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| Field |
Value |
| Title: | On the complexity of the El Farol Bar game: a sensitivity analysis |
| Authors: | 陳樹衡
Chen, Shu-Heng
Gostoli, Umberto |
| Contributors: | 經濟系 |
| Keywords: | Autonomous agents; Complex networks; Computational methods; El Farol bar problem; Imitation; Inequity aversion; Keeping-up-with-the-Joneses; Mutation; Social preference; Sensitivity analysis |
| Date: | 2016-12 |
| Issue Date: | 2017-08-23 11:10:45 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we carry out a sensitivity analysis for an agent-based model of the use of public resources as manifested by the El Farol Bar problem. An early study using the same model has shown that a good-society equilibrium, characterized by both economic efficiency and economic equality, can be achieved probabilistically by a von Neumann network, and can be achieved surely with the presence of some agents having social preferences, such as the inequity-averse preference or the ‘keeping-up-with-the-Joneses’ preference. In this study, we examine this fundamental result by exploring the inherent complexity of the model; specifically, we address the effect of the three key parameters related to size, namely, the network size, the neighborhood size, and the memory size. We find that social preferences still play an important role over all the sizes considered. Nonetheless, it is also found that when network size becomes large, the parameter, the bar capacity (the attendance threshold), may also play a determining role. |
| Relation: | Evolutionary Intelligence, 9(4), 113-123 |
| Data Type: | article |
| DOI: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12065-016-0138-1 |
| DCField |
Value |
Language |
| dc.contributor (Contributor) | 經濟系 | |
| dc.creator (Authors) | 陳樹衡 | zh_tw |
| dc.creator (Authors) | Chen, Shu-Heng | en_US |
| dc.creator (Authors) | Gostoli, Umberto | en_US |
| dc.date (Date) | 2016-12 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2017-08-23 11:10:45 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 2017-08-23 11:10:45 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (Issue Date) | 2017-08-23 11:10:45 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/112108 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (Abstract) | In this paper, we carry out a sensitivity analysis for an agent-based model of the use of public resources as manifested by the El Farol Bar problem. An early study using the same model has shown that a good-society equilibrium, characterized by both economic efficiency and economic equality, can be achieved probabilistically by a von Neumann network, and can be achieved surely with the presence of some agents having social preferences, such as the inequity-averse preference or the ‘keeping-up-with-the-Joneses’ preference. In this study, we examine this fundamental result by exploring the inherent complexity of the model; specifically, we address the effect of the three key parameters related to size, namely, the network size, the neighborhood size, and the memory size. We find that social preferences still play an important role over all the sizes considered. Nonetheless, it is also found that when network size becomes large, the parameter, the bar capacity (the attendance threshold), may also play a determining role. | |
| dc.format.extent | 209 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | text/html | - |
| dc.relation (Relation) | Evolutionary Intelligence, 9(4), 113-123 | |
| dc.subject (Keywords) | Autonomous agents; Complex networks; Computational methods; El Farol bar problem; Imitation; Inequity aversion; Keeping-up-with-the-Joneses; Mutation; Social preference; Sensitivity analysis | |
| dc.title (Title) | On the complexity of the El Farol Bar game: a sensitivity analysis | en_US |
| dc.type (Data Type) | article | |
| dc.identifier.doi (DOI) | 10.1007/s12065-016-0138-1 | |
| dc.doi.uri | http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12065-016-0138-1 | |
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