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中文摘要：中國大陸與印度在 2009 年哥本哈根會議上的合作，對於兩國間的環境合作，具有指標性的作用。本研究強調中國大陸和印度間為因應氣候變遷所進行之環境外交的合作面向。建構中印環境外交的重要變數包括，「談判」、「合作」和「國內考量」。有鑒於，中、印永續發展的需求以及環境治理逐漸成為內生於兩國發展軌跡中的一部份，本研究主張，兩國間國內、雙邊、多邊等多層次的戰略環境談判，賦予了中印雙邊關係更加全面性的特質。

對於中印關係的研究，長久以來，受「零合」途徑的單一視角所束縛。細察其雙邊合作，其中雖然具有競爭的要素，但亦顯現出在全球舞台上針對氣候變遷談判以及達成具體減排進行合作的趨勢。本文探討，中、印環境合作的多重層次以及兩國間倡議形成的方式。其環境合作的外溢作用亦可見於兩國對於在跨界河川進行合作之需要的認知上。雖然，解決邊境爭端的失敗主導了更寬廣層次下的中印關係論述，然而，雙方在形成「對話框架」和「制度性交換」所展現的智慧，為中印關係引進了新的變數—對在國際平台(UNFCCC)上所面臨的共同問題(氣候變遷)，協調出共同立場的意願，這是一項眾所樂見的發展。

本研究，由於其強烈的政策意涵，為中、印在環境外交上的合作相關之探討提供重要的先例。

中文關鍵詞：環境外交、中國、印度、氣候變遷、談判、跨邊境、合作

英文摘要：Abstract

The significance of China-India cooperation in global environmental cooperation at the Copenhagen Conference in 2009 was but an indicator of the criticality of the issue for both countries. This research study undertaken for the NSC emphasizes the cooperative aspects of the environmental diplomacy between China and India on Climate Change. Powerful variables that constitute environmental diplomacy between the two countries include 'negotiation', 'cooperation' and 'domestic considerations.' With the need for sustainable development and environmental governance becoming an intrinsic part of their respective developmental trajectories, this research proposal advances the argument that strategic environmental negotiations between the two countries at multiple

levels - domestic, bilateral and multilateral - are lending comprehensiveness to the bilateral relationship.

China-India relations have for long been hostage to insular prisms of enquiry that are overwhelmingly based on 'zero-sum approaches.' Salient aspects such as economic interaction and competition are ascendant variables providing much needed variation to analyze their bilateral relationship. An investigation into their bilateral cooperation while revealing competitive elements also reveals a tendency to cooperate on global platforms in matters specific to climate change negotiations and efforts to generate concrete mitigation efforts. The study seeks to reveal the levels of cooperation between China and India on environmental issues and the methodologies driving initiatives between the two countries. A spillover aspect is also visible on the aspect of trans-boundary rivers with the two countries acknowledging the need for cooperation. While the wider discourse on China-India relations is dominated by the narrative on failing to reach closure on the vital boundary dispute, the sagacity displayed by both the sides in achieving 'dialogue custom' and 'institutional exchanges' is a welcome development that introduces a new variable to China-India relations - willingness to coordinate and articulate positions on common problems (Climate Change) faced at international fora (UNFCCC). As an academic exercise with strong policy implications, this study offers an important precedent in studying China and India's cooperation on environmental diplomacy.

英文關鍵詞： Environment, Diplomacy, China, India, Climate Change, Negotiations, Trans-boundary, Cooperation

Report Text

I. Introduction

Environmental diplomacy is a salient aspect of contemporary international interactions revolving around global concerns regarding the state of the environment. Embedded within international discourses on the environment especially the UNFCCC are myriad bilateral engagements between nations over common issues of import. China and India as the two largest developing countries of Asia share a relationship dominated more by animosity over a disputed boundary that has clouded development of relations. This research advances the argument that environmental cooperation between the two countries is a new factor gaining traction between the two countries and could emerge as a variable that introduces aspects of cooperation into an otherwise difficult relationship. “Cooperation” between India and China emerges as an antithetical position especially since the world is conditioned to accepting these two countries as being “competitors” and “rivals.” The coordinated positions adopted by the two countries at the UNFCCC were a welcome development that revealed to the world a new and unexpected facet of an “alliance” that could influence any final compact arising out of the UNFCCC. That said, China-India environmental cooperation is more than anything else only an illustration of the potential between the two countries when it comes to cooperating as opposed to their usual intransigence on other issues. This episode also has strong shades of domestic aspects to their respective negotiating positions at the international levels.

II. Research purpose

The aim of this research was to establish that the two countries have adopted a strategy of coordinating their positions on issues relating to Climate Change not because they want to be seen as being “obstacles” to a western agenda of forcing through an agreement on Climate Change but primarily owing to their domestic imperatives to ensure fair and equitable development to their vast populations.

The fundamental premises on which this research proposal was based were the following:

What prompts the two unlikely partners to cooperate?

How do the two countries conduct their environmental diplomacy?

Are there any emergent patterns of cooperation and will it lead to cooperation in other spheres? And,

Who are the agencies/actors involved in this process?

III. Literature Review

The importance of sustaining the environment around us and the impact of human activity plausibly responsible for inducing Climate Change has been a powerful hypothesis for close to two decades with the 1992 UNFCCC Earth Summit at Rio defining Climate Change as the following:

“Climate change” means a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods.¹

The ‘security impact’ of Climate Change has undoubtedly cast its influence in the years since. Climate Change and particularly global warming made a transition to become what Barry Buzan terms as an issue characteristic of “macrosecuritization” – the highlighting of which it is believed would lead to quick action.²

For long, an anguish felt by the Global South was that they counted for little and their collective weight was not of strength but of “marginalization, disenfranchization” imposed on it by the international system. To Adil Najam, the Global South has always received short shrift in negotiations where the powerful and developed countries have held an upper hand. Najam sees three phases in the Global South’s negotiating posture on the Environment – the pre-Stockholm period marked by the politics of ‘contestation’; the Stockholm to Rio period highlighted by ‘reluctant participation’ and the post-Rio period marked by ‘engagement.’³

Irrespective of the negotiations on Climate Change at the international systemic level, the contested nature of the subject and its importance to the “domestic” cannot be underplayed. The importance of the two-level game can also be applied to negotiations on Climate Change and the direction in which current negotiations are headed. “International outcomes” it is argued by Robert Putnam are “significantly improved by understanding internal bargaining” when faced with the prospect of making minimally acceptable compromises.⁴

By themselves negotiations also reflect the introduction of a political temperament to issues of a conflictual nature and that require consensus building. Negotiations represent a salience to the issue at hand and bring to the table bilateral faith and expectations that solutions are at hand. As such negotiations do not need to conform to a template or model and are unique in their approach and methodology.⁵ The participants in such an exercise are aware that environmental issues are varied and each category has different solutions and they need not agree with the next category of issues at hand. In the case of neighbors, the same issue is invariably seen through different prisms. They bring to the “negotiating sphere” not only their interests and official “lines” but also other variables such as attitudes, political culture, bureaucratic temperament, institutional rigidity, emotions etc. Negotiations are to be seen as an “instrument that manage trans-boundary environmental risks”⁶ and evolve a position on

¹ United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), Article 1, *Full Text of Convention*. Available at: http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/background/items/2536.php (Accessed on 30 November 2011).

² Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, “Macrosecuritisation and security constellations: reconsidering scale in securitisation theory” *Review of International Studies* (Cambridge) Vol. 35, No.2, 2009, p.271.

³ Adil Najam, “Developing Countries and Global Environmental Governance: From Contestation to Participation” *International Environmental Agreements*, No.5, 2005, p. 304.

⁴ Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games” in Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson and Robert D. Putnam (eds.) *International Bargaining and Domestic Politics – Double Edged Diplomacy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), p.437.

⁵ On the schema of ‘negotiations’ see Stephen Krasner (ed.) *International Regimes* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983) and Deborah D. Stine, *International Environmental Decision Making* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, 1994).

⁶ Gunnar Sjostedt, “International Negotiation and the Management of Transboundary Risks” Ch.10 in Joanne Linnerooth – Bayer, Ragnar E. Lofstedt and Gunnar Sjostedt (eds.) *Transboundary Risk Management* (London: Earthscan Publications, 2001), p.280.

issues of common import. The importance of regular negotiations between actors is that they lead to a socialization of each other that could lead to a routine procedural process and increased consensual knowledge. To quote Gunnar Sjostedt:

“The problems of coping with environmental issues in international decision making ultimately depend on how those issues are framed and conceived by the policy makers in the negotiating arena. This arena includes not only those negotiating the issues at the table, but also the authorities and other actors “back home”, to whom the negotiators are accountable.”⁷

In a more specific manner, actors evolve positions as they participate in protracted consultations and negotiations. Climate Change issues fulfill this ‘category’ and it is interesting to note the importance China attaches to issuing official White papers. Climate Change and the Environment are not exempt from this kind of an approach.⁸ The White Paper issued in November 2011 is a case in point: To quote

“China has been playing a constructive role in international negotiations on climate change, actively pushing forward the negotiation process, thereby making a significant contribution to addressing global climate change.”⁹

The release of the White Paper coincided with the Conference of Parties 17 to be held in Durban and is to be seen as an instance of China’s environmental diplomacy at work. Most significant is China’s pitch on the “responsibilities” involved in negotiating Climate Change and its role as being a “constructive” one.

The semantic contributions made by Chinese scholars to Climate Change issues is also deeply impressive as it reveals nuances that are a pointer to postures China could adopt in the coming years. For instance, Zhang Haibin views that China is likely to accept reduction commitments if the cost is low, but the commitments will be divided into four phrases: voluntary, conditional, voluntary and conditional, and legally-binding reductions.¹⁰ However, the process can be speeded up if China reaches a much desired goal of becoming a middle-income country. Wang Limao holds similar views arguing that China’s per capita emission is only half the world’s average and before China becomes a middle income country, it can consider holding the intensity of carbon dioxide emission constant.¹¹ Qin Dahe recognizes the increasing pressure on China to reduce emission, but it is economically infeasible for China to do so at this moment because 70 percent of China’s energy comes from coal and there exists no economic model of low emission leading to high growth.¹² Zhang Kunmin and Wen Zongguo also view that advanced countries should adhere to the

⁷ Gunnar Sjostedt, *Ibid.*, p.281. Also see, Gunnar Sjostedt (ed.) *International Environmental Negotiation* (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1993).

⁸ See *Implementation of the Bali Roadmap – China’s Position on the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference*, 20 May 2009.

⁹ See White Paper on *China’s Policies and Actions for Addressing Climate Change*, Information Office of the State Council, PRC, November 2011, Beijing.

¹⁰ Zhang Haibin, “Zhongguo yu guoji qihou bianhua tanpan,” (China and International Climate Change Negotiation). *Guoji zhengzhi yanjiu*, (International Politics Quarterly) (Beijing) 2007, p. 35.

¹¹ Wang Limao, “Zhongguo yingdui qihou bianhua tanpan de jidian sikao”, (Consideration of China Coping with Negotiations for Global Climate Change). *Qihou bianhua yanjiu jinzhan*, (Advances in Climate Change Research) (Beijing) 1, No. 5 (May), pp. 35-37.

¹² Qin Dahe, “Quanqiu qihou yu huanjing yanbian ji duice”, (The Global Climate and Environment Change and the Countermeasures). *Zhongguo keji jiangli*, (China Awards for Science and Technology) (Beijing), No. 1: 37-38.

Kyoto Protocol and other reduction agreements. At the same time, China should increase energy efficiency, develop renewable energy and control population as the means to assist the reduction of CO₂ emissions.¹³ All authors have mentioned common but differentiated responsibility.

On bilateral cooperation between China and India on environmental issues and more specifically on water issues the views and observations made by Chinese scholars is impressive. For instance, Zhang Jincui, states that “water conservancy (sic.) projects are the bridge linking China and India” and “water should be the beginning of bilateral cooperation, not conflict.”¹⁴ Adding a unique perspective, Zhang Jincui introduces a game theory aspect to ‘water security’ between China and India and opines that the two countries are caught between a ‘Prisoner’s dilemma’ and a ‘coordination game’ owing to two factors – extant bilateral difficulties and differences, and, lack of information nodes regarding water security between the two countries.

Continuing along this line is Wang Bin who is of the opinion that with more than three decades of international environmental diplomacy expertise, China and India need to encourage a “flow of dialogue, share experiences in environmental protection and sustainable development and look for innovative solutions” since the sustainable development of Asia is not possible without the cooperation of the two countries.¹⁵ Lan Jiansyue also makes a case for Sino-Indian relations becoming deeper with water resources security deserving the attention” of policy makers on both sides.¹⁶

IV. Research Method

This research employed a rationalistic analytical framework that focused primarily on the conjunction between domestic politics and environmental diplomacy and its expression into national negotiating positions at the international systemic level.

V. Conclusion

National governments adopt policy postures that maximize their own capabilities to accommodate domestic pressures, while looking to minimize the adverse fallout from international developments or processes of negotiations that have their own set of dynamics. Any international concord gaining wide acceptance still has to be ratified domestically and internal political considerations could derail a government’s tacit acceptance of an international agreement. A fractious issue like Climate Change has its own domestic

¹³ Zhang Kun-min and Wen Zong-guo, “Zhongguo guanyu quanqiu biannuan de guandian yu duice”, (China’s Point of View and Countermeasures on Global Warming), *Zhongguo ruankexue* (China Soft Science) (Beijing) 2011, No. 7: pp. 8-10.

¹⁴ Zhang Jincui (Office of Military Studies, Shanghai University). “Yingduei shueizihyuan jhengduan:zhong yin celyue de boyilun fensi (Sino-Indo Strategy Game on Water Resource Dispute).” *Nanya yanjiou jikan* (South Asian Studies Quarterly, Chengdu) 2010 (4), p.19. pp. 15-21.

¹⁵ Wang Bin (College of Law, Qingdao University). “Shilun zhong yin huanjing hezuo wenti (The Issues on Sino-Indian Environmental Cooperation).” *Shangqiu shifan xuebao* (Journal of Shangqiu Teachers College, Henan: Shangqiu) Vol. 24, No.4, 2008, pp. 65-66. Also see Li Xiangyun, “Cong yindu shuizhengce kan zhong yin bianjiexian zhong de shui wenti (Analysis on the Water Issues Along the Sino-Indian Border: From the Perspective of India’s Water Policy)” *Shuili fazhan yanjiu* (Water Resources Development Research, Beijing) Vol. 10 No.3, 2010, pp. 68-70.

¹⁶ Lan Jiansyue (Centre of South Asian Studies, China Institute of International Studies). “Shueizihyuan ancyuan hezuo yu zhong yin guansi de hudong” (The Cooperation on Water Resource Security and The Interaction of Sino-Indian Relations).” *Guoji wunti yanjiou* (International Studies, Beijing) No.6, 2009, pp. 37-43.

reciprocal influences and it is the decision-makers job to reconcile the divergent views of the 'domestic' and the 'international' and achieve a modicum of congruence.

On 'cooperation,' it is not that there is no hope and the future of Sino-Indian hydrogeopolitics is dire. Rather, the issue of sharing river waters offers prospects for cooperation - not conflict. China and India need to initiate a comprehensive structured dialogue on water issues with the objective of institutionalizing the same by setting up a Commission that bears overall responsibility for all trans-boundary rivers flowing into India. With regard to the Brahmaputra/Yarlung Zangpo, as a downstream nation, Bangladesh needs to be part of any initiative. If one were to look for a template within the extended region the best instance of this has been the Indus Water Commission (IWC).

In other words, the creating of an institutional structure flexible enough to accommodate a wide tapestry of stakeholders (technical experts / water related bureaucracies etc.) will have the effect of "de-securitizing" a potential flashpoint and encourage much needed dialogue custom between the participants. Encouraging signs are visible in this direction and bilateral cooperation between the two countries although nascent, offers pointers to the future. In 2002, India signed an MoU with China for provision of Hydrological information on Yaluzangbu/Brahmaputra river in flood season' by China to India. This MoU was for a period of five years. Abiding by the provisions of the MoU, China provided hydrological information on the water level, discharge and rainfall in respect of three stations, namely, Nugesha, Yangcun and Nuxia located on river Yaluzangbu/Brahmaputra from 1st June to 15th October every year - data that helped in the formulation of flood forecasts by the Central Water Commission (CWC) and also to alert state governments along the course of the river to prepare for any exigencies. A new MoU with a validity of five years was signed with China on 5 June 2008.¹⁷

A separate MoU was signed during the visit of Wen Jiabao to India in April 2005 for supply of hydrological information in respect of Sutlej (Langquin Zangbu) in flood season. China provides hydrological information from the Tsada station on river Sutlej. A new MoU on supply of flood season hydrological information on River Sutlej had been agreed in August 2010 by both the countries for signature by the two countries. The landslide dam that formed on the Parechu river in 2004 and its bursting in 2005 leading to sudden discharge into the Sutlej was perhaps a moment of truth for both the sides. Another vestige of cooperation is the Joint Expert Level Mechanism (ELM) headed by Joint Secretary level officials to discuss interaction and cooperation on provision of flood season hydrological data, emergency management and other issues regarding trans-border rivers existing between the two countries since 2006.¹⁸ The ELM meets every year on a reciprocal basis.

For China and India, negotiations on climate change are contentious, to say the least, since their respective policy making segments and domestic polity view the "environment" as being an indivisible part of "sovereignty." It could be argued that their institutional frameworks are predisposed to a "monolithic understanding of sovereignty."¹⁹ Further, the

¹⁷ "India-China Cooperation" Ministry of Water Resources, Government of India. Available at: <http://www.wrmin.nic.in/printmain3.asp?sslid=372&subsublinkid=290&langid=1> (Accessed on 23 April 2012)

¹⁸ See 'Water Sharing Relations with China' Rajya Sabha Unstarred Question No. 3910 by Kumar Deepak Das, 8 September 2011, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India.

Available at: <http://mea.gov.in/mystart.php?id=220118234> (Accessed on 23 April 2012)

¹⁹ Karen T. Litfin, *The Greening of Sovereignty in World Politics* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998), p.4.

discourse on Climate Change in both the countries has strong shades of “a political and cultural framing” which to the developed countries is an approach that typifies a “self-serving exercise” scripted by powerful domestic actors on the environment.²⁰

VI. Discussion/Suggestion

Self-Assessment of Research Results: Consistency with the proposal

Let us scrutinize the four fundamental questions that motivated this research and how the research undertaken and performed revealed answers that make for interesting insights that were to a large extent in congruence with the proposal.

1. *What* prompts the two unlikely partners to cooperate?

Environmental threats are asymmetrical and unlike conventional threats are non-reciprocal. As an existential threat the prospect of Climate Change assumes stark overtones since its impact (and influence) go beyond the territorial limits of nation states. With every year witnessing a march towards a global compact on Climate Change, all nations are participants to a process where the ‘transformative’ power of the ‘global ecology’ triumphs over other contentious issues. It is widely acknowledged that the construction of a ‘new social episteme’ – comprising ‘the spatial, metaphysical and doctrinal’ – is renovating global governance as never before.²¹ Climate Change as an issue is “sovereignty” neutral and establishes a conundrum for states that legitimize themselves and the political system they have created around this core precept. Policies directed towards addressing Climate Change are to be seen as a reaction to environmental problems at an overarching level. Below this level are units that make up the national and sub-national levels that are driven by interests of a local and sector specific nature. The interests based politics of environment primarily focus on the domestic determinants that influence negotiations in international forums.²²

2. *How* do the two countries conduct their environmental diplomacy?

‘Cooperation’ in any aspect requires the consent and willingness of the actors involved. Environmental cooperation is no different and in an international setting provides an interface at different levels. The first level involves two actors displaying the requisite temperament to sort common problems. At the second level, we have two distinct political cultures and institutional sub-systems striving to create a common methodology to address the common problems. The third level provides the necessary interface between science and policy where narrow self-interests are to be restrained and make way for scientific prediction that dovetails with the issue of common grievance.²³ To quote Zhang Yan, the Chinese ambassador to India:

Karen T. Litfin proposes that if “sovereignty” were understood as a “socially constructed institution” varying across time and space with interpretative meanings, its relationship to the environment can be studied. (p.4)

²⁰ Piers M. Blakie and Joshua S.S. Muldavin, “Upstream, Downstream, China, India: The Politics of Environment in the Himalayan Region,” *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* (Washington, DC), Vol.94, No.3, p.522.

²¹ Veronica Ward, “Sovereignty and Ecosystem Management: Clash of Concepts and Boundaries?” Ch.4 in Karen T. Litfin, *The Greening of Sovereignty in World Politics* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998), p.82.

²² Detlef Sprinz and Tapani Vaahtoranta, “The Interest – Based Explanation of International Environmental Policy” *International Organisation* (Cambridge, MA) Vol. 48, No.1, Winter 1994, p.78-79.

²³ John Vogler and Mark F. Imber (eds.) *The environment and international relations* (London: Routledge, 1996), pp.24-26.

“Climate change, one of the most important issues of 2009, has also become a facet of China-India cooperation. Both countries share similar concerns and positions in addressing climate change and closely consulted and coordinated with each other”²⁴

The Agreement signed between China and India to cooperate on Climate Change in October 2009 chiefly highlights the following:

- Adopting a common position on an eventual deal
- Cooperating in creating mechanisms to reduce GHGs
- Cooperating in areas such as energy efficiency, renewable and transfer of technology

The agreement is for a period of five years and a Joint Working Group will also be set up to exchange views on climate change talks, adoption of domestic policies and to monitor the implementation of joint cooperative projects.²⁵ Crucially, the five year period will inform analysts and others whether the two countries have managed to generate levels of coordination, communication and implementation of the nuances emerging from the high level summitry around Climate Change. If the ‘cooperation’ between the two countries is bound to generate an accommodation of their views (however diluted) in an eventual agreement on Climate Change it would undoubtedly be a positive development. The agreement on cooperation between China and India is one of the several joint initiatives undertaken by both the sides to negotiate their way through Climate Change as a process of international negotiation. An earlier agreement signed by both the sides in 1993 for a period of five years was not renewed, owing perhaps to the developments in bilateral relations following Pokhran II in May 1998.

Apart from bilateral cooperation, the two countries have actively participated in multilateral forums and issued regular statements on environmental cooperation displaying an approach that values bilateral and multilateral approaches to Climate Change negotiations. (See Table)

Table 1
Bilateral and Multilateral Environmental Agreements / Statements Issued
emphasizing Cooperation on Climate Change between India and China

Agreement / Joint Statement	Date
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation between the Government of the People’s Republic of China And the Government of the Republic of India	7 September 1993
Agreement on Cooperation on Addressing Climate Change Between the Government of the People’s Republic of China And the Government of	21 October 2009

²⁴ Zhang Yan, “Bonding at Copenhagen Cemented India-China Relations” *Outlook* (New Delhi) 18 January 2010.

Available at: www.outlookindia.com

²⁵ See Text of *Agreement on Cooperation on Addressing Climate Change Between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of India*, Press Information Bureau, Government of India, 21 October 2009. Available at: <http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=53317> (Accessed on 12 September 2011).

the Republic of India	
Joint Statement Issued at the Conclusion of the Third BASIC Ministerial Meeting on Climate Change, Cape Town	25 April 2010
Joint Statement Issued at the Conclusion of the Fourth BASIC Ministerial Meeting on Climate Change, Rio De Janeiro	25-26 July 2010
Joint Statement Issued at the Conclusion of the Fifth BASIC Ministerial Meeting on Climate Change, Tianjin	11 October 2010
Joint Communique at Tenth Russia-India-China Ministerial Meeting, Wuhan	15 November 2010
Joint Statement Issued at the Conclusion of the Sixth BASIC Ministerial Meeting on Climate Change, New Delhi	26-27 February 2011
Joint Statement Issued at the Conclusion of the Seventh BASIC Ministerial Meeting on Climate Change, Zimbali, Durban	29 May 2011
Joint Statement Issued at the Conclusion of the Eighth BASIC Ministerial Meeting on Climate Change, Inhotim, Minas Gerais	26-27 August 2011
Joint Statement Issued at the Conclusion of the Ninth BASIC Ministerial Meeting on Climate Change, Beijing	1 November 2011
Agreed Minutes of the First China-India Strategic Economic Dialogue, Beijing	26 September 2011
Joint Statement Issued at the Conclusion of the Tenth BASIC Ministerial Meeting on Climate Change, New Delhi	13-14 February 2012

Note: The importance and intensity of consultations revolving around Climate Change are evident from the five meetings held in 2011 by the countries comprising the BASIC.

It is argued that as the two countries have intensified their domestic process of economic transformation, their relative success has attracted disparate coalitions who have invoked the phenomenon of ‘global warming’ to ensure compliance in adhering to nascent international norms that seek to address environmental concerns. By initiating cooperation on Climate Change, China and India have displayed an atypical characteristic to their otherwise tense relationship fraught with the constant recalling of events that led to a rupture five decades ago. That India and China are cooperating is the consequence of their becoming large emitters and their being under the glare of international environmental scrutiny. Cooperation between the two countries could go a long way in mitigating climate change, reduce environmental stress and damage to the ecology regionally and globally.²⁶

3. *Are* there any emergent patterns of cooperation and will it lead to cooperation in other spheres?

²⁶ Kamaljit S. Bawa et al, “China, India and the Environment” *Science*, Vol. 327, 19 March 2010, p.1457.

An outcome of China-India cooperation on Climate Change is the initiation of ‘linkages.’ The linkages emergent are politically neutral and policy oriented with their value sets. Three value sets clearly noticeable are:

Functional linkages – when an action (natural) leads to a variety of consequences applicable to both the sides, for instance, the melting of glaciers or the formation of a high altitude lake following a cloudburst or landslide with the potential to cause destruction on both sides.

Actor linkages – when one or the same set of actors is involved in different issues and positions adopted. For instance the ‘group bargaining’ approach ascribed to the G77 or the AOSIS at Climate Change conventions.

Value linkages – when the perception gains ground that different events are part of the same issue with the same invoking of values. For instance, the developed countries position on capping CO2 emissions motivates China and India to coalesce their arguments with strong overtones of national interests cloaked within overall values and their merits.

India’s approach to international concerns over climate change and the need for a global compact revolve around three fundamental positions: no absolute emission cuts; no commitment to any accord that sidelines Kyoto Protocol and no signing of any agreement or treaty without domestic consensus. Adherence to the Kyoto Protocol, principles of the UNFCCC according to the mandate of the Bali roadmap are a basic issue of faith for China and India with the expectation that industrialized countries will not hollow out these precepts.²⁷ India also wants to play a key role in facilitating a solution to Climate Change by being a consensus builder. It is said that when Prime Minister Manmohan Singh appointed Jairam Ramesh as the Minister of Environment and Forests, he instructed him, “India has not caused the problem of global warming. But try to make sure that India is part of the solution.”²⁸

The need for domestic consensus also agrees with policy debates in China and India that call for directing development towards a sustainable path. To quote Yu Hai:

“In dealing with international environment cooperation, we insist on a basic principle that international issue (sic.) is an extension of domestic issue.”²⁹

Positive spillovers of the China-India cooperation are also encouraging regional initiatives on environmental cooperation with China, India and Nepal launching a trans-boundary project to conserve the “highly diverse” and “environmentally fragile area” spanning the mountainous and sacred Himalayan region of Mount Kailash.³⁰ With both countries

²⁷ Paragraph 11 of *Joint Communiqué of the Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China*, 16 December 2010.

²⁸ Daniel Yergin, *The Quest: Energy, Security, and the Remaking of the Modern World* (New York: Penguin, 2011), p. 511.

²⁹ Yu Hai, “Global Environment Change and China’s International Environmental Cooperation” *International Review*, Issue No.2, 2008, p.16.

³⁰ “Project to conserve Mount Kailash launched” *The Hindu* (New Delhi) 11 April 2010. Available at: <http://www.hindu.com/2010/04/11/stories/2010041156971300.htm> (Accessed on 27 September 2011). Institutions involved in this initiative under the aegis of the International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) are, from the Indian side, the G. B. Pant Institute of Himalayan Environment & Development (GBPIHED as Lead Institute); the Wildlife Institute of India (WII as Partner Institute) and the Forest Department of Uttarakhand

investing substantially in renewable energy, there is a need for active bilateral cooperation on “renewables” as this aspect is still in its primary stages.³¹ There is the probability of negative spillovers too. Trans-boundary risks especially those involving rivers and glaciers could get aggravated in the absence of specific dialogue mechanisms addressing the fears of lower riparian countries of the Himalayan sub-region.

Climate change coupled with increased levels of pollution – terrestrial and atmospheric – in an alarming manner is beginning to influence weather patterns across the Indian sub-continent. The shrinking of glaciers in the Himalaya’s, distorted rainfall patterns, intense spells of summer and winter are without doubt in the future going to influence the economic trajectory and livelihoods of more than a billion people in India alone. Stretching this point, if it were to be noticed that climatic change is influencing agricultural output and also responsible for internal displacement owing to rising sea levels, nothing short of a catastrophe awaits policy makers and the affected.³² Echoing these concerns was Jairam Ramesh, the former Minister of Environment and Forests in India during a parliamentary debate.

The most vulnerable country in the world to climate change is India. We are dependent on monsoons...they are the lifeline of our country... We are depressed when the monsoons fail and happy when the monsoons are good... The uncertainty caused by climate change on the monsoons is of first and overriding priority of India.³³

For China and India, environmental sustainability and economic development are inextricably linked. To quote Hu Jintao:

Climate change is an issue arising in the course of human development. It is associated with both natural factors and human activities. It is an environmental issue, but also, and more importantly, a development issue, as it is closely connected with the development stage, way of life, size of population and resource endowment of different countries and their places in the international division of labor. In the final analysis, we should and can only advance efforts to address climate change in the course of development and meet the challenge through common development.³⁴

The above quote is a considered position adopted by China and articulated by its President, and is an illustration of how Climate Change and Environment negotiations have matured in the past four decades since the Stockholm Conference of 1972.

4. *Who* are the agencies/actors involved in this process?

state as a partner organization, who bring to the project their skills and expertise in conservation of mountainous terrain. The Ministry of Forests will be the nodal partner from Nepal, and the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) will be the lead partner and nodal reference institution from China.

³¹ Huang Liming, “A study of China-India cooperation on renewable energy field” *Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews*, (Amsterdam), No. 11, 2007, pp. 1739-1757.

³² Pranab Bardhan, *Awakening Giants, Feet of Clay – Assessing the Economic Rise of China and India* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), pp.120-21.

³³ Daniel Yergin, *Ibid.*, p.511.

³⁴ “Join Hands to Address Climate Change” Statement by H.E. Hu Jintao, President of the People’s Republic of China At the Opening Plenary Session of the United Nations Summit on Climate Change, 22 September 2009, New York.

Available at: <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/zyjh/t606275.htm> (Accessed on 3 January 2012)

The NDRC deals with the overall coordination and response to climate change in China.³⁵ The two countries have maintained close contacts since Bali (2007) and throughout the Copenhagen conference in which they joined Brazil, the US, and South Africa in making the Copenhagen Accord non-binding.³⁶ Behavioral aspects of China's ongoing efforts in negotiating for itself a deal at the Climate Change talks include:

- ✓ A constant emphasis on its active role in international negotiations under the UN framework
- ✓ International consultation and consensus to be the basis of any eventual agreement
- ✓ Calling for more exchanges and coordination between developed and developing countries on Climate Change

The Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF) has been representing India at international forums on Climate Change and its allied debates. India's negotiating behavior broadly emphasizes the following three salient points:

- ✓ Adherence to the principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities."
- ✓ Reliance on multilateral approaches that reflect the voice of the majority over that of the powerful minority
- ✓ Right to domestic development being a non-negotiable aspect³⁷

Whether achieved the expected goal

VII. Findings

The positions adopted by China and India at global conventions on Climate Change and Sustainable Development reflect their priorities of internal economic development. The challenge facing the two countries is to create a custom of cooperation – through dialogue mechanisms and bilateral institutional forums - that ensure a delicate balance between sustainable development and continued economic growth. These conjoined existential necessities generate political goodwill in India for the government of the day and continued legitimacy in China for the Communist Party of China.

As an overlap issue, impacting the domestic political sphere and influential enough to warrant constant international pressure to comply with evolving global norms, the positions China and India adopt towards Climate Change are introducing 'game changing'

³⁵ Kong Fanwei (School of International Relations and Public Affairs, Fudan University), "Qianxi zhongguo qihou waijiao de zhengce yu xingdong (The Policies and Actions of China's Climate Diplomacy)" *Xin shi ye (Expanding Horizons)*, Beijing) No. 4, 2008, pp. 94-96.

³⁶ Amb. Shyam Saran (ret'd), The Prime Minister of India's former special envoy on Climate Change at a talk delivered at the Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, Taipei on 16 December 2010.

³⁷ Preety M . Bhandari, "India: Sustainable development and climate change policy contexts" in Y. Kameyama *et al* (eds.) *Climate Change in Asia: Perspectives on the future climate regime* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2008), p.92.

aspects to their international relations. The linkages that emerge between the domestic and the external or alternately the national and the international are unmistakable.³⁸

Despite different internal structures of governance, China and India coordinate positions on Climate Change since at stake are their carefully constructed programs of national development. Politically, for both the countries, agreeing to a binding treaty on Climate Change is not feasible at present and will erode the legitimacy of their respective leaderships with the added corollary of internal political impact such a decision would have.

China and India need to go beyond the corpus of agreements and statements issued on cooperation regarding Climate Change and need to conduct joint studies on Climate Change in a comprehensive manner. Cooperative technical and academic research is scant, if not absent in the public domain, and if initiated, will transform the manner in which current policy making is made regarding Climate Change by providing more choices to decision-makers and stakeholders to approach this crucial issue. Scientific knowledge and data, independently and collaboratively on issues pertaining to the environment and interaction between technical and policy research institutions needs to be encouraged between China and India on all aspects of Climate Change, especially, mitigation, funding, clean technologies, strategic impact and negotiations. A constant analytic and deliberative process between China and India on the environment has its benefits in guiding analyses, formulating problems, generating independent data and variables, providing unique theoretical models and anticipating uncertainties.

India will not accept any legally binding reduction agreement, and advanced countries must fulfill the obligation under the climate change agreements.³⁹ This creates space for India and China to cooperate in emission reduction issues as developing countries but with the caveat that India has always pointed out its emissions as being half of China's - and that is quite a substantial difference.⁴⁰

Researching aspects of negotiations on Climate Change threw up a surprising finding. There are broadly four types of states involved in the contentious debates over Climate Change. 'Lead states' are those who take the initiatives to set the agenda, prepare backgrounders and detailed technical bulletins, persuade others of the seriousness of the issue and volunteer mitigation by providing funding and expertise. 'Supporting states' are the ones that go along with the agenda set by 'lead states.' The third category comprises 'swing states' who are vociferous in demanding concessions to go along with the agenda and the fourth category comprises 'veto states' who are labeled so as they block initiatives and dilute proposals. China and India to the agenda setting states (the developed countries) are the centrifugal force driving the last category. The 'veto coalition' or dyad made up of the two countries is undoubtedly an irritant to those groupings having solutions to mitigate Climate Change.

China's Climate Change diplomacy is a key component of its foreign policy primarily owing to its global significance and the opportunities it presents for China to display its

³⁸ See, James Rosenau, *Toward the Study of National – International Linkages*” in *Linkage Politics: Essays on the Convergence of National-International Systems* (New York: Free Press, 1969).

³⁹ Huang Yusong & Huang Min, “Qianxi Yindu yingdui qihou bianhua de zhengce,”(India's Policy to Address Climate Change), *Nanya yanjiu* (South Asian Studies) (Beijing) 2010, No. 1, pp. 68-69.

⁴⁰ *Ibid*, p. 76. In fact, India's current emission is only a quarter of China's.

ever increasing responsibilities.⁴¹ An ideological veneer to Climate Change was also inherent within the concept of “Harmonious society” that talks of attaining “harmony between Man and Nature.”⁴² The significance of Climate Change to China’s leadership is evidenced by the First National Climate Change Assessment it undertook on 2006. The document titled China’s National Climate Change and released by the NDRC in 2007 was the outcome of the assessment made the previous year.⁴³ The importance of the issue was underlined by the setting up of a National Climate Change Leading Group under the leadership of the Premier, Wen Jiabao. The National Climate Change Leading Group is responsible for participating in international negotiations, protect domestic interests and coordinate bureaucratic interests.⁴⁴

Both China and India want technology transfer and funding in addition to the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects. As of April 20, 2012, a total of 4023 CDM projects have been approved by Department of Climate Change of NDRC of China.⁴⁵ India is also able to take advantage of CDM because of stable governance and higher allocations to clean technology. The 4,000th project registered with the UNFCCC was a wind power project in the state of Maharashtra which expects to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 21,807 tonnes a year; the equivalent of removing emissions from 4,275 cars each year.⁴⁶ While the two countries have showed efforts to increase the number of CDM projects, CDM has evolved into a financial instrument that requires the participation of financial institutions, but China’s carbon market is still in the infancy stage that makes its financial institutions especially banks less interested in this potential lucrative investment at the moment.⁴⁷ India may be facing the same challenge as well.

⁴¹ Lichao He, “China’s Climate-Change Policy From Kyoto to Copenhagen: Domestic Needs and International Aspirations” *Asian Perspective* (Seoul/Portland, OR), Vol.34, No.3, 2010, p.7.

⁴² Lichao He, *Ibid.*, 12.

⁴³ *China’s National Climate Change*, National Reform Development Reform Commission, 2007. Available at:<http://www.ccchina.gov.cn/WebSite/CCChina/UpFile/File188.pdf> (Accessed on 13 October 2011). Apart from the NDRC, twelve other ministerial and other bureau were involved in the preparation of this report reflecting the wide spread of “environment” as a policy issue within China’s political and administrative set-up. The other ministries and bureau were: the Ministry of Science and Technology, the China Meteorological Administration, the Chinese Academy of Sciences, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, National Development and Reform Commission, the State Environmental Protection Administration, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Water Resources, State Forestry Bureau, State Oceanic Administration, the National Natural Science Foundation.

⁴⁴ Zhu Xufeng, “China’s National Leading Group to Address Climate Change: Mechanism and Structure,” *East Asia Institute* (Singapore) Background Brief No. 572, 22 October 2010, p.i.

⁴⁵ Department of Climate Change, National Development and Reform Commission, Clean Development Mechanism in China, April 20, 2012. Available at:
<http://cdm.ccchina.gov.cn/WebSite/CDM/UpFile/File2854.pdf> (accessed April 21, 2012)

⁴⁶ UNFCCC, CDM reaches milestone: 4000th registered project, Press Release, April 12, 2012. Available at:http://cdm.unfccc.int/CDMNews/issues/issues/I_L9HTDCWQC5OT5N0A7U0L9Q97XSZB7Q/viewnewsitem.html (Accessed April 21, 2012)

⁴⁷ Chao-lung Liu, “China’s Strategic Adoption in Climate Change,” *Review of Global Politics*, No. 37, 2012, p. 104.

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國科會補助專題研究計畫移地研究心得報告

日期：101年10月30日

計畫編號	NSC 100-2410-H-004-193-		
計畫名稱	龍象共舞? 中國與印度之環境外交		
出國人員姓名	那瑞維(Raviprasad Narayanan)	服務機構及職稱	國立政治大學國際關係研究中心
出國時間	101年05月27日至 101年05月30日	出國地點	中國大陸上海

一、移地研究過程

The Principal Investigator (PI) conducted a field trip to Shanghai from 27-30 May 2012. The PI was hosted by the Institute of International Studies of Fudan University, Shanghai.

Within a span of two working days (Monday 28 May and Tuesday 29 May) the PI interviewed several scholars on China-India relations and environmental cooperation issues. These included:

1. Dr. Du Youkang, Director, Centre for South Asian Studies, Institute of International Studies, Fudan University
2. Dr. Zhang Jiegen, Research Fellow, Centre for South Asian Studies, Institute of International Studies, Fudan University
3. Dr. Wang Dehua, Director & Professor, Institute of South-Central Asia Studies, Shanghai Municipal Center for International Studies, 622/7 Huaihai Zhonglu, Shanghai and Director and Professor, Center for South Asia Studies, School of Political Science and International Relations (SPSIR), 1239 Siping Road, Yangpu District, Shanghai 200092
4. Dr. Yang Jian, Vice President, Shanghai Institute of International Studies, Shanghai
5. Dr. Liu Zongyi, Research Fellow, Institute for World Economic Studies and Center for South Asia Studies, Shanghai Institute of International Studies, Shanghai
6. Dr. Wang Weihua, Research Fellow, Center for South Asia Studies, Shanghai Institute of International Studies, Shanghai
7. Dr. Yu Hongyuan, Professor and Deputy Director, International Organization and International Law, Shanghai Institute of International Studies, Shanghai.

Knowing the intricacies involved in China-India relations the PI conducted informal unstructured interviews to elicit responses from the scholars on the topic of 'Environmental Diplomacy between China and India.'

二、研究成果

The main questions asked by the PI were as follows:

- 1. Is it feasible for China and India to engage in environmental cooperation without this in any way being influenced by the boundary dispute?*
- 2. How do Chinese scholars and officials define ‘environmental diplomacy’ and its overall importance to China’s foreign policy?*
- 3. Are there different schools of thought on handling the vital issue of ‘environmental diplomacy’ in China?*
- 4. China and India have had very testy relationship owing to the non-resolution of the boundary dispute. Will growing environmental concerns of the two large developing countries also begin to influence the bilateral relationship?*
- 5. Are there structures of official cooperation between China and India to handle environmental issues and negotiations that dominate Climate Change?*
- 6. Have you been part of any project/research or initiative regarding environmental diplomacy between the two countries?*
- 7. What is the methodology China follows while conducting environmental diplomacy at international forums?*
- 8. What is the role of domestic variables in the influencing of opinion on environmental diplomacy?*
- 9. Is the ‘environment’ seen as an issue for conflict or cooperation between China and India?*
- 10. The ‘environment’ is a generic issue and buried within it are sub-issues like ‘water.’ China and India are geographically divided by the Himalayas and from the watershed region of Tibet several rivers flow into India and further into Bangladesh as also Pakistan. Are the two countries – China and India – discussing the need to share water resources as also sharing information on water flows?*

The answers gleaned from the informal interactions/interviews on the questions could be summarized as follows:

1. China has the advantage as upper riparian but developing closer relations with India is a priority. “Cooperation” as rising powers is important and the role of BRICS and G20 is salient enough to discuss Climate Change.
2. As China and India develop there will be more pressure on them to exploit all possible avenues to ensure energy security leading to a situation where available domestic resources would be fully exploited.
3. The pace of development in both the countries is such that 60 percent of new emissions originate from China and India.
4. China and India are cooperating with each other in matters pertaining to global environmental governance at the ‘international normative level’ with the basic principle that there are historical aspects to Climate Change and advanced economies need to acknowledge “common but differentiated responsibilities” into any eventual future outcome.
5. The highest expression of cooperation in global governance mechanism is that of “coalition building or institution building.” This is a difficult task for China and India to undertake and ensure.
6. Bilateral cooperation between China and India at international forums should give way to a deeper level of interaction and technical cooperation with initiatives to expand Clean Energy and Shale Gas exploration to the benefit of their respective economies

7. On environmental diplomacy and cooperation between the two countries there should not be any “zero sum game” approaches since it will benefit neither. Currently the bilateral cooperation between the two countries on global environmental governance issues is visible in three tracks – the UNFCCC, the Durban Platform and the Kyoto Protocol.

8. The cooperation between the two countries on Climate Change arose following the disturbing pattern followed by developed countries to thrust agendas that absolved themselves of any responsibilities to reduce GHG emissions and shifting the onus on to newly emerging economies especially China and India. This was most apparent in Copenhagen.

9. The two countries cooperate on environmental issues – but strictly at the official level. There is minimal cooperation between scholars on such a vital issue. Since common interests guide them in visualizing a multipolar world, they should cooperate more on issues.

10. Other issues flowing from Climate Change where China and India can cooperate include the Aviation Carbon Tax and Shipping Carbon Tax. The former has been implemented by the EU while the latter is fast becoming an agenda gaining momentum.

An overall assessment made by the PI regarding the field trip is that scholars in China are welcome to the idea and demonstrable aspects of cooperation between China and India on issues pertaining to global environmental governance. Whether this would translate into any positive spillovers on the contentious bilateral issues such as the outstanding boundary dispute is a matter of speculation for now since there exist very few institutional mechanisms between the two countries to handle security related subjects.

三、建議

四、其他

國科會補助計畫衍生研發成果推廣資料表

日期:2012/10/29

國科會補助計畫	計畫名稱: 龍象共舞? 中國與印度之環境外交
	計畫主持人: 那瑞維
	計畫編號: 100-2410-H-004-193- 學門領域: 國際關係
無研發成果推廣資料	

100 年度專題研究計畫研究成果彙整表

計畫主持人：那瑞維		計畫編號：100-2410-H-004-193-					
計畫名稱：龍象共舞？中國與印度之環境外交							
成果項目		量化			單位	備註(質化說明：如數個計畫共同成果、成果列為該期刊之封面故事...等)	
		實際已達成數(被接受或已發表)	預期總達成數(含實際已達成數)	本計畫實際貢獻百分比			
國內	論文著作	期刊論文	0	0	100%	篇	「龍象共舞？中國與印度之環境外交」研究成果報告
		研究報告/技術報告	1	1	100%		
		研討會論文	0	0	100%		
		專書	0	0	100%		
	專利	申請中件數	0	0	100%	件	
		已獲得件數	0	0	100%		
	技術移轉	件數	0	0	100%	件	
		權利金	0	0	100%	千元	
	參與計畫人力(本國籍)	碩士生	1	1	100%	人次	黃仲歡
		博士生	0	0	100%		
博士後研究員		1	1	100%	廖祐德		
專任助理		0	0	100%			
國外	論文著作	期刊論文	0	0	100%	篇	Raviprasad Narayanan & Howard Liao You-te, 'Securing their future: The 'environment' in Sino-Indian strategic relations,' Working Paper presented at the ICRIER Conference on Strategic Economic Capacity Building Program, New Delhi, 30 July 2012.
		研究報告/技術報告	0	0	100%		
		研討會論文	1	0	100%		
	專利	申請中件數	0	0	100%	件	
		已獲得件數	0	0	100%		
	技術移轉	件數	0	0	100%	章/本	
		件數	0	0	100%	件	

		權利金	0	0	100%	千元	
	參與計畫人力 (外國籍)	碩士生	0	0	100%	人次	
		博士生	0	0	100%		
		博士後研究員	0	0	100%		
		專任助理	0	0	100%		

其他成果 (無法以量化表達之 成果如辦理學術活 動、獲得獎項、重要 國際合作、研究成果 國際影響力及其他協 助產業技術發展之具 體效益事項等，請以 文字敘述填列。)	無						
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	成果項目	量化	名稱或內容性質簡述
科 教 處 計 畫 加 填 項 目	測驗工具(含質性與量性)	0	
	課程/模組	0	
	電腦及網路系統或工具	0	
	教材	0	
	舉辦之活動/競賽	0	
	研討會/工作坊	0	
	電子報、網站	0	
	計畫成果推廣之參與(閱聽)人數	0	

國科會補助專題研究計畫成果報告自評表

請就研究內容與原計畫相符程度、達成預期目標情況、研究成果之學術或應用價值（簡要敘述成果所代表之意義、價值、影響或進一步發展之可能性）、是否適合在學術期刊發表或申請專利、主要發現或其他有關價值等，作一綜合評估。

1. 請就研究內容與原計畫相符程度、達成預期目標情況作一綜合評估

達成目標

未達成目標（請說明，以 100 字為限）

實驗失敗

因故實驗中斷

其他原因

說明：

2. 研究成果在學術期刊發表或申請專利等情形：

論文： 已發表 未發表之文稿 撰寫中 無

專利： 已獲得 申請中 無

技轉： 已技轉 洽談中 無

其他：（以 100 字為限）

3. 請依學術成就、技術創新、社會影響等方面，評估研究成果之學術或應用價值（簡要敘述成果所代表之意義、價值、影響或進一步發展之可能性）（以 500 字為限）

This research on China-India cooperation on the Environment is a unique instance of deconstructing a bilateral relationship through an entirely new perspective. The uniqueness of this research is the adoption of 'cooperation' as a methodology between China and India. The preliminary results of this research are encouraging with documented evidence of 'cooperation' between the two countries on the 'environment' being a reality. This reality however extends more to the international realm with the UNFCCC being the instance that witnesses the two countries leveraging their common concerns. This is to be seen only as a beginning of an endeavor that has to survive political differences otherwise inherent within the bilateral relationship. The next step for the two countries is to build a dense network of institutional relationships that straddle the entire spectrum of environmental issues between the two countries. The sharing of river waters - transboundary waters - is an issue that is quickly gaining salience in both the countries especially since the tapping of river waters for generating hydel power to fuel their growing economies is an attractive option that also ensures energy security at home. 'Water' by itself could thus emerge as either a flashpoint between the two countries or an arena for applying their nascent cooperation initiatives. A limitation that the researcher came across was that there are

indeed very few studies on China-India cooperation on the environment that are academically rigorous and this is therefore a field that requires more attention from academia. There is a perceptible gap between government reports and scholarly endeavors that can put into a perspective the myriad challenges the two countries face as regards their environment.