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| Field |
Value |
| Title: | The Lobbying Game for Recruitment in Asymmetric Information |
| Authors: | Wang, Jue-Shyan;Hung, Hsiao-Yin
王智賢;洪曉吟 |
| Contributors: | 財政系 |
| Keywords: | Asymmetric Information;Employment;Equilibrium;Information;Principal Agent;Promotion |
| Date: | 2008-07 |
| Issue Date: | 2015-10-06 16:33:42 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | Because the interests of the manager and the organization are not necessarily coincident, the principal-agent problem arises in the process of recruitment. The standard of employment and the motive in the manager's mind may influence the result of recruitment. The present paper analyzes a game in which the recruit may lobby the manager. We discuss the equilibrium when the manager has a prejudice against some applicant or has a consideration about his own future promotion prospects. |
| Relation: | Journal of Economics and Management, 4(2), 125-143 |
| Data Type: | article |
| DCField |
Value |
Language |
| dc.contributor (Contributor) | 財政系 | |
| dc.creator (Authors) | Wang, Jue-Shyan;Hung, Hsiao-Yin | |
| dc.creator (Authors) | 王智賢;洪曉吟 | zh_TW |
| dc.date (Date) | 2008-07 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2015-10-06 16:33:42 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 2015-10-06 16:33:42 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (Issue Date) | 2015-10-06 16:33:42 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/78875 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (Abstract) | Because the interests of the manager and the organization are not necessarily coincident, the principal-agent problem arises in the process of recruitment. The standard of employment and the motive in the manager's mind may influence the result of recruitment. The present paper analyzes a game in which the recruit may lobby the manager. We discuss the equilibrium when the manager has a prejudice against some applicant or has a consideration about his own future promotion prospects. | |
| dc.format.extent | 159 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | text/html | - |
| dc.relation (Relation) | Journal of Economics and Management, 4(2), 125-143 | |
| dc.subject (Keywords) | Asymmetric Information;Employment;Equilibrium;Information;Principal Agent;Promotion | |
| dc.title (Title) | The Lobbying Game for Recruitment in Asymmetric Information | |
| dc.type (Data Type) | article | en |
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