

### (三)報告內容

#### 1.前言

總統是國家元首，對外代表國家，對內依法統治，是我國憲政體制下最重要也是權力最大的行政首長。也因此，總統施政表現的良窳，不但攸關國家機構的順利運作，也與民眾生活密切相關。從民眾的角度來看，總統集憲政權力於一身，且既接受選民付託，自當為選民帶來和平、繁榮與充滿希望的生活，提升民眾福祉與創造光明的國家前景。不過，總統在任期固定的情況下，是否在勝選過後就忘記民眾付託？還是會兢兢業業以民為本？同時，在其任職期間，憲政制度未必提供選民適當且可行的手段，給予總統獎勵與懲罰。因此，民眾對總統的滿意度就成為兩次選舉之間，民眾能不斷給予總統「評鑑」的方式，也是民眾對總統作為及表現之意見反映。

自 1940 年代，美國民調機構即持續研究總統滿意度，累積的民調資料也相當可觀，結合報紙重要事件的報導、總體經濟指標以及戰爭傷亡人數等相關總體資訊，使得美國總統滿意度的研究成果相當豐碩，但國內在此一領域的研究並不多見，台灣地區最早的政治人物施政滿意度調查，是民意調查基金會 1984 年 1 月 4 日公佈的「台灣地區的政治人物施政滿意度調查」，而後因為政治的解嚴及媒體對民意調查的重視，對政府首長進行施政滿意度的評估才蔚為趨勢（周祖誠 2009:17）。然而學術界並未因此而對此一問題有較多的注意，至今也僅有零星幾篇研究出現，究其原因，可能主要來自於資料的限制。由於以調查蒐集研究資料的方式，大約是在 1990 年左右才開始在台灣的政治學界受到較多的重視，媒體也大約是在同時期陸續成立專門機構，較有系統地進行民意的調查，經過將近廿年的時間，國內的調查技術及品質漸臻成熟。然而在選舉的相關調查中，學術界的焦點通常在於投票行為的研究，總統滿意度經常只是附屬於其中的一兩個綜合性的題目，且限於研究經費，並未進行定期及系統性的總統滿意度調查，因而缺乏相關資料可供進行研究；媒體雖然對政治首長的施政滿意度相當關注<sup>1</sup>，但研究者除了資料取得不易外，也因為媒體通常著重於新聞性，對於總統的聲望調查，「特殊事件情境下的調查多過定期性調查」（周祖誠 2009:19），較多是定期舉行，比較多是附屬於特定事件的調查，而且媒體的調查中除了基本的人口變數外，很少包括進行學術研究所需的相關變數，因此較難以媒體資料進行研究；其次可能是來自時間的限制，我國自 1996 年才開始有直選的總統，至今總共也只有四次總統選舉及三任總統，時間的長度及總統人數尚無法形成通則，多數研究只能針對單一總統或單一任期進行；因此，周祖誠指出：「國內對於政府首長施政滿意度，尤其總統聲望的研究，仍停留在『調查多，研究少；實務多，理論少』的階段；對於滿意度變化的解釋，也多偏向新聞事件式的說明及敘述性的分析」（周祖誠 2009:7）。在台灣以民主選舉產生國家領導人已成為常態，且政黨也已二次輪替，政黨政治漸趨成形的情況下，實有必要在過去的研究基礎之上，進行定期且有系統的調查，長期累積研究資料，以探討影響總統滿意度的因素及其政治效果。

#### 2.研究目的

從台灣總統直選以來三任總統的表現來看，李登輝總統在 1996 年我國的第一次總統直選中，拿到 580 多萬張選票 54.0% 的支持率當選，顯示民眾對他過去八年的執政表現應有一定的滿意程度，然而國民黨卻在四年後的選舉中，輸給了民進黨提名的陳水扁總統，雖然當時是因為國民黨分裂，使得陳水

<sup>1</sup> 根據周祖誠的統計，在李登輝總統執政的 12 年間，聯合報共進行 104 次總統聲望調查，陳水扁總統任期內則有 102 次；TVBS 在 1996-2000 年李登輝總統執政期間，共進行了 20 次總統聲望調查，陳水扁總統任內則有 76 次（周祖誠 2009:17）。至於馬英九總統（當選及）上任的二年半以來，媒體進行的調查中包含其滿意度者，計有：遠見雜誌有 30 次，TVBS 37 次，聯合報 12 次。

扁僅以 39.3% 的得票率(497 多萬票)當選，但陳水扁仍在 2004 年以 50.1% 的得票率(647 多萬票)險勝連任。研究顯示在李登輝總統及陳水扁總統執政的期間，民眾對二人的滿意程度都隨著時間而逐漸下降(周祖誠 1999; 盛治仁、白瑋華 2008)，最後的結果都是在他們的任期結束後，由另一政黨的候選人當選，形成了台灣民主政治史上的二次政黨輪替。至於在 2008 年，挾著高人氣以將近 58.5% 的得票率(約 766 萬票)當選的馬英九總統，根據幾家媒體的調查，在其未就任及就任之初的滿意度都超過五成以上甚至將近七成，不滿意度則僅在一成到二成之間，然而他的聲望卻在就任三個月之內，立刻急速下跌，之後的每次調查結果幾乎都顯示：民眾對他的不滿意度都高過滿意度的，而且他的滿意程度一直都僅在一成到三成之間徘徊，甚少有超過四成的時候<sup>2</sup>，顯示大多數民眾對他擔任總統後的表現，似乎是相當失望的，這樣的情況，使得許多人對於他在 2012 年是否能夠順利連任不表樂觀<sup>3</sup>。

從民眾對於過去的李登輝及陳水扁二任總統，以及現任馬英九總統滿意度的起伏與結果，不禁令人好奇，在選舉中得到多數人支持而勝選的總統，為何在執政期間經常無法維繫聲望？影響總統滿意度的因素到底為何？為什麼前二任民選總統在任期結束後，他們所屬的政黨都無法再繼續執政，是因為他們的表現太讓人民失望，而導致對其政黨提名的候選人沒有信心？還是有其他的因素所造成？馬英九總統低迷的滿意度，會不會造成他的連任障礙，再度出現政黨輪替的情況？同時，在馬英九總統執政的這二年半以來，我們也觀察到，媒體在一些重大事件發生時(如陳雲林訪台、毒奶事件、美國牛肉進口事件、八八風災等)，或推行重大政策時(如兩岸各項協議的簽署、外交出訪、打壓房價、二代健保等)，通常都會有相關的總統滿意度的民調結果發表，政府的應變方式甚或處理速度，或多或少都與之有所關連，顯示民眾對總統表現的滿意程度，也有可能對總統的施政造成壓力。此外，在馬英九執政之後，幾次的立委補選及縣市長選舉，執政的國民黨結果都不理想<sup>4</sup>，而被視為總統選舉前哨戰的五都選舉<sup>5</sup>，國民黨雖然保住三席，但在總得票數上，卻輸給民進黨約四十票<sup>6</sup>，馬英九總統的滿意度在選後也未見大幅回升，一般皆認為從五都選舉的結果來看，馬英九的連任之路有相當多的變數，困難度也將增加<sup>7</sup>，因此，馬英九總統在 2012 總統大選，究竟採取何種策略或推行何種政策，來挽救低落的聲望，而仍然可以打敗來勢洶洶的挑戰者蔡英文，也是值得觀察的重點。

本研究以二年的時間，結合質性以及量化的研究，以混合性方法(mixed method)的研究設計，研擬適當的測量工具，定期且系統性地檢視民眾對總統表現滿意度的變化情形、探討影響我國民眾對總統滿意度的各種可能因素、並觀察總統滿意度與政策推行之間的關係，以及其他可能的政治效果。同時，也因為本計畫執行的第一年(2011 年 8 月至 2012 年 7 月)期間將舉行總統選舉，研究團隊在選前有將近八個月的時間，來蒐集相關的資訊，以探討總統滿意度與政治權利轉移間的關係及其影響。再者，本計畫所蒐集的資料，應該也有助於提供 2012 年馬英九為何能再次連任的相關解釋因素，讓我們

<sup>2</sup>資料來源：遠見雜誌民調中心，<http://www.gvm.com.tw/gvsrc/index.asp>; TVBS，

[http://www.tvbs.com.tw/news/poll\\_center/index.html?dd=2010/12/22](http://www.tvbs.com.tw/news/poll_center/index.html?dd=2010/12/22); 聯合報 <http://udn.com/NEWS/mainpage.shtml>。

<sup>3</sup> 資料來源：自由電子報，<http://www.libertytimes.com.tw/2010/new/mar/21/today-o4.htm>。(檢索日期:2010 年 12 月 26 日)

<sup>4</sup> 2009 年 9 月 27 日雲林補選，民進黨勝利；2010 年 1 月 9 日立委補選，民進黨拿下桃園縣、台中縣及台東縣全部三席，2010 年 2 月 27 日立委補選，民進黨拿下桃園縣、新竹縣及嘉義縣 3 席，國民黨僅保住花蓮縣 1 席。資料來源：中央選舉委員會，[http://www.cec.gov.tw/?Menu\\_id=2022](http://www.cec.gov.tw/?Menu_id=2022)。(檢索日期：2010 年 12 月 26 日)

<sup>5</sup> 資料來源：聯合新聞網，<http://udn.com/NEWS/NATIONAL/NATS4/6001015.shtml>。(檢索日期:2010 年 12 月 26 日)

<sup>6</sup> 五都選舉民進黨得票數為 3,772,373 票(占 49.9%)，國民黨為 3,369,052 票(佔 44.5%)。資料來源：中央選舉委員會，[http://vote2010.nat.gov.tw/zh\\_TW/PC/0000000000000000.html](http://vote2010.nat.gov.tw/zh_TW/PC/0000000000000000.html)。(檢索日期:2010 年 12 月 26 日)

<sup>7</sup> 資料來源：中時電子報，[http://tol.chinatimes.com/CT\\_NS/CTContent.aspx?nsrc=A&ndate=20101128&nfno=N0007.001&nsno=5&nkeyword=%b0%a8%ad%5e%a4E%b3s%a5%f4&SearchArgs=Keyword%3d%b0%a8%ad%5e%a4E%b3s%a5%f4%26Attr%3d%26Src%3d7%26DateFrom%3d20101126%26DateTo%3d20101225%26ShowStyle%3d2%26PageNo%3d1%26ItemsPerPage%3d10&App=NS](http://tol.chinatimes.com/CT_NS/CTContent.aspx?nsrc=A&ndate=20101128&nfno=N0007.001&nsno=5&nkeyword=%b0%a8%ad%5e%a4E%b3s%a5%f4&SearchArgs=Keyword%3d%b0%a8%ad%5e%a4E%b3s%a5%f4%26Attr%3d%26Src%3d7%26DateFrom%3d20101126%26DateTo%3d20101225%26ShowStyle%3d2%26PageNo%3d1%26ItemsPerPage%3d10&App=NS)。(檢索日期:2010 年 12 月 26 日)

可以進一步思考，總統滿意度對於民主治理的可能影響。因此，本研究兼顧理論意涵的探索，以及實際應用的可能性，未來也可將相關的研究結果與測量工具，分享供國內外學界使用。

### 3.文獻探討

#### (1) 國外相關文獻

在總統滿意度的相關研究中，主要聚焦於以下的問題：

##### 1) 總統滿意度對於總統權力運用的重要性

總統滿意度的重要性，在於民眾滿意度高的總統，往往擁有較多的「無形權力」。例如，一個具高民氣的總統，在國會的提案通過機會較高 (Ostrom and Simon 1985)，因此，他往往可以運用他的高民氣，提出新的法案或是推動重要創新，並獲得民眾支持。我們也可以看到，許多總統總是利用上任初期與國會的蜜月期，推動重要的立法。此外，滿意度高的總統為同黨國會議員的助選，往往可以產生「拉拔效果」(coattail effect)。許多研究針對美國的期中選舉均發現：總統的滿意度對於同黨議員國會選舉的投票有重要的影響。(Erikson 1990, MacKuen, Erikson and Stimson 1989, Marra and Ostrom 1989, Tufte 1978) 這些無形的權力，不但讓總統在黨內擁有強勢的領導地位，更可以據以說服他黨議員，推動重要政策，同時也政策較不會受到挑戰，推行將較為順利(Skorownek 1998; Neustadt 1990; Kernell 1986)。因此，擁有高滿意度的總統像是收到選民給予的空白支票，當他拿著這些支票向國會銀行兌現時，國會銀行成員往往在謹慎思考不兌現的可能政治後果後，兌現支票。

另外，Kernell(1986:187)指出沒有得到過半滿意度總統很難獲得連任，而投票行為的研究也指出，如果當現任者的表現一直很好時，挑戰者很難說服選民他能比現任者更好(Abramson, Aldrich and Rohde, 2002:152)，因此民眾對總統表現的滿意度，不僅影響其政治合法性(political legitimacy)，也影響其繼續執政的可能性。Muller(1970:1149)也認為：代議政治是將政治社群的成員與權威當局連結的重要機制。因為成員可以檢視權威當局是否支持或是代表成員的利益，並評估權威當局表現是否令其滿意。成員對於權威當局滿意度的評估，Muller(1970:1149)指出，會進一步變成其成員對於政治體系的支持。

##### 2) 影響總統滿意度的因素

影響總統滿意度的因素，有幾個不同的看法：執政時間的長短、整體經濟表現、事件的影響及戰爭。就時間因素而言，對於總統滿意度研究最重要的學者 Mueller (1973:197)即指出：總統擔任的任期長短、重要國際事件、經濟以及戰爭，是影響總統滿意度的重要因素。就總統任期而言，總統就職之初，挾著勝選的光環與民眾對其擔任職務的期許，自然具有一定的聲望。但是，隨著上任後推動新的政策、重要政策窒礙難行、未履行競選政見或是執政團隊出現負面新聞時，他的滿意度隨之下滑，Stimson (1976) 也持同樣的看法，認為總統的滿意度會隨著時間而衰退。總統推出的新的政策或許會得到一些選民的支持，不過，也可能引起部分民眾的不滿。因此，隨著其執政愈久，推動政策愈多，對單一政策不滿意的選民所累積的「聯盟」愈多，其支持度自然下降。Mueller (1973:233-7) 指出：多數總統在其任職期間，滿意度總是愈來愈低，但他指出一個「愛森豪現象」(the Eisenhower phenomenon)。他描述在愛森豪任職期間的聲望是上下波動而非每況愈下，因此，Mueller 認為愛森豪是因為戰爭英雄與給人溫和形象的個人特質、終結韓戰、政治生手 (amateur status)、無為而治的治理方式以及處在美國社會風氣良好的 1950 年代等因素，使得他的滿意度並未隨任期終了而逐漸下滑。所謂「無為而治」，即指愛森豪未推動重要政策，且任職期間大多蕭規曹隨，所以沒有得罪太多選民。不過也有學者對於時間變數提出質疑，認為時間與滿意度沒有因果關係(Kernell 1978) 或者認為時間表示的是滿意度的變化，不能作為影響因素(Brody 1991)。

經濟攸關國家命脈，而經濟情況的好壞更是民眾日常最切身的體會，許多研究指出，國家經濟情況的好壞，是影響民眾對施政滿意程度的重要因素，不論是國民所得、失業率、通貨膨脹的消長等問題，都可能會造成民眾對施政滿意度的波動 (Brody 1991; Eisenstein and Witting 2000; Erikson 1990; Fiorina 1981; Kinski 1977; Kinder and Kiewiet 1979; Monroe 1978; Norpoth 1984; Ostrom and Simon 1985)。同時在投票時，選民可能會有回顧國家或個人整體經濟的情況，來評斷執政者的「回溯性投票」(retrospective voting)，或者依國家及個人未來經濟的展望，來決定未來的國家領導者的「前瞻性投票」(prospective voting)行為 (Fiorina 1981; Achen 1992)；而 Abramson 等人則進一步指出，對國家整體經濟表現的評價對投票決定的影響，大於對個人經濟情況的評價 (Abramson, Aldrich and Rohde 2002:157, 159)。另外，Mueller(1973:213-6)運用失業率作為指標，檢視總統在該次民調的失業率減去就任時的失業率，看他如何對總統滿意度造成影響。不過，他也特別指出：經濟衰退會讓民眾對於執政者不滿，但經濟好轉未必立刻有助他滿意度的提升 (Mueller 1973:215)。

至於事件的影響，在於考驗領導人處理突發的事件或危機的能力 (Norpoth 1984)，包括對國內外的重大衝突、政策的瑕疵以及國際性的危機或軍事行動等正負面事件的處理及後果 (Brace and Hinckley 1992)。Mueller (1973:208) 則提出「擁護領導中心」(rally-round-the flag) 的效果，他認為事件必須是國際性的、與美國及特定總統相關且眾所矚目的事件，例如：美國採取入侵他國的軍事行動、進行中戰爭的重要發展、重要外交事件、重要科技發明、美國與蘇聯領袖的高峰會以及總統的上任等 (Mueller 1973:209-10)。此外，戰爭也是一個重要因素，他認為戰爭對於總統的滿意度將是一項打擊 (Mueller 1973:216-7)，他的研究發現大致支持他的上述假設 (Mueller 1973:219-31)。

### 3) 解釋總統滿意度成因的通則

Muller(1970:1149)認為成員對權威當局表現的認知未必全然奠基於「工具性的表現滿意」(instrumental performance satisfaction)，有時也視其對權威當局「符號性的表現滿意」(symbolic performance satisfaction)。在他後續的研究中，針對民眾對於權威當局的表現 (performance) 歸類為工具性的 (instrumental)、表達性的 (expressive) 以及其他的 (extraneous) 表現三種，他認為民眾會因為對這些不同表現的滿意程度，而決定是否給予權威當局支持。不過，Muller(1970:1154-6, 1155 fn.31)認為，民眾在評估權威當局的工具性表現之前，需具備一定資訊且對政治事務積極關注，他們會因為特定政策輸出 (不) 符合其預期而表現出 (不) 滿意。例如，選民會因為特定政治人物所持的立場與其相同也對此工具現表現感到滿意。至於民眾無法權威當局的表現與特定政策輸出連結，而僅是認為體系成員也會因為政治人物的一些符號性行為而感到滿意。例如，民眾會因為特定政治人物是民主黨的或是保守黨的黨員而對其支持。當然，選民也可能僅因為受家人影響而喜歡特定政治人物，此即屬於其他的支持。

Ostrom 與 Simon (1985) 提出一個相當全面的解釋模型，來說明影響總統度的原因。他們指出：民眾總是期望總統可以帶來和平、繁榮、國內穩定以及維持總統職位本身的威信與正直。這些期望，是民眾認為總統職位具有一定權力可以完成，因此，這些預期是以制度為基礎 (institution-based) 的基本要求，不會因在位者不同而有所改變。除了以制度為基礎的因素之外，也有因為不同總統在競選期間提出不同競選政見或是對問題的解決方案，而有以不同在位者為基礎 (occupant-based) 的評估 (Ostrom and Simon 1985: 336-8)。因此，他們從國際、國內與個人三個面向，自以制度為基礎以及以個人為基礎兩個角度，以選民預期以及為預期的兩個方向，將與總統相關的結果區分為表 1 所示的 12 種類型。

表 1：評價總統相關事件的類型

	預期的			非預期的		
	國際	國內	個人	國際	國內	個人
制度為主	和平	繁榮	繼任	危機	社會動盪	總統誠信
個人為主	強權外交政策	立法活動	通過法案	外交活動	國內政策	個人困頓

資料來源：Ostrom and Simon (1985) p. 338, Table 1.

如果總統知道哪些因素會影響到民眾對他的滿意程度，他自然有動機加以操縱，以確保自己權力穩固，所以短期的經濟政策、國外出訪、甚至發動戰爭，都是可能的選項。Ostrom 與 Simon (1985:350-4)的研究發現：美國總統在國際關係領域的作為，與其滿意度密切相關。其中，當美國與蘇聯對抗或是出現重要國際危機事件，總統滿意度會提高。以超級強國自居的美國，當總統挺身與當時蘇聯另外一個超級強國對抗時，民眾當然也會在總統背後集合力挺。當國家出現重大危機時，如古巴飛彈危機事件，民眾當然希望擁護領導中心，因此總統滿意度自然升高。此一現象我們也在「911 恐怖攻擊」時，小布希總統的滿意度上昇到歷史高點可以看出。當然，他們發現：戰爭死傷人數增加，滿意度會下降，此點應該在我們預期內。不過，兩位作者提到了 Mueller 的觀點倒是頗具啟發。Mueller (1973:62) 指出：民眾對於戰爭初始階段的傷亡人數較為敏感，不過，隨著戰爭的進行，死傷人數當然會累加，所以會對最後階段的大量傷亡較為關切。此外，Ostrom 與 Simon 也指出：總統參加重要國際會議或是出訪重要國家，都對滿意度有正面的影響。在國內方面，總統在國會通過的法案愈多，滿意度愈高。不過，當總統提出法案太多、經濟表現不佳或是國內出現重要社會抗爭事件，總統滿意度都會下降。值得說明的是，為何總統提案太多會引來滿意度下降？根據 Mueller (1973:205) 的解釋：當總統強力推動特定政策時，一定會得罪一些因此政策被推動而強烈受害者甚至是兩面都不討好。這些人剛開始雖為少數，不過，隨著總統提出的法案愈多，這些不滿意的少數會愈來愈多而成聯盟 (coalition-of-the-minorities)，也將導致總統的滿意度下降。此外，就總統個人因素而言，當民眾同情總統健康出現問題、遭到暗殺、因故辭職等事件，現任者或是繼任者的滿意度都會升高。不過，當出現醜聞對其滿意度定是一大打擊。

## (2) 國內相關文獻

國內學界對總統滿意度的研究不多，最早較有系統討論總統聲望的研究，是於周祖誠 1999 年發表的「李登輝總統聲望初探：1989-1999」，在這一篇文章中，他運用聯合報民意調查研究中心 1989 年 8 月到 1999 年 10 月所進行的調查中，42 次關於李登輝總統聲望定期性調查資料，以及總體資料分析影響李登輝聲望變化的原因。他的研究發現：執政時間、政府施政滿意度及國民黨得票率對李登輝總統聲望變化有所影響，但若時間因素去除，模型仍有很高的解釋力，顯示政府施政滿意度及國民黨得票率是影響李登輝總統滿意度的主要因素，此外，總體經濟情勢的失業率、通貨膨脹及痛苦指數在模型中則不顯著。限於研究資料，作者認為後續應該可以對一些可能影響總統聲望的重要事件或變數再做探討。

自 1999 年至今，國內有關總統滿意度的重要研究屈指可數，以下是幾較代表性的著作。首先是李世宏與吳重禮 2003 年的文章，他們的主要研究目的是探討評價總統施政表現的因素，並比較不同施政評價的影響因素。他們以「政府整體施政評價」、「經濟發展施政評價」以及「兩岸關係施政評價」等三項，作為政府施政測量變數，而在自變數方面，則依照社會學研究途徑(sociological approach)的觀點，選取年齡、性別、省籍、居住地區，以及教育程度等變數；在社會心理研究途徑(social psychological

approach)方面，則選擇政黨認同、族群認同、統獨立場、政治知識，以及「分立政府」等心理認知變數；另外也依據理性抉擇途徑的(rational choice approach)觀點，選擇個體經濟回顧、個體經濟展望、總體經濟回顧、總體經濟展望，以及台灣未來經濟前途評估等變數(李世宏與吳重禮 2003:39)。研究的結果發現：在「整體施政表現評價」方面，年齡、性別、省籍、政黨認同、國家整體經濟的回顧、台灣未來前途評估等因素，的確會左右民眾對於政府整體施政表現的觀感。在「經濟發展施政評價方面」，省籍、居住地區、教育程度、政黨認同、政治知識、分立政府心理認知、個體經濟的回顧與展望、總體經濟的回顧與展望、台灣未來前途評估等，是主要影響因素。至於影響「兩岸關係施政評價」的因素，則是居住地區、政黨認同、統獨立場、政治知識、分立政府心理認知、個體經濟展望、總體經濟展望。他們的研究結果顯示不同施政項目的評價影響因素，確實存在著相當程度的差異(李世宏、吳重禮 2003:52-57)。所以他們認為探討民眾施政評價影響因素時，必須依據施政項目的特性設定相關模型，始能較完整地瞭解相關變數的影響(李世宏、吳重禮 2003:58)。

相較於李世宏與吳重禮以橫剖面資料(cross-sectional data)的研究，盛治仁與白瑋華 2008 年的研究，是以「貫時性與橫斷性<sup>8</sup>共同資料分析」(Pooled Cross-sectional Analysis)來探討影響陳水扁總統首任施政評價的因素。本文運用TVBS民調中心在 2000 年到 2004 年間的 21 次調查資料，並依相關文獻作為建構理論架構的依據，將時間、經濟環境、事件、政黨認同、意識型態、省籍、年齡、教育程度、性別等可能影響總統施政滿意度的因素放入統計模型。本文的特色在於貫時性與橫斷性的共同資料分析，作者認為：跨時性資料可以得知個人特質變項對施政評價產生的差異性影響，同時也可以讓總體層次的時間、經濟環境、以及事件變成解釋變數，來分析施政評價的趨勢變化，更全面性地瞭解影響施政評價的因素(盛治仁、白瑋華 2008:12)。研究的主要發現是：1.隨著時間的流逝，總統施政評價有衰退的趨勢；2.在好的經濟環境時，總統施政評價會上升；3.當正面事件發生時，總統施政評價會上升；4.當民眾的政黨認同屬於總統的政黨或總統的政黨聯盟，則該民眾會給予較高的施政評價；5.相對於本省族群(閩南族群與客家族群)，外省人通常對(陳水扁)總統施政表現不是很滿意(盛治仁、白瑋華 2008:30-31)，顯示執政時間、經濟環境、重大事件、政黨認同和省籍等都是對施政滿意度起伏造成影響的因素。他們認為本文的限制在於檢驗變項間的共變性，無法建立明確的因果關係；而且所能使用資料有限，僅侷限於一位總統的一屆任期，不能進行不同黨籍或同黨籍總統的比較；同時使用單一民調單位資料，恐有機構效應的問題。他們也認為施政滿意度的評價具有理論與實務重要性，建議未來可以發展的研究領域有：進行各類職務施政評價的比較分析、施政滿意度在台灣政治實際可能造成的影響、分析施政評價與時間關係究竟是線性關係或曲線關係，以及施政評價是否成為選舉的關鍵因素，被選民用以作為回溯性/前瞻性投票的依據(盛治仁、白瑋華 2008:32)

陳陸輝與耿曙 2009 年的文章，則是運用調查的資料，檢視影響總統滿意度的因素，研究的焦點在於解釋民眾總統滿意度的差異(陳陸輝、耿曙 2009b:354)。本文雖然同樣參考美國總統滿意度的分析研究架構，但在變數的建構上，作者認為民眾對於馬英九總統施政表現的評估，除了受個人既有政治立場及經濟環境的影響外，馬英九總統上台後，兩岸關係、經濟發展以及民眾的政治信任，都可能對其施政滿意度造成影響，因此也將民眾對兩岸關係評估、兩岸戰爭可能性、兩岸經貿交流、經濟不佳究責、台灣意識，以及政治信任等因素納入模型之中加以檢視，從和平與繁榮的角度，結合我國特有的國際關係與兩岸情勢，來解釋民眾對總統的滿意度(陳陸輝、耿曙 2009b:353-356)，是本文的一大特色。研究結果發現：除了民眾既有的藍綠政治立場，統獨傾向、性別、教育程度、台灣意識都是影響馬英九總統滿意度的因素；就兩岸關係而言，雖然在馬英九總統上任後，兩岸關係大為和緩，兩岸陸續舉行多次「江陳會談」，達成多項協議，但認為兩岸關係轉變得較佳的民眾，未必給予馬總統更高

<sup>8</sup> 對於 cross-sectional 一詞的譯名，有人譯為橫斷性，也有人譯為橫剖面，目前並未有定論。

的評價，甚至於在兩岸關係和緩之後，民眾對於兩岸是否會發生戰爭的疑慮既消除，也沒有影響他們對馬總統施政表現的評價。相對而言，經濟因素似乎是主宰民眾評價馬總統的重要標準。當民眾認為兩岸交流對於台灣經濟較為有利與認為經濟情況較佳者，他們才會給馬總統較正面的評價。對於經濟情況不佳的究責上，儘管有超過四分之三的民眾認為是因為國際景氣差所致，但是，當民眾認為是馬政府所造成的，會給予馬總統施政表現較差的評價。此外，民眾的政治信任，也顯著影響他們對於馬總統的施政評價。研究的結果顯示民眾對於總統施政表現的評價，除了民眾的藍綠政治傾向、統獨偏好與台灣意識高低之外，主要是以經濟面向來評估總統。作者認為希望民眾完全擺脫意識型態或是政黨立場來詮釋政治事務並不容易，但能較理性地以經濟利益來對總統究責，對台灣民主政治的良性發展有重要意義（陳陸輝、耿曙 2009b:360-361）。

包正豪(2010)的研究則是從政治領袖個人特質的關點，來探討影響馬英九總統施政滿意度的因素。本文使用的資料，來自中央研究院人文社會科學研究中心政治思想研究專題中心與國立政治大學選舉研究中心共同合作之「領導與公民意識」研究計畫，該計畫對於領導個人特質概念的形成，除了來自政治領導相關研究理論之外，為更貼近台灣政治現況，也邀請媒體記者座談<sup>9</sup>，從而建構了品格、度量、遠見、決斷力，以及是否重視公益等五個面向的個人特質，做為一個好的政治領導者應具備的條件，在測量上，則受是讓訪者依其主觀看法，在 0-10 之間對於馬英九總統進行評分，並以此作為探討影響民眾評價馬英九總統的因素。研究的結果發現：馬英九總統政治領導的總體評價的平均分數為 5.23 分，且五項評價的平均都低於 6 分，即使是馬英九總統最引以為傲的品格也僅有 5.70 分，而決斷力則是民眾普遍認為馬英九總統最弱的一環，平均僅有 4.38 分（包正豪 2010:4）。模型分析的結果則顯示，民眾對馬英九總統的施政滿意程度，與對其個人特質評價高低的確息息相關，愈肯定其個人領導特質者，愈傾向肯定其施政表現。然而，本文同時也指出，民眾在評價馬英九總統地個人領導特質時，會受到藍綠政黨傾向、性別、族群認同，以及省籍等因素的強烈影響，亦即對部分民眾而言，即使認可馬英九總統的個人領導特質，仍不會給較為正面的評價（包正豪 2010:19）。

從上述國外的研究模型可以發現：國際事件、國內政策、經濟情況、個人政治立場，以及總統個人因素，都對於總統滿意度有重要影響；而國內少數幾篇關於總統施政表現的研究，雖然也發現經濟情況、個人背景、政治立場、兩岸關係、重大事件、總統個人特質等是影響評價總統的因素，但我國的總統直選始自 1996 年，迄今也不過十幾年經歷五次選舉及三位總統，上述的研究大多只能集中討論一位總統一任的表現，因此我們仍需思考國外研究模型可否應用於台灣的研究。除了理論模型之外，研究資料是否充分也值得注意，同樣的，僅有三位直選總統十幾年時間，以運用時間序列(time series) 結合主要報紙重要事件報導與總體資料的分析方式，可能仍有困難，需要再做更長期的觀察及累積資料。

#### 4.研究方法

本計畫希望長期記錄及追蹤總統滿意度的變遷及走向，並探討其政治後果，為了達到上述目的，以質性的焦點團體研究法與量化調查訪問結合的混合性方法(mixed method)研究設計，是本計畫的特點。本研究將運用二年的時間發展對總統滿意度的測量與應用作系統的分析，並長期追蹤民眾對總統滿意度的變化情形、可能的影響因素、總統滿意度對政策推行的影響，以及對民主政治的可能效果。由於本研究也擬對於總統滿意度的測量工具作系統的分析，以研擬適當的測量工具，因此，需要運用定群追蹤(panel study) 持續二年觀察民眾對總統表現滿意度的持續與變遷。由於第 12 屆總統選舉於 2012

<sup>9</sup> 媒體記者專家座談邀請來了自聯合報、中國時報、自由時報等三大主要平面媒體曾專職或長期採訪馬英九總統之五位記者，針對領袖個人特質與領導力問題進行討論。

年 1 月舉行，本研究第一年的研究重點以定群追蹤方式，於選前及選後分別進行了一次的電話訪問，選前訪問中同時加入總統滿意度、候選人評價與政治效果的探討，所蒐集的資料可以讓研究者得以比較民眾對連任總統滿意度的評價因素及探討民心思變或不變的原因。選後訪問的問卷除了滿意度的評價外，也以探討馬英九總統得以連任的原因為重點，另外也在 2012 年 3 月份進行焦點團體訪談，為馬英九總統滿意度與連任原因，蒐集深入的詮釋資料。第二年（2012 年 8 月至 2013 年 7 月）則在 2013 年 5 月進行一波電訪，持續觀察民眾對連任總統滿意度的變遷情形，另外也在 2013 年 10 月以焦點訪談的方式，蒐集與補充質性資料，對於影響台灣民眾評價總統表現的因素，做深入而有系統的分析以改進測量的工具，以及分析總統滿意度幾個層次之間的可能相互關係，並探討可能的政治後果。

## 5. 結果與討論

本計畫以二年的時間所蒐集的資料，因受限於經費，僅進行了二次的電訪及二次的焦點團體訪談，為充實研究內容，在研究論文寫作時，也再加入其他相關研究計畫所蒐集的資料進行分析，於「『台灣選舉與民主化調查』2014 年國際學術研討會：公民參與面面觀：TEDS2013 調查資料的分析」，與王德育教授共同發表研究成果，文章全文如下：

### **Presidential Approval in Taiwan: An Analysis of Survey Data in the Ma Ying-jeou Presidency**

T.Y. Wang · Su-feng Cheng

When scholarly research on presidential approval in the US began half a century ago (Mueller, 1970; 1973; Neustadt, 1960), voluminous studies on the subject have since been published in English.<sup>10</sup> The strong academic attention to the subject is understandable. Presidential popularity<sup>11</sup> ratings are not only a manifestation of public sentiment for the president but also “causal agents” of presidential effectiveness (Stimson, 1976: 2). Indeed, presidential power rests in part on public support. High approval ratings pay off electorally for the president and for the president’s party. Approval ratings also play a crucial role in a national leader’s calculations of decision-making as widespread public support increases a president’s ability to bargain and to persuade. A popular president is more likely to get his/her policy agenda through the legislature and/or helps his/her partisan candidates’ electoral bids. The approval ratings are more than a snapshot of the public sentiment for the president at any given moment as higher presidential approval essentially means more power and greater ability to govern. In the research of American politics, a number of studies have documented the impact of approval ratings on congressional as well as presidential elections (Gronke, Koch, and Wilson, 2003; Lewis-Beck and Rice, 1982; 1984; Newman and Ostrom, 2002), presidential policy initiatives and legislative success (Canes-Wrone and Shotts, 2004; Canes-Wrone and de Marchi, 2002; Ostrom and Simon, 1985), and veto politics (Rohde and Simon, 1985). Research of presidential approval thus speaks to important questions rooted in the democratic theory.

While research on presidential approval is abundant, very few studies written in English were

<sup>10</sup> Gronke and Newman (2003) provide a comprehensive review of the American presidential approval literature. For more recent studies, see Fox (2009) and Kriner (2006).

<sup>11</sup> As Stimson pointed out a long time ago, “presidential popularity” and “presidential approval” are two conceptually distinct and empirically separable notions but one is frequently used as a reference to the other. This study shall thus use the two terms interchangeably (1976: 1, footnote #1).



conducted on democratic polities other than the US. The current research is one of the few such studies with data collected in non-US democratic countries.<sup>12</sup> Using six waves of survey data collected in Taiwan between September 2012 and December 2013, and aggregate electoral data of the 2008 and 2012 presidential elections at the township level, coupled with information gathered through focus group interviews, this study examines the following research questions: How do Taiwan citizens evaluate their president and specifically the incumbent President Ma Ying-jeou of the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang or KMT)? What factors help to explain the patterns we observe? While the study is limited by available data and only examines the popularity of one president in Taiwan, our answers to these questions nevertheless have important implications to the young democracy of East Asia considering that Ma has lasting low approval ratings during most of his 6-year in office since 2008. Members of the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) have recently dubbed him as a “9% president.” Findings of the current study will also contribute to a more general theoretical understanding about how citizens of democratic polities use information to govern themselves. It attempts to contribute, not just to making sense of Taiwan, but more broadly to the theoretical understanding of democratic theory in general.

## Review of the Literature

Empirical studies on American presidency have long concluded that the state of the national economy is an important factor to presidential approval (Clarke, Rapkin, and Stewart, 1994; Kinder, 1981; Muller, 1970; 1973; Norpoth, 1985; Stimpson, 1976). When economic conditions are good, the president gains public support. The approval rating deteriorates if the state of the economy sours. The crushing defeat of Jimmy Carter by Ronald Reagan in 1980 and the loss of election of George H. W. Bush to Bill Clinton in 1992 are typical examples of the kind. Reflecting this conventional wisdom, one observer states that “[e]conomics is the fate of politicians” and that “[t]here can be little doubt that the economy matters for presidential popularity” (Norpoth, 1985: 167 & 180). Two hypotheses regarding citizen-as-evaluator have been developed in this “reward-punishment” model<sup>13</sup> that may underlie the relationship between economic conditions and presidential popularity. The first hypothesis maintains that when citizens’ personal or household well-being, i.e., their pocketbook, suffers they are more likely to punish the incumbent president. The quote from Ronald Reagan’s 1980 presidential debate that “[a]re you better off than you were four years ago?” has been cited as a typical appeal to voters’ personal economic conditions (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2007).<sup>14</sup> An alternative argument to the pocketbook hypothesis is that rather than focusing on personal finance the public tends to emphasize the economic well-being of the nation. The so-called sociotropic hypothesis thus maintains that it is the state of national economy plays a central role in the mind of citizen-as-evaluator. Presidential approval rises as the public perceives a healthy national economy and the rating declines when the overall economic prospect appears to be gloomy.

In addition to the effect of the economy on approval ratings, citizens’ assessment of presidential

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<sup>12</sup> There are a few studies in English on public support for executive branches in other countries, including (Cuzán and Bundrick, 1997), Lewis-Beck (1980), Treisman (2011), Weyland (1998; 2000) and Yantek (1988). Several studies were conducted on Taiwan’s presidential approval (Chen and Keng, 2009; Pao, 2010; Sheng, 2008) and its electoral effects (Hsiao and Yu, 2008; Hsu, 2009; Lee and Wu, 2003; Lim, 2000; Wu and Lee, 2003; 2004; Yu, 2012) and they were published in Chinese.

<sup>13</sup> For a concise discussion of the “reward-punishment” model, see Lewis-Beck (1988) and Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2007).

<sup>14</sup> For the full text of the October 28, 1980 presidential debate between Ronald Reagan and Jimmy Carter, see the website of the Commission on Presidential Debates at <<http://www.debates.org/index.php?page=october-28-1980-debate-transcript>>.

performance in areas other than economy has also attracted scholarly attention. That is, the public is mindful of whether the incumbent has the capacity to get the job done in an effective way. In this context, the international dimension has also been added to the analysis of presidential approval. In an era of globalization, it is argued that foreign policy and domestic agenda are not entirely independent of each other and frequently the calculus of decision-making in one domain bears important implications to the other, especially the economy. Citing the substantial literature on the effects of “internationalization,” Burden and Mughan (2003) has shown that foreign trade and various international events have important implications for citizens’ reactions to those who govern them in democratic polities. As modern presidents have a tendency to promise economic benefits from global economic integration, they are expected to be held accountable for these promises. Similarly, some observers note that public attitudes about foreign affairs are consequential in presidential elections as “[t]he candidates are waltzing before a reasonable alert audience.” When given a choice, “the public votes for the candidate who waltzes best” (Aldrich, Sullivan and Borgida, 1989: 136). Presidential approval ratings thus depend just as much on the handling of foreign affairs as they do on the management of the economy. Thus, presidential performance in areas other than economy, especially in the area of foreign affairs which may bear both political and economic consequences, are said to affect approval rating (Aldrich, et al., 1989; Burden and Mughan, 2003; Marra, Ostrom, and Simon, 1990; McAvoy, 2006; Nickelsburg and Norpoth, 2000).

In addition to presidential performance, character and integrity of the person in office have also attracted scholarly attention. V. O. Key’s insight of “the role of [a president’s] personality” provides an intellectual origin of this inquiry. Using Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the 32<sup>nd</sup> President of the United States, as an example, Key states that “[h]is personality qualities may have intensified both hatred and love for him. And the popular image of Roosevelt enabled many persons to support or to oppose him without detailed knowledge of what policies he was for or against; they could accurately regard him as for or against their kind of people” (1966: 56). Later developed in the literature on the relations between character assessment and vote choice (e.g., Kinder 1986; McCurley and Mondak, 1995; Sullivan, Aldrich, Borgida and Rahn, 1990), three reasons were provided to justify the importance of character in the public’s assessment of politicians. First, seeking for and digesting political information is a costly endeavor, which not everyone has the time or ability to engage in. The assessment of presidential character offers the public a useful shortcut without constantly looking for otherwise costly information. Second, judgment of character also serves an instrumental function because it provides a clue how the president will run the country. Third, since the presidency usually is the principal position in the government, it has important symbolic meaning and sets public standards for all political behavior (Greene, 2001; Kinder, 1986). Presidential character thus is likely to paly an important role in citizens’ evaluation of presidents (McCurley and Mondak, 1995: 865).

Finally, empirical research has demonstrated that political behavior is affected by contextual factors. Rather than treating citizens as isolated beings, this literature maintains that circumstances in which individuals are placed are consequential to their decision-making. Through interpersonal communications or personal experience and observation that occur on a daily basis, the public may obtain information in places where they live or work. Ordinary citizens may also be influenced by the distribution of political preferences locally in the form of percentage of votes for a candidate or local leaders’ partisan affiliations. They may be drawn to a given perspective and form a position toward that viewpoint as a result. When individuals are making vote choices or deciding whether to support the incumbent government, they are likely

to take cues from their local context and act accordingly (Burbank, 1995; Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1987; Johnson, Shively and Stein, 2002; Johnston, Pattie, Dorling, MacAllister, Tunstall and Rossiter, 2000; Johnston, Jones, Propper and Burgess, 2007; Marsh, 2002). Contextual analysis is thus “built on an assertion of behavioral interdependence: the actions of individual citizens are to be understood as the intersection between individually defined circumstances” (Huckfeldt and Sprague: 1993: 281). Substantively, this means “observing individuals at the same time we observe the collective properties of the aggregates within which individuals are imbedded” (Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1993: 284).

The above discussion thus yields the following theoretical expectations to be examined in the subsequent sections. That is, presidential approval is affected by the public’s assessment of a president’s performance in various areas, including that particularly in the areas of economy and external relations. A president’s popularity may also be affected by citizens’ view of his/her personal integrity and by the context in which individuals live or work.

### **Presidential Approval During Ma’s Presidency**

Taiwan is a democracy under threat. Located only about a hundred miles away from the southeast coast of the Chinese mainland, Beijing leaders have vowed to “unify the island with the motherland” when the government led by Chiang Kai-shek of the KMT retreated to the island from the Chinese mainland in 1949. The 1970s saw a shift of China’s strategy towards Taiwan away from reliance on “military liberation” to a wave of “peaceful initiatives.” Though cross-Strait interactions have since intensified, Chinese leaders have refused to renounce the use of military force to realize their cause of unification. Attempting to compel Taipei to accept its unification formula known as “one country, two systems,” Beijing has also isolated Taiwan internationally. Despite continuing political and military hostility, cross-Strait economic exchanges have nevertheless increased exponentially since 1990s. Like many countries in Asia, Taiwan’s export-oriented economy has been progressively integrated with the economic activities of the Chinese mainland during the past decade. Meanwhile, in their attempt to realize their ambitious goal of “recovering the Chinese mainland,” the KMT leaders imposed harsh authoritarian rule coupled with a variety of measures to foster the “Chinese identity” among the island residents. Activities that might encourage a separate “Taiwanese identity” and promote the island’s independence were censored and suppressed. As the issue of “unification vs. independence” has later become a major political cleavage in the society, the political divide is reflected in the island citizens’ party identification. Those who support Taiwan’s independence are more likely to identify with the DPP, while the KMT supporters tend not to reject the possibility of cross-Strait unification.

The rapid democratization in Taiwan was set into motion in the mid 1980s when the opposition DPP was established. After a series of constitutional amendments, a French-style semi-presidential system was adopted in 1997. The institutional design is that the president is popularly elected and wields considerable power, including the appointment of a premier without the consent of the legislature known as the Legislative Yuan (LY). As democratization ran in full speed, Taiwan witnesses its first peaceful transfer of political power from one political party to another in 2000 after Chen Shui-bian of the DPP was elected the president. Chen has a strong pro-independence credential and his affiliated DPP is the only major party on the island that has a plank of pursuing Taiwan’s de jure independence. During the 8-year period of his administration, Chen implemented a series of de-Sinicization measures to arouse the Taiwanese identity among the local population while consciously suppress the Chinese identity previously promoted by the KMT government. Fearing that

cross-Strait economic exchanges would increase Taiwan's dependence on China and threaten the island's national security, the Chen administration imposed various restrictions to interactions with the Chinese mainland.

As Chen's anti-China, pro-independence policies irked Beijing and irritated Washington, his scandal-ridden second term brought "devolution" to Taiwan's democracy (Copper, 2009). In 2008, the island country witnessed its second peaceful transfer of political power at the national level when Ma Ying-jeou of the KMT won the presidential election. Ma was characterized as a "Teflon pot" (*buzhanguo*)<sup>15</sup> due to his non-corruptible image and self-discipline. Campaigning on "clean politics" and "peaceful cross-Strait relations," along with the momentum provided by the KMT's landslide victory in the LY election held early in the year, Ma won a landslide in the election with a 58.5% to 41.5% victory. In the first few months after inauguration, Ma's presidential approval ratings were between 50% and 65%, according to various media reports.


With a strong popularity among the public, the newly elected President Ma implemented a policy of rapprochement towards China. Ma proclaimed that his administration would pursue a three-no policy of "no independence, no unification, and no use of military force" and would strive to maintain "the status quo in the Taiwan Strait" under "the framework of the ROC [the Republic of China] Constitution." Ma also reversed the confrontational diplomacy of the previous administration and called for a "diplomatic truce" (*wai-jiao xiu-bing*) between Beijing and Taipei. Under this new initiative, the Ma administration not only stopped the practice of "dollar diplomacy" to buy off new allies, but also refrained from actively promoting Taiwan's independent and sovereign status in the international community. Taipei's cross-Strait and foreign policies have thus been welcomed by Beijing and praised by Washington as they have reduced cross-Strait tension and stabilized the relationship between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. A number of accords were reached between Beijing and Taipei, including the landmark trade deal known as the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA). Taiwan has also been able to sustain diplomatic ties with existing allies lest they be bought off by Beijing's generous foreign aid (Wang, Lee and Yu, 2011).

Despite the progresses made on the front of cross-Strait relations and diplomacy, the Ma administration has been handicapped by domestic issues. First of all, the downward spiral of the global economy took Taiwan's export-dependent economy along the way. Although the economy saw a subsequent rebound, it trailed behind other East Asian countries in terms of economic growth rate, unemployment rate and per capita income. By the end of 2011, the economic reality showed a far distance from Ma's 2008 campaign pledges of 6% GDP growth, unemployment below 3% and US\$30,000 per capita income (Chen, 2012). Although Ma was able to win a second term in the 2012 presidential election, the total number of votes he received fell short by almost 800,000 comparing with that in 2008. Shortly after winning the re-election bid, a series of policy reforms initiated by Ma encountered fierce public opposition. These included permitting a rise in both gas and electricity prices, imposing a capital gain tax on securities transactions, and lifting restrictions on importing US beef products. The Ma administration was seen as incompetent, inefficient, and lacking inter-governmental coordination and his policies of allowing energy price hikes and the importation of US beef were seen as hurting the public's livelihood. Moreover, a bribery scandal involving a major cabinet member erupted in June of 2012, who was repeatedly promoted by Ma. The scandal dealt a serious blow to Ma's image of "Mr. Clean" and the public further question his ability to

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<sup>15</sup> The analogy was borrowed from Weisman (1984: 39; quoted from Ostrom and Simon, 1989).

staff the right persons in key cabinet positions.



Data source: Chen (2008), Huang (2010, 2011, 2012), Lin (2011), Tsai (2011), Yu (2010)

**Figure 1. Ma Ying-jeou's Presidential Approval Rating:  
April, 2009 – December 2013**

It is against this backdrop, six waves of surveys were conducted in Taiwan between September 2012 and December 2013.<sup>16</sup> In each of the surveys, Taiwan citizens over the age of 20 were asked the following question: “How satisfied are you with his overall performance as President over the past six months?” Respondents’ answers to this question are treated as the measure of *presidential approval*. Along with the data collected in previous surveys, Figure 1 shows Ma’s presidential approval ratings from April, 2009 to December, 2013. One year after Ma’s victorious win with 58.5% vote share in March of 2008, his popularity dropped to 42% and dipped further down to 31% in March of 2010. Although his presidential approval saw a rebound in the following months, it shows a downward trend of no return thereafter to 14% by December of 2013. How can the pattern of Ma’s popularity be explained? What are the factors responsible for Ma’s declining approval rating? To address these questions, multivariate statistical analyses are provided in the following section.

## The Analysis

It is commonly recognized that time series analysis provides a powerful investigative tool for studying presidential approval (Gronke and Newman, 2003). The advantage of time series analysis is that it can clearly delineate the trend of presidential support and determine whether the ups and downs in approval ratings were real or just artifacts or if they are affected by some long-term determinants. Despite these advantages, time series analysis is not employed in the current study for two reasons. First, most of these studies pooled monthly or quarterly approval ratings at aggregate-level over a period of several decades across several

<sup>16</sup> Through telephone interviews, the surveys were conducted quarterly under the auspice of the Planning and Executive Committee of the Taiwan’s Election and Democratization Study (TEDS) Project. This is the first time that survey data related to presidential approval are systematically collected in Taiwan. Because the six surveys contain a battery of questions directly relevant to presidential approval, they provide the most comprehensive survey data at micro-level that are available on Taiwan. The coordinator of the multi-year TEDS project is Professor Chi Huang and the data are managed and distributed by the Election Study Center, National Chengchi University in Taiwan. More information is available on the TEDS website (<http://www.tedsnet.org>).

administrations (e.g., Brace and Hinckley, 1991; 1993; Clarke and Stewart, 1994; MacKuen, Erikson and Stimson, 1992; Norporth, 1996). While these studies are valuable in identifying the conditions affecting the time path of presidential approval ratings, treating approval rating as the opinion of an aggregate fails to investigate the direct linkage between the conditions and individuals' choice-making process. Since citizens' support for politicians is a personal decision, the absence of individual-level analysis creates a gap in the presidential approval literature (Ostrom and Simon, 1988). Second, due to Taiwan's short democratic history time-series data on presidential approval either at yearly or quarterly basis are not available. We thus employ data collected through the aforementioned six surveys conducted in Taiwan.<sup>17</sup>

Table 1 presents Taiwan citizens' appraisals of Ma's performance in various areas. Because the state of economy is an important factor to presidential approval, the first two measures elicit respondents' economic concerns. The sociotropic side concern is tapped by their assessment of Ma's efforts of *boosting the national economy* while the measure of pocketbook concerns is by his handling of matters related to *people's livelihood*, which, in the Taiwanese context, is generally understood as issues of personal economic well-being.<sup>18</sup> As the ratings range from 12% to 20% in the six surveys, both measures indicate that respondents had a low appraisal of Ma's performance in the two areas. The president enjoyed higher marks in the areas of *cross-strait relations*, *foreign affairs* and *national defense* as most of the ratings were in the mid 20% to upper 30%. However, Ma's ability of *staffing key cabinet positions* is questioned by the public because the satisfaction scores are between 2.8 and 3.7 on an 11-point scale in all six surveys. In the area of *Ma's integrity*, the island citizens offered an above average rating. Also measured on an 11-point scale, this indicator shows that the public had viewed Ma as a politician with high moral standards.

**Table 1. Summary Statistics of Presidential Approval and other Variables**

	2012/09	2012/12	2013/03	2013/06	2013/09	2013/12
Boosting the Economy	12.20%	13.00%	15.40%	17.00%	14.10%	12.20%
People's Livelihood	12.30%	13.10%	13.10%	16.50%	12.60%	11.20%
Cross-Strait Relations	37.00%	37.90%	35.80%	29.10%	33.10%	30.30%
Foreign Affairs	33.40%	38.80%	44.10%	30.10%	37.30%	27.10%
National Defense	29.10%	28.90%	29.70%	25.10%	23.30%	23.50%
	Mean (on a 11-point scale)					
Staffing Key Cabinet Positions	3.6	3.5	3.7	3.5	2.8	3.2
Integrity	5.9	5.81	N/A	5.79	N/A	5.2

Data source: Huang(2012).

Note: the English version of the survey questions is listed in the appendix 2.

In addition to the indicators listed in Table 1 as independent variables, several control variables are included in the analysis. Previous studies show that presidential approval varies according to individuals'

<sup>17</sup> There are other surveys conducted in Taiwan, which contain a question on presidential approval but they do not have relevant questions about the president's performance in specific issue areas. The six polls employed in this study have the most comprehensive survey data that are available on Taiwan.

<sup>18</sup> Though one may argue that the meaning of people's livelihood may not be identical to that of pocketbook concern, this is the best item that is available in the data. In addition, as it will be demonstrated in the discussion below, many respondents of focus group interviews considered people's livelihood synonymous to personal economic well-beings. We thus employed the item of people's livelihood as the measure, or a proxy measure, of respondents' pocketbook concerns.

political affiliation (Fox, 2009; Hibbs, Rivers, and Vasilatos, 1982a; Clarke, Stewart, Ault, and Elliott, 2005). A respondent's partisan identification is important in Taiwan also because it generally reflects the individual's position on the issue of "unification vs. independence," as previously indicated.<sup>19</sup> Two partisan dummy variables, *Pan-Blue affiliation* and *Pan-Green affiliation*, are created accordingly with 1 for respondents in the relevant categories and 0 otherwise with nonpartisan voters as the baseline group. Respondents of the pan-Blue camp are those who are identified with the KMT, the People's First Party, and the New Party, while the pan-Green camp includes those identified with the DPP and the Taiwan Solidarity Union. It is commonly believed that citizens who self-identify as mainlanders or as Chinese are more likely to support Ma because the president is a mainlander and consider himself with a Chinese origin. Respondents' ethnicity is recoded into two dummy variables, *Hakka* and *Mainlander*, which are coded 1 for respondents in the relevant category and 0 otherwise with *benshengren* as the baseline group.<sup>20</sup> Two dummy variables, *Taiwanese* and *Chinese*, are created in the same way to assess respondents' identification. Respondents with a dual identity (i.e., consider themselves as both a Taiwanese and a Chinese) serve as the base category. Finally, respondents' levels of education, gender and age are also included. *College education* is created with 1 for respondents who have a college (and above) degree and *female* is coded as a dummy variable according to respondents' gender. The variable of *age* is a continuous variable and is measured by the number of years since birth.

To evaluate the contextual effects on individuals' support for President Ma, electoral information at the level of township has been collected. As hypothesized, citizens' assessment of the incumbent government is likely to be affected by the information they acquire from places where they live or work. Due to a lack of data on interpersonal communications, the *vote shares of Ma* in the 2008 and 2012 presidential elections, respectively, are compiled to assess the distribution of preferences within the context. Presidential approval of an individual is expected to be higher if the percentage of presidential votes for Ma in a township is greater. The electoral data are gathered from Taiwan's Central Election Commission.<sup>21</sup> Due to high collinearity between the two variables, however, only the 2012 vote share is included in the analysis. The macro-level information is merged with the aforementioned survey data at the micro-level and the merged six data files are then pooled together for analysis.<sup>22</sup>

The above design encompasses both micro-level and macro-level information and the data structure consists of two levels, i.e., individuals are placed within township. Such a data structure is inherently multilevel and demands an assessment of the need for multilevel models. Because the dependent variable, *presidential approval*, is measured dichotomously, an "empty model" of binary logit analysis is employed.

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<sup>19</sup> Variables assessing respondents' unification/independence positions were included in the analysis and they were not statistically significant. For the sake of having a parsimonious model, this study excludes the variables of respondents' unification/independence positions.

<sup>20</sup> *Benshengren*, Hakka and mainlander are the three major ethnic groups in Taiwan. Taking about 77 percent of the island's residents, *benshengren* refers to island residents whose ancestors migrated to Taiwan from the Chinese mainland several hundred years ago and is the largest ethnic group on the island. Hakka refers to the 10% island resident who are descendants of immigrants migrating to Taiwan roughly at the same time as *benshengren* from areas in central China. With about 12% of the total population, mainlanders are those Chinese migrants who fled to the island at the end of the Chinese civil war. While the mainlander is not a homogeneous ethnic group due to its diverse origins from various Chinese provinces, the rocky start from the moment the forces of Chiang Kai-shek first arrived on Taiwan in 1945 and the subsequent historical development have imposed a distinct but common ethnic identity on those who are known as "mainlanders."

<sup>21</sup> The electoral data are gathered from Taiwan's Central Election Commission at <http://db.cec.gov.tw/histMain.jsp?voteSel=20120101A1>.

<sup>22</sup> Whether the six datasets are analyzed separately or pooled together for analysis does not affect the substantive conclusions and the key findings are the essentially the same.

With no level-1 and level-2 variables, the intra-class correlation coefficient (ICC) is less than 0.02,<sup>23</sup> which shows that a multilevel analysis is not needed. This evidence suggests that there is little variation in predicted log odds of presidential approval across towns in Taiwan, or substantively speaking, it means that Ma's popularity in general does not vary from town to town. This may be due to the fact that Taiwan is a small island country with one of the highest population densities in the world. Interactions between individuals are frequent and intense and thus approval ratings rather similar at the township level.

A logit model with binary outcomes is thus employed instead. Specifically, the regression model takes the form of

$$\ln \Omega(\mathbf{x}) = \ln \frac{\Pr(y = 1|\mathbf{x})}{\Pr(y = 0|\mathbf{x})} = \mathbf{x}\boldsymbol{\beta}$$

where  $\ln \Omega(\mathbf{x})$  is the natural logarithm of the conditional odds of having a positive presidential approval relative to having a negative approval,  $\mathbf{x}$  is a vector of independent variables that includes all independent variables, and  $\boldsymbol{\beta}$  is a vector of regression estimates. Because the question on presidential integrity was not included in two of the six surveys, the inclusion of the variable of *integrity* automatically eliminates about 1,300 cases. To avoid the possibility of biasing the results due to different sample sizes, two panels of regression outcomes are thus presented in Table 2, with and without the variable of *integrity*. The table shows that, the regression results are consistent between the two panels, which suggest that the outcomes are quite robust. Table 3 presents expected changes in predicted probabilities of presidential approval for independent variables that are statistically significant. Collectively, the Table 2 and Table 3 reveal several major findings.

First of all, as expected, all regression coefficients associated with boosting the economy and people's livelihood are statistically significant and bear positive signs. These findings validate the pocketbook hypothesis that political preferences are conditioned by predicaments of individuals' private life. The results also confirm the sociotropic hypothesis that concerns over the country's economic well-being determine the public's appraisal of presidential performance. Specifically, Table 2 indicates that respondents who appreciate Ma's abilities in these two areas are 4 to 6 times more likely in odds to give a positive presidential approval. Or, as Table 3 shows, the probabilities of a positive rating are 7% - 9% higher for those who believe Ma has done a good job in handling the economy. Ma's perceived abilities of advancing the national economy and taking care of citizens' personal economic hardship thus play a paramount role in the public mind about him as a competent president. Coupled with the data presented in Table 1 showing a low appraisal of Ma's performance in the area of economy, this evidence explains Ma's inability of improving his approval ratings.

Second, Taiwan citizens' assessment of Ma's ability in economy is closely followed by their evaluation of his ability in managing cross-Strait relationship. The odds of giving a positive presidential approval are

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<sup>23</sup> The ICCs are calculated through the following equation:  $\rho = \frac{\sigma_{\mu_0}^2}{\sigma_{\mu_0}^2 + \frac{\pi^2}{3}}$ , see and Raudenbush and Bryk (2002: 298, 334).



about 5 times higher for those who have a favorable view of Ma's ability in this area, or the probabilities of a positive rating increase about 6%. This reflects the Taiwan's citizens' anxiety over the island country's relationship with China, which has important implications to almost every aspect of their lives. As Beijing leaders assertively claim sovereignty over the island and refuse to renounce the use of military force against Taiwan while continue to isolate Taipei internationally, the public's assessment of a president's management of cross-Strait relations naturally plays an important role in their presidential approval. This therefore comes no surprise that all regression coefficients associated with national defense and diplomacy are also statistically significant and contribute to public approval of the president, albeit to a lesser degree by comparison, as data in Table 3 show.

Third, the statistically significant and positive coefficients associated with Ma's appointment of cabinet minister deserve attention. Respondents who appreciate Ma's cabinet appointments are 1.4 times more likely in odds to provide him with a positive rating. The fact that presidential approval depends on the ability of staffing key cabinet positions is somewhat unique because no studies in the literature identify this aspect as a contributing factor to presidential popularity, a point we will explore further later. Interestingly, while Ma places much emphasis on high moral standards on himself and his ministers, presidential integrity has no effects on his approval ratings as the related coefficient is statistically insignificant.

Fourth, as hypothesized, the coefficients associated with pan-Green affiliation are statistically significant and bear negative signs. This shows that pan-Green identifiers are less likely to provide a positive approval to Ma, which is expected. What is unexpected is the statistically insignificant coefficients of pan-Blue affiliation, which suggests that Ma has lost the backing of his own supporters. Meanwhile, none of the regression coefficients related to respondents' identity, ethnicity, education levels, gender and age are statistically significant, indicating that respondents' demographic characteristics have little effects on their approval for the president.

**Table 2. Presidential Approval in Taiwan: Logit Analysis**

Variables	Panel 1		Panel 2	
	Coef. (s.e.)	% ch. (O.R.)	Coef. (s.e.)	% ch. (O.R.)
Boosting the Economy	1.49*** (0.17)	343.4 (4.34)	1.64*** (0.21)	417.3 (5.17)
People's Livelihood	1.62*** (0.18)	406.7 (5.07)	1.83*** (0.22)	525.1 (6.25)
Cross-Strait Relations	1.48*** (0.18)	337.5 (4.38)	1.56*** (0.24)	374.2 (4.74)
National Defense	0.97*** (0.15)	163.5 (2.64)	0.99*** (0.19)	169.1 (2.69)
Diplomacy	0.96*** (0.18)	162.4 (2.62)	0.79*** (0.22)	121.1 (2.21)
Staffing Key Cabinet Positions	0.32*** (0.04)	38.2 (1.38)	0.36*** (0.05)	43.1 (1.43)
Integrity	- -	- -	-0.00 (0.06)	-0.2 (1.00)
Pan-Blue	0.33 (0.19)	38.8 (1.39)	0.42 (0.24)	52.5 (1.53)
Pan-Green	-1.03** (0.33)	-64.2 (0.36)	-1.49** (0.48)	-77.4 (0.23)
Hakka	0.01 (0.22)	0.6 (1.01)	0.13 (0.27)	14.1 (1.14)
Mainlander	0.25 (0.19)	28.2 (1.28)	0.12 (0.23)	13.3 (1.13)
Taiwanese	-0.10 (0.16)	-9.3 (0.91)	-0.09 (0.20)	-8.4 (0.92)
Chinese	0.31 (0.31)	35.9 (1.36)	0.70 (0.38)	102.2 (2.02)
College Education	-0.08 (0.15)	-10.0 (0.90)	-0.13 (0.19)	-12.1 (0.88)
Female	0.04 (0.14)	3.6 (1.04)	0.03 (0.18)	-2.5 (0.98)
Age	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.9 (0.99)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.7 (0.99)
Ma's Vote Share-2012	-1.59* (0.77)	-79.5 (0.20)	-2.45* (0.97)	-91.4 (0.09)
N	3978		2672	

Data source: Huang(2012).

Note: Coef.=Regression coefficient; s.e.=standard error; % ch.=percentage change in odds; O.R.=odds ratio; \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001, two-tailed test.

**Table 3. Change in Predicted Probability of a Positive Presidential Approval in Taiwan**

Variables	Panel 1	Panel 2
Boosting the Economy	0.07	0.07
People's Livelihood	0.09	0.09
Cross-Strait Relations	0.06	0.05
National Defense	0.04	0.03
Diplomacy	0.03	0.02
Staffing Key Cabinet Positions	0.01	0.01
Pan-Blue	0.01	0.01
Pan-Green	-0.03	-1.49
Ma's Vote Share-2012	-0.05	-0.07

Data source: Huang(2012).

Note: Probabilities are calculated for each of the statistically significant variables in Table 2 with all other variables being held at their means

Finally, both regression coefficients related to Ma's vote share in 2012 are statistically significant and bear negative signs. The finding confirms the hypothesis that context presents significant effect on individuals' political behaviors. The negative coefficients indicate the loss of popularity of Ma in towns where he received supports in the 2012 election, which is consistent with the above finding of a statistically insignificant pan-Blue affiliation. As Table 3 shows, the probability of positive rating declines by 5% - 7% for one percent vote share Ma previously received in an average town. Since there is little variation of Ma's popularity at the township level, as previously indicated, this shows a widespread loss of presidential approval for Ma during the period under study.

## Discussion and Conclusions

The above evidence shows that Ma's popularity is highly related to the public's appraisals of his presidential performance in various areas. Consistent with the conventional wisdom and the previous findings in Taiwan (Chen and Keng, 2009; Wu and Lee, 2003; Sheng and Pai, 2008;), the state of the economy plays a vital role in Taiwan's presidential popularity. Note that Taiwan citizens' evaluation of Ma's presidential performance is based on both the country's overall economic conditions as well as their personal well-being. They hold the president accountable for deteriorating national economy as much as they ask him to be responsible for their private hardships. Qualitative data from focus group interviews provide an interpretative understanding of the "pocketbook" linkage. Respondents identified low minimum wage, high gas price, rising utility bills, skyrocketed housing costs, and food safety as major complaints against the Ma administration, all of these conventionally falling into the area of people's livelihood. These complaints come from respondents of all political affiliations, including pan-Blue identifiers who presumably are Ma's

supporters. A self-declared pan-Blue respondent's remarks at the focus group interview were instructive: "we are the general public...the housing cost is too high for regular wage earners to bear. Our salary simply cannot keep up with the rising cost of the housing market. If I cannot afford my own house, how can I expect my children to buy their houses? Everything has become so expensive... Living costs has consistently risen except our salary...". As the respondent succinctly put it, "this is people's livelihood" (2013PNB03). Across all political affiliations, personal economic hardship becomes one of the major complaints against the Ma administration.

Taiwan citizens also believe that the incumbent president's policies affect the state of national economy and feel that the president bears the responsibility of implementing policies that should mollify the malign consequences of national economic problems. A pan-Green identifier's comments at the focus group interview were informative: "Being a leader, [Ma] needs to provide the people with a promising future of the country. However, I don't see any hope ... in the county's economic prospect (2013TSG03). Others expressed distrust of Ma's conciliatory approach toward China and believed that his policies have only increased the island's growing dependence on the Chinese economy: "The mainland [China] plans to employ economic means to resolve the Taiwan issue. It provides many economic benefits to Taiwan. Right?... When Taiwan develops a complete dependence on the Chinese economy, it will resolve the Taiwan issue by using the economy as a leverage" (2013PSB01). As quantitative survey data in Table 1 show, only 12% to 20% of respondents are satisfied with Ma's performance in boosting national economy and taking care of people's livelihood. This explains why Ma's popularity suffered.

The complaint about Ma's ability of staffing key cabinet positions is also evident across different political affiliations. Since Ma assumed the presidency in 2008, his Cabinet has a large proportion of doctorates and professors serving as ministers than any other government in the world. Such appointments may be due to the fact that Ma himself has a degree in Doctor of Juridical Science (S.J.D.) from Harvard Law School and was a university professor before becoming a politician. This may also be due to Ma's emphasis on high moral standards and the desire of running a clean government. Since professorship as a profession traditionally possesses high occupational prestige in the Taiwanese society, his inclination of staffing like-minded individuals in key cabinet positions is thus understandable. Critiques, however, pointed out that "these political newcomers on loan from universities have no sense of mission and no team spirit. They are just a bunch of 'happy-go-lucky temporary workers'" (Shih, 2014). Data in Table 1 show that most respondents appear to agree with this assessment and there is a widespread perception that the cabinet is weak among participants of focus group interviews. As one respondent stated, "his team is totally incompetent." Using some of his cabinet members who were arrested for corruption charges as examples, the respondent asked a rhetoric question: "[a]re members of his team really non-corruptible as it was preached during the presidential campaign?" (2013TSN10). Another respondent complained that "he [Ma] filled [the cabinet] with a lot of scholars... I am not saying that scholars are no good but they lack practical experiences ... When they encountered obstacles during the process of implementing a policy, they soon withdrew or resigned from the position" (2013TSN06). Interestingly, while Ma places much emphasis on high moral standards on himself and his ministers, presidential integrity has no effect on his popularity. In fact, respondents of focus group interviews believed that Ma's character of being a "Teflon pot" is an indirect factor contributing to his low approval rating since he lacks the courage to support his cabinet (2013TSN06).

Partisan differences are apparent in the area of cross-Strait relations. Respondents affiliated with the

pan-Blue parties have been in general pleased with Ma's policy of rapprochement toward China. They are glad to see the reduction of cross-Strait tension due to "increased economic and academic exchanges" (2013TNB03), "improved cross-Strait relations" (2013TNB06) and "free from the fear of war with China" (2013TSB04). They are also glad to see the stabilization of Taiwan's diplomatic front as an added benefit of improved cross-Strait relations. Pan-Green identifiers are not supportive of Ma's policies towards China. For them, increasing cross-Strait exchanges only leads to Taiwan's growing economic dependence on the Chinese market and the resulting infringement of the island's sovereignty (2013TNG02).<sup>24</sup> In their view, "diplomatic truce" between Taipei and Beijing only has symbolic gains and Taiwan's independent status in the international community will be lost due to Ma's accommodating policies toward China. "...I cannot take the national flag in international sport events and cannot [officially] claim that I am a Taiwanese." "I feel very frustrated and feel no dignity" (2013TSG06).

The above findings also have important implications for the study of presidential approval as a whole. Consistent with the conventional wisdom, the state of the economy plays a vital role in Taiwan's presidential popularity. Unlike American voters who tend to pay principal attention to the nation's economic health (Kinder, 1981; Clarke and Stewart, 1994; MacKuen, et al., 1992), Taiwan citizens' evaluation of the president's performance is based on both the country's overall economic conditions as well as their personal well-being. The fact that performance of handling people's livelihood is as much important to presidential popularity as boosting the national economy may be due to the influence of Confucianism. The old saying that "while the ruler treats the populace paramount to his ruling, the populace consider livelihood supreme to their existence" ("王者以民爲天，而民以食爲天")<sup>25</sup> is generally considered the principle of good governing. Taiwan citizens thus hold the president accountable for their private hardships as much as asking him/her to be responsible for the health of national economy.

The fact that presidential performance in the areas of cross-Strait relations, diplomacy and national defense are important to Taiwan's presidential approval is also consistent with previous findings (Aldrich, Sullivan and Borgida, 1989; Marra, Ostrom, and Simon, 1990). Contrary to Almond's observation that foreign policy attitudes lack intellectual structure and tend to be unstable (1950), the empirical evidence in Taiwan along with that gathered in the American setting show that citizens are cognitive in these areas. This conclusion is particularly significant in the case of Taiwan because the island's relationship with China has important implications to every aspect of the island citizens' lives, including national defense and foreign affairs. Given that the president is facing a reasonably alert public, performance in these areas become an important factor to Taiwan's presidential popularity.

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<sup>24</sup> Ma's plans to deepen economic relations with China has recently led to a massive demonstration in Taiwan, known as the "Sunflower Movement" (*the Economist*, 2014).

<sup>25</sup> 《漢書·酈食其傳》

## Appendix 1. Focus Group Participants

### 1. Taiwan's Election and Democratization Study

#### Northern Taiwan Pan-Green Group

Code	Sex	Age	Education
2013TNG01	Male	38	College
2013TNG02	Male	55	University and higher
2013TNG03	Male	33	College
2013TNG04	Female	21	Senior High School
2013TNG05	Male	38	University and higher
2013TNG06	Male	40	College

#### Northern Taiwan Pan-Blue Group

Code	Sex	Age	Education
2013TNB01	Male	59	Senior High School
2013TNB02	Male	45	University and higher
2013TNB03	Female	37	University and higher
2013TNB05	Male	52	College
2013TNB06	Female	49	Junior High School
2013TNB07	Female	66	College
2013TNB08	Male	37	University and higher
2013TNB09	Female	55	University and higher

#### Northern Taiwan Nonpartisan Group

Code	Sex	Age	Education
2013TNN01	Male	38	University and higher
2013TNN02	Female	57	Elementary School and under
2013TNN04	Male	66	Elementary School and under
2013TNN05	Female	44	Senior High School
2013TNN06	Female	43	College
2013TNN07	Male	57	University and higher
2013TNN08	Male	56	University and higher
2013TNN09	Male	52	Junior High School

#### Southern Taiwan Pan-Green Group

Code	Sex	Age	Education
2013TSG02	Male	25	University and higher
2013TSG03	Female	28	University and higher
2013TSG05	Male	70	College
2013TSG06	Female	53	Senior High School

### Southern Taiwan Pan-Blue Group

Code	Sex	Age	Education
2013TSB01	Male	62	Senior High School
2013TSB02	Female	66	Junior High School
2013TSB03	Male	44	Junior High School
2013TSB04	Male	46	College
2013TSB05	Female	40	University and higher
2013TSB06	Male	47	Senior High School
2013TSB07	Female	61	University and higher

### Southern Taiwan Nonpartisan Group

Code	Sex	Age	Education
2013TSN01	Male	79	Elementary School and under
2013TSN02	Male	36	University and higher
2013TSN03	Male	48	College
2013TSN04	Male	39	University and higher
2013TSN05	Female	45	University and higher
2013TSN06	Male	62	College
2013TSN08	Male	39	University and higher
2013TSN09	Female	52	Senior High School
2013TSN10	Male	27	Senior High School

Data source: Huang(2012)

## 2. Presidential Popularity and Its Political Effects

### Southern Taiwan Pan-Green Group

Code	Sex	Age	Education
2013PNG02	Female	69	Senior High School
2013PNG03	Male	62	University and higher
2013PNG04	Female	49	College
2013PNG07	Female	31	University and higher
2013PNG08	Male	47	University and higher

### Northern Taiwan Pan-Blue Group

Code	Sex	Age	Education
2013PNB02	Female	27	Senior High School
2013PNB03	Female	44	College
2013PNB05	Female	52	College
2013PNB06	Male	51	University and higher
2013PNB09	Female	50	College
2013PNB10	Female	43	Senior High School

Northern Taiwan Nonpartisan Group

Code	Sex	Age	Education
2013PNN01	Female	63	Elementary School and under
2013PNN02	Male	59	University and higher
2013PNN03	Male	55	College
2013PNN04	Male	53	Elementary School and under
2013PNN05	Male	52	Junior High School
2013PNN07	Female	80	Elementary School and under

Southern Taiwan Pan-Green Group

Code	Sex	Age	Education
2013PSG01	Female	62	Junior High School
2013PSG02	Female	51	University and higher
2013PSG03	Male	51	Junior High School
2013PSG04	Female	57	Junior High School
2013PSG05	Male	52	College
2013PSG10	Female	49	Senior High School

Southern Taiwan Pan-Blue Group

Code	Sex	Age	Education
2013PSB01	Female	64	Senior High School
2013PSB02	Female	53	Senior High School
2013PSB03	Male	56	Elementary School and under
2013PSB04	Female	66	University and higher
2013PSB05	Male	38	Senior High School
2013PSB06	Male	42	University and higher
2013PSB07	Male	52	Senior High School
2013PSB08	Female	37	College

Southern Taiwan Nonpartisan Group

Code	Sex	Age	Education
2013PSN01	Female	51	Senior High School
2013PSN02	Female	26	University and higher
2013PSN05	Male	60	College
2013PSN08	Female	50	Senior High School
2013PSN10	Female	60	University and higher

Data source: Cheng (2011)



## **Appendix 2. Survey Questions**

1. How satisfied are you with his [President Ma Ying-jeou's] overall performance as President over the past six months?
2. How satisfied are you with his performance in promoting economic development?
3. How satisfied are you with his performance in handling the livelihood issues?
4. How satisfied are you with his performance in handling the Cross-strait relations?
5. How satisfied are you with his performance in national defense?
6. How satisfied are you with his performance in diplomacy?
7. In human resource allocation, if 0 means that he employs persons irrelevantly, 10 means that he employs persons relevantly, how would you rate Ma using a 0-to-10 scale?
8. In personal morality, if 0 means that he has bad personal morality, 10 means that he has good morality, how would you rate Ma using a 0-to-10 scale?

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