor; the electorate cannot blame either party for the economy. In terms of demographic variables, low educated and young voters are less likely to vote for either party in the 1998 election.

(Table 1)

In Britain, class voting remains strong among voters, but party identification provides the other voting guide. Using the 1992 British General Election Cross-Section Survey, it is found that the effect of party identification is statistically significant, controlling for respondent's self-identified class.

(Table 2)

The coefficients of three dummy variables of party identification are positive and statistically significant. The influence of social class is also significant; people who identify themselves as working class tend to vote for the Labour Party. The level of education has an impact on the support of the Labour Party, but how people feel about the economy negatively affects their support for the Conservative Party.

The 1996 Japanese Election Democratization Study data provides another

test for party voting theory. Before the 1994 electoral reform, it was widely regarded that Japanese voters emphasize the candidate more than party labels because of the single non-transferable voting system (SNTV). After the reform, however, it is expected that Japanese voters turn to political parties since single-member districts replaced the multi-member districts. Therefore, party identification should override candidate evaluations in the 1996 election.

As shown in Table 3, party identification indeed affected the probability of voting for the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), New Frontier Party (NFP), and other minor parties. The relative difference between candidates remains critical to both LDP and NFP, but not other parties. Ideology (conservative v.s. liberal) negatively affects the probability of voting for the LDP and NFP because both parties are from the same conservative camp. People's stand on the issue of local politics is less important than partisanship, candidate evaluations, and ideology. Age has influence on the probability of turning out to vote.

(Table 3)

Taiwan's case study is important because Taiwan uses SNTV, which emphasizes candidates, and presidential system, which divides power into two halves and encourages members in the legislative body to seek interest from the executive body. Therefore, the party discipline should be the lowest among all types of government; party voting theory should not apply to Taiwanese voters.

Table 4 does not confirm this hypothesis; party identification measured by a seven-point scale is fairly significant in terms of voting behavior. Candidate evaluations have mixed effects on the voting choice; they only influence the probability of voting for the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Issue position on the independence/unification issue is critical to voting for the Kuomintang (KMT), but not the DPP. Because Taiwan just underwent the democratization, therefore it is necessary to control for party images. It is shown that

party images are important for both parties, which means that partisanship is independent from temporary images. In terms of demographic variables, only the level of education positively affects the likelihood of voting for the KMT.

(Table 4)

Conclusion

In this study, the individual case study approach has been used to disclose how people decide their vote choices on the grounds of ideology, partisanship, issues, and campaign context. The explanation regarding why a particular political attitude prevails in the country is context-specific, if not idiosyncratic.

All in all, the empirical evidence shows that party voting theory—partisanship is the most effective determinant of voting behavior—hold in these four cases. Despite that the incumbency advantage has played an important role in U.S. congressional elections since the 1940s (Mayhew, 1973; Fiorina, 1989), the electoral importance of party labels has not diminished. In Taiwan, moreover, partisanship remains dominant in terms of the vote decision because of intense party confrontation on democratization and unification issues. It is not surprisingly that voters in both Japan after 1994 and Britain embrace partisanship as they turned out to vote.

Party voting theory suggests that the assessment of candidates is largely related to personal characteristics of the candidates and very campaign-specific. The revisionists instead assert that the competing candidates are actually the focus of campaign (Kelly and Mirer, 1974; Page and Jones, 1979; Miller and Shanks, 1996). After the theory was constructed forty years later, nevertheless, the evidences suggest that partisanship still lies in the center of voting behavior.

Self-Review of Research

This study absolutely needs more cases to support the hypothesis. Due to the problem of data collection and the requirement of comparable variables, unfortunately, even the Britain case is not ideal for lacking the

candidate evaluation variable. Therefore, the project in practice does not perfectly match the original proposal in terms of research design and expectations.

Having said that, this project accomplishes the task of comparative voting behavior, which probably has been overlooked since Asher and Richardson (1977). Without a perfect comparative dataset, this approach at best uncovers differing voting patterns across countries. In the future, the findings will be examined more closely. The investigator may submit the findings to either Taiwan's journal or international one, especially in the field of comparative politics.

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
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Source: Whiteley (1988)

Figure 1. The classical Michigan model

Table 1. Multi-nomial logit estimates for US voting model, 1998

| | Democratic | Republican |
|-----------------|------------|------------|
| Constant | -5.386*** | -3.703*** |
| Partisanship | .270*** | -.231**** |
| Candidate | .477*** | -.529*** |
| Big Government | -.024 | -.140* |
| Individualism | -.019 | .083 |
| Ideology | .338* | -.186 |
| Incumbent | .866*** | -.572* |
| Economy | -.115 | .000 |
| Black | .440 | .069 |
| Age | 1.075*** | .958*** |
| Education | .591*** | .474*** |
| Number of Cases | 909 | |
| Pseudo-R-square | .3083 | |

Data: 1998 NES data

Note: Coefficients are maximum likelihood estimates with standard errors in parentheses.

Abstention is the comparison group. *: p<=.05, **: p<=.01, ***: p<=.001.

Table 2. Multi-nomial logit estimates for British voting model, 1992

| | Conservative | Labour |
|------------------|--------------|-----------|
| Constant | -.526 | -5.865*** |
| Conservative PID | 1.911*** | -1.328*** |
| Labour PID | -2.328*** | -2.185*** |
| Liberal PID | -3.348*** | -4.026*** |
| Class | -.481* | -.186 |
| Economy | -.832*** | .125 |
| Age | -.304 | .111 |
| Education | .087 | .184** |
| Number of Cases | 1194 | |

Pseudo-R-square .412

Data: 1992 British General Election data

Note: Coefficients are maximum likelihood estimates with standard errors in parentheses. Liberal Democratic Party is the comparison group. *: $p \leq .05$, **: $p \leq .01$, ***: $p \leq .001$.

comparison group. *: $p \leq .05$, **: $p \leq .01$, ***: $p \leq .001$.

Table 3. Multi-nomial logit estimates for Japanese voting model, 1996

| | LDP | NFP | Others |
|-----------|----------|-----------|----------|
| Constant | -2.106** | -2.804*** | -1.856** |
| LDP PID | .711** | -.470** | -.501** |
| NFP PID | .785** | 1.415*** | .850** |
| LDP can. | .099* | .104* | .012 |
| NFP can. | .110 | .373*** | .114 |
| Ideology | -.597** | -.410* | -.098 |
| Localism | -.063 | -.074 | -.187* |
| Education | .134 | .406 | .455* |
| Age | .537*** | .563*** | .702*** |

Number of Cases 955

Pseudo-R-square .202

Data: 1996 Japan Election Democratization Study

Note: Coefficients are maximum likelihood estimates with standard errors in parentheses. Abstention is the comparison group. *: $p \leq .05$, **: $p \leq .01$, ***: $p \leq .001$.

Table 4. Multi-nomial logit estimates for Taiwanese voting model, 1995

| | KMT | DPP |
|--------------|----------|---------|
| Constant | -.233 | -.619 |
| Partisanship | -.389*** | .189*** |
| DPP Can. | -.025*** | .082*** |
| Evaluation | | |
| Independence | -.096* | .023 |
| DPP Image | -.005* | .014*** |
| Education | -.026*** | .073 |
| Age | .309*** | .057 |

Number of Cases 1194

Pseudo-R-square .412

Data: 1995 Taiwan Legislative Election Data from Election Study Center

Note: Coefficients are maximum likelihood estimates with standard errors in parentheses. Abstention is the

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