

美中關係變遷與亞太安全新架構

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(二)中、英文摘要及關鍵詞 (keywords)。

中文摘要：

2008年爆發的美國次貸風暴而引發全球性的金融危機，更加強化了全球的財富與經濟實力已經由西方轉向東方。中國大陸經濟實力持續上升，預料在國際社會終將漸增扮演重要決策角色。2010年歐洲出現重大債信問題，更加凸顯中國經濟實力的角色，相對於美國實力的衰微，中國在世界的影響力陡然增加。這就是歐巴馬總統就任之後，首先面對中美關係與過去完全不同的情境，美國必須要面對強大的中國，同時擁有大部份美國公債的中國。因此，在總體結構上，中美之間將會尋求更多的合作，並極力避免彼此發生衝撞、衝突的機會。中美關係也將進入重新調整結構的新時代，這也意味著新時代中美關係已經朝向建構穩定機制性互動關係。

美國從2010年充分掌握住東亞周邊的突發事件，積極運用周邊國家與中國發生外交摩擦機會，強勢介入拉攏周邊國家，重新樹立美國在亞洲的權勢與威望。尤其是北韓天安艦事件、和中國對南海的核心利益說，都激起美國強力介入區域的動作，增強美國與周邊國家拉攏的機會。2011年美國正式宣告「美國太平洋世紀」來到，完整的從經濟戰略、外交戰略、和軍事戰略推出積極作為。2012年1月美國因應在伊拉克撤軍的情況，宣布對亞洲軍事戰略進行調整！最重要的戰略意義是美國要如何面對強大的中國，重點係指向中國的軍事擴張。美國已經積極運用外交形勢與中國建立穩定的對話機制，透過協商與對話，尋求共同合作的基礎。

針對美中之間的關係結構性轉變，到底會走向更多合作還是繼續競爭，再加上一些合作呢？美國軍事戰略轉變與部署，在亞太區域形成一強大的勢力網絡，拉攏與周邊國家的互利與深化互動，重要的是美中關係所呈現出的戰略競爭與雙方漸增的合作關係，會如何轉變為中美關係合作的框架？本計畫的重點項目。本計畫第一階段聚焦在中國對中美關係發展的重點觀察與分析。計畫第二階段重點著眼於習近平上台後建構美中新型大國關係。

關鍵詞：美中關係、戰略競爭、亞太安全、全球金融危機、美中戰略暨經濟對話、新型大國關係

英文摘要:

Abstract:

Global financial tsunami has since 2008 challenged the existing global and regional orders. China was expected to take more responsibility by the international community. In coping with the unprecedented scale of challenge, China has been at the center of international financial relief. On the contrary, the supremacy of the United States has relatively declined as a result of the financial crisis at home. Under the broader context of power shift, the US-China relation is now entering into a complex situation. It is clear that more cooperation and consultation on international issues between the two are required.

The United States is generating a new effort in Asia. President Obama made it clear in 2010 that the US is coming back to Asia! In 2011, the US indicated that it has come to the American Pacific Century. How does the US see the rise of China and a much powerful China today? The US is building more dialogue mechanism to work with China, but at the same time making the gesture much tougher in the region. In the South China Sea and the Southeast Asia, the US is beefing up its presence and effort by linking up with regional countries. It has resulted in strategic competition against China in the region.

This paper is thus trying to examine the extent of fundamental change of the US-China relation over the past four years since the beginning of the global financial tsunami and of the Obama Presidency. Under the Obama Administration, a more cooperative approach toward China is desirable but at the same time the US is pushing back to Asia. It is a new challenge for the US and China to try to accommodate with each more. When President Xi Jinping came to power in November 2012, China has started to try to develop a new major power relationship with the US.

Keywords: US-China relations, strategic competition, Asia Pacific security, global financial crisis, US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, new major power relationship

(三)報告內容：包括前言、研究目的、文獻探討、研究方法、結果與討論(含結論與建議)…等。

1. 研究目的

歐巴馬總統上臺後，對於亞洲改採積極態度，意圖扭轉布希政府因忽視而產生對美國不利的戰略環境。面對全球金融危機所造成的國力衰退，美國體會到無論在國際議題上或是雙邊關係上，都有必須要與中國進行合作的壓力。美中關係在2009年度過短暫的「蜜月期」，11月歐巴馬第一次以總統身份出訪中國，當時歐巴馬與胡錦濤的第一次正式接觸，簽署「美中聯合聲明」，試圖規範未來兩國之間互動的一些根本原則，雙方關係可謂達到新的初試高點。華府與北京之間，延續著布希政府時期的財政部長鮑森(Henry Paulson)所規劃出的親中氛圍，充滿著相互之間對於未來許多的正面期許。不過，歐巴馬團隊為求營造美中之間的和樂氣氛，所展現的低姿態和妥協，卻在美國國內引起許多的批判。

這份密切的互動氣氛，於年底前在丹麥舉辦的聯合國氣候變遷公約大會(UNFCCC)上，卻因美中各自代表著不同國家集團的利益而產生齟齬。進入2010年，1月6日歐巴馬依據臺灣關係法批准對台64億美元的軍售案、1月11日北京方面刻意透露其所進行的彈道飛彈防禦能力試射，作為對美國的軍售台表達的初步反應。1月15日谷歌公司針對中國所進行的網路駭客和監控行為，威脅要退出中國市場營運，引發美國政府對北京的批判，並導引到對北京人權的問題。2月6日美國白宮公開確認歐巴馬將在白宮接見來訪的達賴喇嘛。這些事件均直接挑戰甫進入親和的美中關係，以及歐胡兩位領導人的智慧。其中，尤其是美國對台軍售和會見達賴喇嘛均被北京視為碰觸政策的紅線，北京除嚴詞痛批之外，也採取相關回應措施；特別是宣告美中軍事交流將無限期延後。

迄至2010年6月初，美國國防部長蓋茲(Robert Gates)對於原先擬訪問中國大陸的提議遭到北京方面的拒絕，表示強烈不滿，他並利用香格里拉區域安全會議的舞台，言詞批評中國的作法。之後，美國國務卿希拉蕊(Hillary Clinton)利用出席東協區域論壇的機會，表白美國在南海有國家利益說，也引爆中美之間在南海議題上的外交與軍事對峙。接下來，美國聯合東亞若干國家，在黃海一帶和南海進行聯合演習。顯示中美兩國再外交態勢上的相互對峙氣氛。似乎軍事對峙的氛圍瀰漫東北亞，又加上北韓的強勢作為，使得東北亞戰雲密布。

但是，在媒體的鎂光燈之外，美中雙方的外交努力積極進行溝通，試圖降低軍事對峙的緊繃氣息。9月初，美國白宮國家經濟理事會主任(White House National Economic Council)桑默斯(Lawrence Summers)和國家安全副顧問多尼隆(Thomas Donilon)訪問北京(按多尼隆在訪問北京之後返回華府，隨即接受任命為國家安全顧問一職，並於2013年6月習歐莊園會談前離職)，會見胡錦濤、溫家寶、王岐山、徐才厚等中國方面領導人；就伊朗、北韓對台軍售等相關議題交換意見。對美國來說該團最重要的目的是與中國方面共同就這些共同利益的議題相互交換意見，並尋求共同解決作法。因為，中美兩國都有最新的體認，那就是雙方愈來愈無法採取片面對抗的作法，形勢迫使雙方必須要磋商進行合作。

當時美國副國務卿史坦柏格甫完成三天(12/15-17)的訪問北京行，此團包括歐巴馬政策團隊中對亞洲與中國政策最核心成員：貝德(Jeff Bader)和坎博(Kurt Campbell)，史坦柏格這項訪問也是近來美、中雙方一連串高層互訪的一部分。另外，解放軍副總參謀長馬曉天於12月10日在華府與美方進行中美第十一次防務磋商。其中確定美國國防部長蓋茲將訂2011年1月10-14日赴大陸，同時，解放軍總參謀長陳炳德，亦將於5月雙方方便的時候訪美。中國國務院副總理王岐山則在12月14日抵達華府，出席第21屆中美商貿聯委會。而中國國家主席胡錦濤也確定在明年1月訪美，進行國是訪問。

綜合言之，雖然2011年當中媒體不斷擴大報導美中的軍事對峙，但是幾乎同時間，美中之間高層

官員來回協商，並在整體形勢的需求之下，雙方均體認到必須要盡速化解掉軍事對峙的緊繃氣氛，運用外交協商更有效的共同面對許多國際議題的挑戰。

習近平就任國家主席之後，即積極建構中國外交的新氣勢，與相關大國建構新型大國關係，希望透過特殊的互動關係，能夠獲得其他大國在國際事務上更多的尊重與支持。正好就在美國推動亞洲再平衡戰略當時，中國推動在美中之間構建新型大國關係，透過更加機制化的互動，增加對話互動，並以提升互信。

本研究的目的是在於進行深入評估美中關係現階段的定位，以及對於亞太安全體系的實質影響。美中之間的合作與競爭態勢愈來愈明顯，實際上，雙方非常清楚未來必須要採取更多合作，降低對峙與衝突的可能性。美國已經強勢運用其硬實力，重新鏈結亞太安全體系，除了雙邊同盟關係之外，也積極介入東亞區域整合的多邊架構，這將導致亞太新安全結構的出現。

2. 研究進展

近期美中軍事交流的波折與對峙在過去幾年中，美中軍事交流雖然在不同的政治氛圍之下，進展時進時停；但至少在官員的互動上也已逐漸趨於頻繁。雙方軍事防務安全磋商 累計已達十次(自1997年迄今)，並建立起三個管道的溝通機制：第一、戰略層面的國防部副部長層級磋商；第二、工作層級的防務政策和防務安排對話；第三、美中國防部熱線溝通。自歐巴馬就任總統之後，美國便積極尋求全面改善與中國關係。2009年2月國務卿柯林頓上任首次訪問北京，便促使美中恢復軍事交流。

在新加坡舉行的第九屆香格里拉區域安全對話會議，美國國防部長蓋茲在演說中，直接點出當時美中軍事交流的問題之後，美中軍事關係立即成為現場各界關注的焦點。在會前即已傳出蓋茲希望在新加坡會議之後轉訪北京被拒事件，蓋茲顯然對中國此舉表達出相當不以為然的態度。北京方面並未正式回應說明拒絕其訪問的理由，無限期延長邀請蓋茲訪問就是中國想要對美傳遞的不滿訊息。其實，在北京舉行第二屆「美中戰略暨經濟對話」，當時曾傳出美國太平洋指揮區司令威拉德(Robert Willard)與中國解放軍副總參馬曉天進行閉門會議，中方明確指出當前軍事交流中斷，完全係因美國決定對台軍售所致。

2010年進入暑假，美國國務卿首先在ARF的發難表態，使得美中軍事部門進入對峙的態勢。美韓在黃海與日本海的軍演，之後美越在南海周邊的聯合演習；再加上，中日就釣魚台事件之後的緊張關係，美日在沖繩一帶進行高調的軍事演習。整個美中關係似乎受到軍事部門相互對峙的影響而產生緊繃效應，但是美中雙方外交部門卻始終都有相互溝通的渠道，包括正式與非正式管道，雙方均表示要降低緊張氣氛。

美中之間建構中的新秩序基於美中之間這些新的變動與挑戰，代表一定程度美中之間希望建立起互動的新模式，至於是否代表美中將在亞太區域中建立起新的互動架構呢？這通常反應出美國新總統就任後逐漸會與中國方面進入磨合期，再發展出新關係的模式。因此，目前美中關係的表面緊繃，實際上雙方外交單位互動頻仍，而且重要的政治領袖也互相絡繹於途，更像是建立一種新秩序的形成。對於未來美中之間就國際性議題、區域性的問題和雙邊的問題，彼此可以在調整之後而做出較符合雙方期待的作法。

基本上，在美中關係建立新秩序的過程中，其本質是具有複雜的面向，包括：雙方暨合作又競爭的面向。而且雙方合作諮商更朝機制化的方向發展，未來一旦恢復軍事交流，美中的所謂防務交流諮商合作將會納入機制化方向發展。

3. 中美關係變遷對台灣的影響評估

就台灣問題方面，在美中關係發展中，台灣問題逐漸消失在雙方討論的議程中，目前除了美國對

台軍售之外，其餘幾乎不見雙方的討論。就軍售而言，美國並不打算將此議題放進與中國的諮商議程中，凡此顯現美國將只進行考慮是否符合美國國家利益來決定是否對台軍售，而不會將之提出向中國諮商。美國歐巴馬政府自去年大聲高唱要重返亞洲之後，今年積極利用韓國天安艦事件的機會，加強拉攏韓國與日本。十一月北韓突然砲擊南韓延坪島事件更使得南韓政府面臨戰爭邊緣的威脅，更加強化與美國聯盟的關係。而中日釣魚台事件，也使日本政府別無他途，只有重返美日安保的架構下與美國積極合作。

美國在區域整合當中，加強投入與東協的關係，建構「美國—東協高峰會」，並承諾加入東協加入的東亞高峰會。在外交形勢上，由於中國在區域內的強勢表現，使得東協諸國更歡迎美國進入亞洲扮演平衡中國的角色。所以，美國一方面強化與個別國家的聯盟關係，另一方面掌握契機切入東亞區域整合的主流中，自明年起，美國將是東協固定對話機制裡的新成員，屆時以東協為核心的區域整合機制到底會導向何方？確實值得進一步研究與觀察。

4. 初步研究發現

新關係發展的啟示目前亞太安全環境急遽變化中，美中關係也在進行新一波的調整，周邊國家同時也在調整適應美中為主軸的新秩序發展。面對這些新挑戰，國家政策便必須要具有相當彈性進行調整，以肆應新局面的形成。由於美中關係將會同時充滿著衝突與合作的複雜面向，整體而言，雙方關係在既有的固定利益上，一時間相互衝突處仍在所難免，但是雙方的互動已經進入機制化協商的時代，一旦有矛盾出現，就是雙方進行協商尋求解決之道。片面引發衝突的可能性在未來期間將會逐漸減少，就算是會有突發的對峙，應該也不至於引爆成為大衝突點。這些是我國未來面對美中關係發展中，應該具備的政策思維。美中關係新秩序的建構中，透露出未來將會形成相互協商解決問題的方式。

在本計畫研究的第一階段中，研究初步發現如下：

- (1) 美中關係重新建構，主要係以合作多於對抗導向。
- (2) 美中關係互動已經進入機制化時代，每年舉辦的「戰略暨經濟對話」具有相當代表性，是雙方溝通交換政策訊息的重要平台。對於美中關係具有穩定作用，今年在北京召開前夕，正逢大陸盲人維權律師陳光誠案出現，雖然事前雙方疑慮頗深，但是美國國務院立即派遣亞太助卿Kurt Campbell赴北京進行協商。讓陳案順利落幕，美中戰略暨經濟對話如期舉行。
- (3) 美國重返亞洲的勢力逐漸加強，也帶動美國積極介入區域多邊機制，除了原有的東協區域論壇之外，新創立的東協擴大國防部長會議(ADMM plus)，美國也於2010年正式加入。中美關係調整勢必直接影響整體亞太安全結構。
- (4) 目前觀察直接衝擊的包括有對南海安全形勢架構，美國原先採取不直接介入立場，但與中國就南海問題上的互動顯示，美國已經帶動挑戰中國的南海立場，也直接影響周邊國家對南海的態度。

在本計畫研究執行的第二階段中，研究發現如下：

- (1) 隨著美國重返亞洲的逐漸落實，美國已經積極透過重新在區域內部署軍隊強化其存在與影響力，在澳洲達爾文、菲律賓駐軍，並自2013年6月起在新加坡部署近岸戰鬥艦，將美國軍事實力延伸進入南海與麻六甲海峽。
- (2) 美國自加入東協擴大國防部長會議積極推動該區域國防機制進行演習，2013年6月下旬以ADMM plus的機制，在汶萊周邊海域進行海上搜索和人道救援。美國希望透過區域國防機制的建立與區域國家聯合推動區域合作規範，也爭取與中國在這些非傳統安全領域的合作。
- (3) 美中積極建構新型大國關係，確立增加信任以釋疑的相互合作機制。同時也看到美中合作對於國際秩序的穩定具有重大的引導作用。

(四)計畫成果自評部分：請就研究內容與原計畫相符程度、達成預期目標情況、研究成果之學術或應用價值(簡要敘述成果所代表之意義、價值、影響或進一步發展之可能性)

國科會補助專題研究計畫成果報告自評表

請就研究內容與原計畫相符程度、達成預期目標情況、研究成果之學術或應用價值(簡要敘述成果所代表之意義、價值、影響或進一步發展之可能性)、是否適合在學術期刊發表或申請專利、主要發現或其他有關價值等，作一綜合評估。

1. 請就研究內容與原計畫相符程度、達成預期目標情況作一綜合評估

- V 達成目標
 未達成目標 (請說明，以 100 字為限)
 實驗失敗
 因故實驗中斷
 其他原因

說明：

本計畫原設定就美中最新的互動關係以及其機制化關係進行分析，目前達成目標重點有三：

- (1) 隨著美國重返亞洲的逐漸落實，美國已經積極透過重新在區域內部署軍隊強化其存在與影響力，在澳洲達爾文、菲律賓駐軍，並自2013年6月起在新加坡部署近岸戰鬥艦，將美國軍事實力延伸進入南海與麻六甲海峽。
- (2) 美國自加入東協擴大國防部長會議積極推動該區域國防機制進行演習，2013年6月下旬以ADMM plus的機制，在汶萊周邊海域進行海上搜索和人道救援。美國希望透過區域國防機制的建立與區域國家聯合推動區域合作規範，也爭取與中國在這些非傳統安全領域的合作。
- (3) 美中積極建構新型大國關係，同時也看到美中合作對於國際秩序的穩定具有重大的引導作用。

2. 研究成果在學術期刊發表或申請專利等情形：

- 論文： V 已發表 未發表之文稿 撰寫中 無
專利： 已獲得 申請中 無
技轉： 已技轉 洽談中 無
其他：(以 100 字為限)

- 請依學術成就、技術創新、社會影響等方面，評估研究成果之學術或應用價值（簡要敘述成果所代表之意義、價值、影響或進一步發展之可能性）（以 500 字為限）
- 學術成就：本計畫進行中，美國將其「重返亞洲」戰略更加進一步具體化，於 2011 年 10 月正式將亞太戰略具體化，美國政府正式提出「美國太平洋世紀」；2012 年 1 月 3 日歐巴馬總統宣布美國對亞洲新的軍事戰略，形塑出美國對中國具體的政策架構。初步研析美中關係的發展，可以確定雙方關係正在變遷與調整當中，尤其習近平就任國家領導人之後，建構新型大國關係對於美中是否確定發展新結構具有學術研究的意義。
- 社會影響：本計畫進行中，除及時蒐集並進行深入研究美國戰略調整之外，更具體針對美中關係的轉變深入分析。並及時撰寫短篇分析文章，並主辦美中關係與台灣的研討會多場。進行與媒體的對話，特別是有關即時性議題的反應，已在媒體發表相關短文多篇。
- 評估研究成果之學術或應用價值：目前本計畫執行期間，已經依據主題發表一篇期刊專文“**The Structural change in the United States and China Relation: Security Implication for the Asia Pacific Region,**” *East Asian Review*, Vol. 14. pp. 39-56. 2011；也針對美中在南海戰略競爭形勢發表一篇專書專章之專文在 “**The United States-China Competition in the South China Sea: Strategic Implications for Regional Security,**” in Tran Truong Thuy, ed., *The South China Sea: Cooperation for Regional Security and Development – A conference Proceeding*. Hanoi: Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam and Vietnam Lawyers’ Association. 2011.；另外，以中國外交為主的促進區域合作，以強化其對美國的競爭力量發表專書專文，“**China’s Strategy in Asian Regional Cooperation: Towards Multi-layered Engagement,**” in Sudhir Devare, Swaran Singh, and Reena Marwah, eds., *Emerging China: Prospects for Partnership in Asia*. New Delhi: Routledge, 2012. 出版專文、撰寫即時性分析短文以及辦理相關研討會或座談會，主要係掌握住動態性國際研究研究的要領，就本議題所牽涉的相關層面提供社會、政府、專業深入分析觀點。

(五)若該計畫已有論文發表者(須於論文致謝部分註明補助計畫編號)，得作為成果報告內容或附錄，並請註明發表刊物名稱、卷期及出版日期。

本計畫迄今已經發表長篇論文三篇如下：

1. “The Structural change in the United States and China Relation: Security Implication for the Asia Pacific Region,” *East Asian Review*, Vol. 14. 2011, pp. 39-56.
2. “The United States-China Competition in the South China Sea: Strategic Implications for Regional Security,” in Tran Truong Thuy, ed., *The South China Sea: Cooperation for Regional Security and Development – A conference Proceeding*. Hanoi: Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam and Vietnam Lawyers’ Association. 2011.
3. **“China’s Strategy in Asian Regional Cooperation: Towards Multi-layered Engagement,”** in Sudhir Devare, Swaran Singh, and Reena Marwah, eds., *Emerging China: Prospects for Partnership in Asia*. New Delhi: Routledge, 2012.

國科會補助專題研究計畫項下赴國外(或大陸地區)出差或研習心得報告

日期：100 年 11 月 30 日

計畫編號	NSC 100-2410-H-004-089-MY2		
計畫名稱	美中關係變遷與亞太安全新架構		
出國人員姓名	劉復國	服務機構及職稱	國立政治大學國際關係研究中心 研究員
出國時間	100 年 11 月 18 日至 100 年 11 月 21 日	出國地點	中國大陸上海

一、 國外(大陸)研究過程

- (一)、 100 年 11 月 16 日前赴海口市參加由中國南海研究院所主辦南海問題國際研討會，會議主軸探討中美之間針對南海議題的國際法和國際政治爭端。會後，專程由海口飛往上海進行拜訪當地專家，除蒐集大陸方面相關專家學者的著作與研究報告外，另進行交流中美關係變遷的研究趨勢。
- (二)、 利用有限的訪問時間，分別拜訪上海交通大學和上海國際問題研究院。
- 訪談交流的重點主要有：
- i. 自 2009 年歐巴馬總統就職以來，美國對中國政策的微妙轉變，中國大陸方面的觀察，以及中美政府間主要政策負責官員間的思維與互動情形。
 - ii. 2010 年開春之後，中美之間在 2009 年 11 月歐胡簽署的中美聯合聲明融洽氣氛中，開始走向複雜對立的一年，美國同意出售台灣武器、以及同意讓達賴喇嘛訪美等事均刺激北京。導致中方宣告雙方軍事交流中止以示不滿。中方對美國的不諒解以及批判的重點！

- iii. 2010年東亞周邊情勢變化，從天安艦事件、南海問題、美韓黃海軍演、中日釣魚台糾紛、以及北韓砲擊延坪島，均是中國外交形勢居於負面的形象中。中美之間醞釀對立氛圍，導致區域緊張情勢升高。中方對此的解讀以及政策的轉變思維。
- iv. 2011年1月胡錦濤訪美進行國是訪問，在中美之間確立未來交往的根本規範。之後，中國解放軍總參謀長陳炳德於5月訪美，重新啟動軍事交流。8月美國副總統拜登訪中，再度為雙方的友好互動營造更進一步的氛圍。
- v. 另外，歐巴馬上台之後，為進一步與中國政府相互對話，將原有「戰略經濟對話(SED)」機制擴大為「戰略暨經濟對話(S & ED)」機制。
- vi. 探詢未來中美關係發展，中國的政策觀點以及對未來的觀察與顧慮。

二、研究成果

- (一)、特別針對中國大陸方面對於近三年來中美關係發展的觀點變化，可以較為深入理解。並深入掌握北京對美觀點的變化與疑慮！
- (二)、雖然中美關係近三年間有較大的起伏趨勢，中國大陸方面從積極營造中美和諧氛圍，到不滿意美國政策施為，而採取對抗的做法。從中，解讀出相互間的期待與不滿意。
- (三)、儘管中美之間利益矛盾甚至相互衝突，但是因為兩大強國之間的關係已經不同於前，在歐巴馬總統時期，雙方正要逐漸進入關係架構建構期間，雙方互動形式已經進入機制化。中美關係的具體內涵有合作、也不排除

對抗的意義在內！

三、 建議

- (一)、 由於進行實地調查訪問研究，需要足夠的研究經費支撐，受限於經費與時間安排的不容易，無法展開較為細密的訪問調查。只能選擇性的訪問一些專家，其意見並不一定具有足夠代表性。建議計畫案可以依據提計畫書申請時的規劃，衡量提供較足夠經費！
- (二)、 第一年的研究案重點主要以中美關係的中國政策觀點，第二年才是以美國觀點的中美關係政策為主要研究內涵，但因經費核定有限無法赴美進行調研。配合研究進度之推進，建議計畫書的進度可以在認定上有些彈性空間，以方便研究計劃的進行！

四、 其他

- (一)、 從第一階段研究與赴大陸實地交流的心得，中美關係結構上有趨向穩定的趨勢，但是彼此在戰略利益的矛盾，在南海的利益相互衝突。預計將會是中美戰略競爭激化的焦點議題。
- (二)、 中美在東南亞的戰略態勢也在美國重返亞洲推動之下有明顯變化，美國加強與越南、柬埔寨、緬甸發展合作關係，並對湄公河計畫案提供積極的援助，顯見這亦是美國積極競爭態勢的未來戰略重點。

The Structural Change in the United States and China Relation: Security Implication for the Asia Pacific Region

Fu-Kuo Liu

Global financial tsunami has since 2008 challenged the existing global and regional orders. China was expected to take more responsibility by the international community. In coping with the unprecedented scale of challenge, China has been at the center of international financial relief. On the contrary, the supremacy of the United States has relatively declined as a result of the financial crisis at home. Under the broader context of power shift, the US-China relation is now entering into a complex situation. It is clear that more cooperation and consultation on international issues between the two are more desirable.

At the peak of the global financial tsunami, President Obama came to the office in January 2009. The national power of the US was weakened and thus American options on foreign policy were substantially limited. At the end of 2009, during President Obama's first visit to Asia, a clear and friendly gesture to the region was shaped. The new Democrat's government was obviously trying to transform the American negative image to a positive one. In particular, Obama was trying to build a new friendship with Chinese leader, Hu Jintao. The US-China summit concluded with the US-China Joint Statement, which stressed establishment and deepening of bilateral strategic mutual trust. The US was seeking for more Chinese cooperation in bilateral, regional and global issues. Many believe that the bilateral relationship was going to march through a cozy period of time, as new friendly was established between Obama and Hu Jintao. Basically, the US was thinking of setting a new tone with a forthcoming message to China. The bilateral relation could become more comprehensive.

Under such an unprecedented situation, what the United States could do was trying to send a positive message to Asia and China. A conciliatory gesture was clear. The US needs to work closely with China and the rest of regional countries. It is clear that the US was beginning changing the course of engaging Asian countries and China. Especially, in the wake of the global financial tsunami, China becomes the US government's number one foreign debt owner. The US therefore needs to be more conciliatory to China than ever before. It also complicates the bilateral relations. Toward the end of 2009, the positive impression on the US-China relation left to the region was developing.

Quite surprisingly into 2010, the relationship however turned sour. Following through a number of issues popped up, the US government announced to approve the arms sales deal to Taiwan and agreed to welcome Dalai Lama visiting the US. The Chinese government reacted with a strong protest on those political issues which have been considered as breaching integrity of sovereignty. In responding to arms sales deal to Taiwan, Beijing immediately announced to cease military exchange with the US indefinitely canceling several rounds of official visits. In June, US Defense Secretary, Robert Gates proposed to visit China, but the proposition was rejected by Beijing right away. Although the bilateral Strategic Economic Dialogue continues, military

exchange was called to a halt. Then, on 23 July 2010, US State Secretary Hilary Clinton highlighted in the occasion of ASEAN Regional Forum ministerial meeting that “the US has a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia’s maritime commons” and all disputes should work through regional multilateral platforms.¹ Chinese responded with criticism as if the US is trying to interfere in the South China Sea disputes and internationalize the issues, which China can not accept.²

As the US-China’s military exchange was putting on halt, both the US and China announced to conduct different scale of military exercises to express certain dissatisfactory gesture to each other. This paper is thus trying to examine the extent of US Asia policy and fundamental change of the US-China relation over the past two years since the beginning of the global financial tsunami. Under the Obama Administration, a more cooperative approach toward China is desirable. It would lead to US’s keen interest in engaging in the regional multilateralism.

Fragile Power and the United States Rethinking Asia Strategy

After the US clearly bogged down in the Middle East and global counter-terrorism campaign, American leadership was not strongly presented in the region. Especially, throughout the process of regional mechanism buildup in Asia, the US was completely left behind and considered an outsider. There may be two factors affecting the US policy in Asia. First, the focuses of US national security strategy were over-emphasized on counter-terrorism and Middle East. US negligence of Asia was an inevitable outcome. Second, regionalism was driven by Asian countries and accompanied with the intention of big power competition. Initially, the China-led regional cooperation was exclusive to the US. As it develops, it has also left no any room for the US.

Subsequently, US negligence to Asia has resulted in decline of its influence in the region and the emergence of Chinese dominance. From the American perspective, it is very important at the outset of President Obama’s term to make strong commitment to its Asian allies and friends, as his policy approach will be completely different from what President Bush gave to the region. Thus, it has become the first priority on the policy Agenda of the Obama administration to assert the US is back to Asia.³ The rationale behind the Obama administration is that the US would like this strong message to be sent to Asian nations and stress that the US is not distracted by its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Now, the US intends to broaden and deepen its partnership with the region. The most constructive effort by the US so far is direct link with ASEAN plus mechanisms. In 2010, the ASEAN plus 8 (adding Russia and the United States on the original plus 6 list) is on the making. The first ASEAN Defence Ministerial Meeting plus 8 is scheduled to be taken place in October in Ha Noi.

For now, what President Obama should be addressing is US strong presence in and commitment to Asia. For

¹ Stephen Kaufman, “Clinton Urges Legal Resolution of South China Sea Dispute,” US Government, July 23, 2010. <http://www.america.gov/st/peacesec-english/2010/July/20100723154256esnamfuak4.879177e-03.html&distid=ucs>

² Li Hongmei, “Unwise to elevate “South China Sea” to be core interest ?” People’s Daily Online, August 27, 2010. <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90002/96417/7119874.html>

³ “U.S. ‘is back’ is Asia, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declares,” *NY Daily News*, (The Associated Press), July 21, 2009. http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/2009/07/21/2009-07-21_clinton_us_is_back_is_asia.html

far too long, the region has not seen American leadership with clear direction and seriousness in regional cooperation, especially clear American initiatives of regional cooperation. What questions remain is: whether the US would be able to rise up from here to lead the region and regionalism. How much has Washington decided to move the region forward? Is it perhaps only for near term policy consideration to make its comeback to reengage with regional partners or would the US intend to restructure regional cooperation? To answer these questions, the Obama administration would have to build on its Asian strategy, which will have to be in accordance with various national interests in the region.

Shift of US Policy and Alarm for Declining Influence in Asia

After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, U.S. foreign policy has been fully preoccupied with a counter-terrorism campaign and Iraq and Afghanistan-related issues. Asia has been largely disregarded by the U.S. It was common to see that while China tries hard to woo regional countries by offering substantial economic incentives, the U.S. appeared to be only interested in pressing and demanding that regional countries fall in line with its counter-terrorism campaign. Over the years, China's good neighbor policy has successfully changed its image and won friendship around the region. In contrast, the U.S. is considered by regional countries as not serious enough about the region. While a preoccupied Washington continuously ignores what regional countries want and look for, Asian regionalism continues to progress and is more likely tilting toward China's advantage for years to come. As a result, the U.S. is not only losing a sense of close friendship in the region as a whole, but is also losing influence. Its voice is frequently shut off from regional forums.

The progression of Asian regionalism indicates that economic-focused integration does pave the way for a more cohesive regionalism, but at the same time strategic competition between the United States and China, as well as between China and Japan, also contributes to new momentum for regionalism. As this integration is taking place to a large extent under China's leadership, the immediate policy implication for the United States is that it must review and reshape its Asia policy into a more serious and sincere commitment to the process of regionalism. The U.S. approach to Asian regionalism under the Bush administration, in which it only makes effort to reemphasize significance of APEC and ARF to regional issues and tries to propose a political pie in the sky -- the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP), is insufficient. In fact, the U.S. may not be able to completely catch up with the new drive that has developed in the region. Asian countries still need American leadership, but U.S. policy may have forced them to distance themselves from different U.S. interests. No matter how strategic evolution may affect the course of regionalism in Asia, the U.S. should return to the region with genuine leadership.

Regional Discontent with the US and China Gaining New Role in Asia

When Malaysian former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad proposed an East Asian Economic Caucus in early 1990s, the U.S. tried to dissuade regional countries from participating. U.S. supremacy was impressive, but its blunt reaction to regional initiatives was not welcomed in the region. Fifteen years later, critiques of the U.S. attitude then are still voiced with dissatisfaction. The general impression in East Asia has been that the

U.S. wants to maintain its dominance and would undermine any attempt to build new regional groupings, which may potentially deviate from U.S. interest from the region.

Asian discontent with the U.S. loomed larger in the wake of the 1997 Asian financial crisis.⁴ Those regional countries that suffered during the crisis all accused Western speculators of undertaking a financial assault on their economies. During the critical moment in which they could not withstand dysfunction of their financial markets, the U.S. and the International Monetary Fund came to the rescue with “capitalist regulations.” The imposing image of the IMF in particular would be remembered among several generations in Asia. In one particular example, as the then Korean President Kim Dae-jung was reluctantly forced to sign the IMF rescue deal in front of TV cameras, the head of the IMF standing nearby and pointing fingers. Watched by millions of Koreans and even more across Asia, President Kim seemed to accept what was considered the humiliation of his nation. Furthermore, later when regional countries proposed an Asian Monetary Fund to pool financial resources within the region, the U.S. blocked it, perhaps considering regional financial cooperation to be a threat to American interests.⁵ Struck by the crisis, many Asian leaders realized that there simply was not a substantial financial cooperation mechanism that existed within the region, and those existing trans-Pacific regional institutions did not work.

One serious lesson learned after the crisis was that as long as the U.S. and Western influences remained critical within any Asian regional institutions, there would not be any chance for Asian countries to look after themselves. Desire for an effective regional grouping among Asian countries to protect them from devastation by Western influence grew stronger and stronger. It was critical that China withstood international market pressures and maintained the value of its currency (RMB), as the RMB’s depreciation would mean absolute devastation to the entire region. Compared with China’s sacrifice to save regional economies from crumbling, the ambivalent United States tried to distance itself from the region at a critical time, and generated anger in the region.

American New Attempts to Asia Since 2006

Over the past few years, the United States’ war on terror has been the overwhelming concern in Washington, and has complicated its relations with regional countries. U.S. policy in Asia has not been proactive, especially with regard to the regional building process. American interests in Asian regionalism generally include open regionalism and inclusiveness, assurance of U.S. alliance interests, and contribution to regional economic growth.⁶ The United States may be overconfident in believing that regional groupings will not jeopardize American interests, even if the United States is excluded. Regional countries have not seen an American emphasis on projecting future development in the region. Even when the region encounters danger, such as North Korea’s development of a nuclear capability, the United States by reaction insists in exercising a tough line against North Korea. But, a more realistic assessment reveals that the United States and

⁴ Edward Lincoln, *East Asian Economic Regionalism* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2005), p. 5.

⁵ Chang Noi, “Asian regionalism in a high wind,” *The Nation*, December 25, 2006.

http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2006/12/25/opinion/opinion_30022430.php

⁶ John Miller, “The roots and implications of East Asian regionalism,” Occasional Paper Series, Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies, (September 2004), p. 13.

international community may have to make certain compromises, perhaps even considering seriously the existence of a nuclear North Korea in Northeast Asia. There seems to be no clear strategy for the United States to manage regional security as yet.

Beyond economic development and security, it was apparent the United States has not paid enough attention to the progress of regional integration in Asia. Many experts around the region worry that the U.S. did not seem alert to broad changes in the region.⁷ While the region is marching toward economic integration and cooperation with China, the U.S. has been content to watch from the sidelines. In the past five years, the U.S. has been either too confident or too naïve in coping with new trends of regional cooperation. In the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami disaster, the U.S. was the first to arrive on the scene and brought in the largest disaster relief program, of which it is justifiably proud. It of course shows that the U.S. is the only country with full competence and capacity to help in time of crisis. But the American perspective is simply that the region should be thankful.

In 2005, when Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice skipped the annual ARF regional security conference, her absence sent a negative message to regional leaders, as if the U.S. was overwhelmed by many burning issues and did not really care about Asia. Media and think tanks have warned that this neglect would cost U.S. diplomacy in the region. This is not to suggest that the region dislikes the U.S., but to point out that Asia needs the U.S. for security assurance. Regional leaders even believe that U.S. presence could effectively balance against China's expanding influence in the region.

Since 2006, however, the U.S. has attempted to express a serious commitment to regional cooperation. In August 2006, U.S. Trade Representative Susan Schwab met 10 ASEAN economic ministers and signed a Trade and Investment Framework Arrangement (TIFA). The signature of the U.S.-ASEAN TIFA reflects a strong U.S. commitment to establishing the architecture that will serve as a platform to facilitate vigorous U.S. economic engagement in the ASEAN region. "The TIFA will be a platform to intensify our trade and investment relations with the ASEAN region, which collectively constitutes our fourth largest trading partner and represents one of the most rapidly growing and dynamic economies in the world."⁸

In 2006 APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting, President George Bush took the occasion to call for a bold strategy for trans-Pacific trade liberalization, a region-wide Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP).⁹ The initiative, which was discussed and designated for senior officials to explore and report to the next APEC meeting in Canberra, marks the U.S. comeback effort to Asian regional cooperation. When asked if this grand proposal shows a decisive effort to return to the region, U.S. officials do not seem quite sure whether there is exactly a clear strategy. The U.S.' top priority on trade now is to revive the delayed progress of the Doha Round global trade negotiation. On region-wide trade cooperation in Asia, the U.S. takes a realistic approach

⁷ Experts reflected the concern at the Senior Policy Seminar. "The United States and Asia: Assessing Problems and Prospects," Senior Policy Seminar 2006, (Honolulu: East-West Center, 2006).

⁸ "U.S. Trade Representative Susan C. Schwab Meets with ASEAN Economic Ministers and Signs TIFA," August 25, 2006. <http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/Press_Releases/2006/August/US_Trade_Representative_Susan_C_Schwab_Meets_with_ASEAN_Economic_Ministers_Signs_TIFA.html>

⁹ "Results of the 2006 APEC Leaders' Meeting -- Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 2006," The White House, 2006. <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/apec/2006>>

and focuses more on bilateral FTAs than a regional one. As economic development is so varied within ASEAN, the U.S. may prefer a bilateral FTA or TIFA with individual ASEAN countries to regional FTA. Obviously, the U.S. up to that particular timeframe did not have an immediate plan for a single bilateral FTA with ASEAN. Looking from a critical perspective, FTAAP for the time being is not a realistic project for the U.S., because it can not comply with existing U.S. trade practices. Trade experts nevertheless saw the proposal as a reflection of American concern with its declining economic influence in the Asia Pacific region.¹⁰

Trying to improve their image in the region, President Bush and Secretary Rice visited more individual countries in Asia in 2006. Some may see that during the Leaders' Meeting the proposal was brushed off for the following year. But, one would have to think more positively that as long as the U.S. keeps initiating new proposals for follow-on regional cooperation, the message of the U.S. resuming strong and active leadership to the region would be clearly understood. It would always be a better use of time and effort to undertake real policy debate than just argue against the idea of keeping the U.S. out of regional new groupings.

In short, US attempt to strengthen its presence and leadership in Asia has not been able to pump up American influence automatically as it imagines. Throughout the Bush administration, there were several decent attempts to raise American profile in the region, but did not literally lead to a grand strategy, which the region is hoping for. It seems that American Asia policy then was more sort of taking the short-term problem-solving approach than a long-term overarching structure. The real concern is in whatever form the US would be introducing to the region, it seems that the US lacks of sufficient prudence and seriousness to regional development. Thus, the US policy could not really catch up with the momentum of regional progress.

Inattentive US Asia Policy: Beyond Bilateral Frameworks?

Obviously, Asian regional cooperation has flourished. While Asian regional cooperation has moved toward broader issue areas and includes a variety of structures, like the Boao Forum for Asia sponsored by China, Asian Cooperation Dialogue hosted by Thailand, and different ASEAN-related regional forums, U.S. policy surprisingly has not reflected the dynamism of regional cooperation. Rather, the U.S. government has continued mostly to emphasize the conventional "hub and spokes" strategic system of bilateral security arrangements with individual countries in the region, and gives little attention to existing regional multilateral organizations such as APEC and ARF. The American system of Asian alliance may have worked well during the Cold War, but it is questionable whether it can manage today's regional and national realities.¹¹ Asian leaders have begun to express their concern with the insufficient American attention, to Southeast Asia in particular. Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien-loong cautioned that "distracted by problems elsewhere, the U.S. isn't paying enough attention to Southeast Asia, losing its regional influence to a rising China and potentially weakening antiterrorism cooperation."¹²

¹⁰ "US pushes for APEC free trade agreement," ABC Online, November 7, 2006.
<<http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200611/s1782553.htm>>

¹¹ Francis Fukuyama, "Re-envisioning Asia," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 84, no. 1 (January/February 2005).

¹² Yaroslav Trofimov and Paul Beckett, "Politics & Economics: Singapore Prime Minister urges US to bolster its ties in Asia," *Wall Street Journal*, April 18, 2007, p. A9.

Regional experts have warned that the U.S. does not have a clear strategy and strategic vision for coping with the rise of China. Washington's reliance on outmoded structures may not only have weakened the U.S.'s definitive influence in the region, but also forced allies and friends to opt for their own hedging approaches.¹³ Perhaps, the American system of Asian alliances has to be renovated to cope with today's political reality, as many new factors and developments have emerged in Asia.¹⁴ The question is whether the US would be able to expand its influence beyond traditional bilateral frameworks. To comply with the current momentum for region cooperation, the US may need to consider an overarching framework to push through the region. Perhaps, the US should think through how to position the US in a region-wide mechanism, like Australian version of Asia Pacific Community and Japanese East Asia community.

Many in American policy circles feel that the Bush administration failed to articulate a strategy to engage East Asia.¹⁵ The real concern over the last few years has been that the United States has not been able to come to terms with new reality of ASEAN's central role in the process of Asian regionalism. While most of America's regional allies rely on active strategy and policy coordination in Asia, the U.S.' benign neglect toward the region has gradually resulted in confusion and uncertainty among regional countries on how to effectively deal with the rise of China. This is not to suggest that the United States has already lost its influence in Asia, but to underline some of the results of the U.S. preoccupation with problems in the Middle East. It is odd to see the U.S., which once dominated the development of regional cooperation, sidelined in the new wave of regionalism in Asia. U.S. policy momentum may not be able to catch up with Asian dynamism. Now, it has become real burden or obligation for President Obama to make a comeback for the US in Asia. The region of course has more expectation from Obama, but at the same time also a lot more criticism to the US than ever before.

Obama's Asia and China Strategy

As soon as the Obama administration took the office in January 2009, newly appointed Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited Asia and carried a strong and firm message to Asia that Asia is very important for the US.¹⁶ As the Secretary of State, Clinton's first ever overseas official visit made to four Asian countries, Japan, Indonesia, South Korea and China changed the tradition of first going to Europe and reflected the emphasis of the Obama administration on Asia. Secretary Clinton's second trip to Asia came in July 2009, when she was in Thailand for regional security dialogue. By signing up the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), Clinton took the occasion of the ASEAN Regional Forum to announce the US is back to Asia. It won of course a round of applause from regional leaders. It also set a right tune for the US to push further with the bilateral leaders' meeting in November. President Obama arrived at Singapore and formally kicked off the ASEAN-US leaders' meeting in November.

¹³ Wendell Minnick, "Special report - China rising: East Asia braces as American influence fades," *Defense News* (March 19, 2007), p. 11.

¹⁴ Francis Fukuyama, "Re-envisioning Asia," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 84, no. 1 (January/February 2005).

¹⁵ Daniel Sneider, "Asia's polite reception to Bush masks declining US influence," *YaleGlobal*, November 17, 2005.

<<http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/article.print?id=6531>>

¹⁶ Dan Twining, "A U.S. Asia strategy for Hillary Clinton's trip," *Foreign Policy*, February 15, 2009.

<http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/02/15/a_us_asia_strategy_for_hillary_clintons_trip>

In late November 2009, President Obama made his first trip to Asia, since taking over the office, in which many important regional issues were highlighted. During the visit, he addressed many issues with his counterparts, such as US-Japan security alliance, US-ASEAN future cooperation, US in APEC and Asian regionalism, US-China strategic relation, development of the cross-strait relations, and North Korea nuclear issues. Basically, what Obama has been trying to do is to reassure the region that the US will now be taking more active role to engaging the region. After Obama's visit to Asia, regional analysts found his trip encouraging but without much substance in it. It is not surprising to learn that his visit was full with expectation from the region. But, the problem is there has not been a systematic and forthcoming initiative in place. No wonder why some corners in the region were not that satisfied with US leadership in Asia.

Currently, it seems that the most important development in the region is robust momentum of regional integration. How would the US do about it? What the region has seen is US new effort to engage with a regional mechanism by linking up with ASEAN. Nevertheless, it left the region an impression after his Asia trip that there has not been a forward looking planning proposed by him and his attitude toward America's rivals seems to be kinder than to its friends.¹⁷ Sooner or later the region will find out whether Obama's diplomacy is subtle and strategic or naïve enough. Would there be a new American Asian structure for the future of regional cooperation? The presumption of American real intention remains to be seen. President Obama looks likely to lead the US to a new era with Asia. But, how much will he be able to move around? Would the US still be capable enough to turn the tide in its favor?

Engagement with Asian countries seems to be necessary and required for Washington, as the US has formally announced to return to the region. But, restructuring regional order may be just too heavy a duty to carry for the US at the time of emergence of a rising China. On his trip, what Obama may have developed so far is to strike the strategic balance in the region. Looking into the near future, how does the US see through critical issues in Asia? It would gradually come into the structure of the Obama's national security strategy on Asia.

US-China Heading for a New Era of Cooperation or Competition?

On the visit to China, a new US-China relation has been highlighted as if the most important bilateral relationship in the world will be upgraded from sharing the concept of the responsible "stakeholder" to building strategic mutual trust. The US-China Joint Statement on 17 November 2009 emphasizes on building a positive, cooperative, and comprehensive relationship. What does it really mean to build strategic mutual trust between the US and China? Before President Obama arrived at China this time, Chinese intellectual community was probing whether the both sides should confirm strategic reassurance to move this bilateral relation into a new era, when two leaders met. It seems that it was Chinese high hope for a more equal and fair relation, but the US tends to be caring more about solving some pressing issues between them. It is obvious that President Obama was kindly asking for Chinese cooperation on a number of bilateral, regional, and international issues, as the US position has been weakened during the global financial tsunami.

¹⁷ "The quiet American," *The Economist*, November 28, 2009, p. 11.

Before the two leaders, there are two significant factors, which have fundamentally changed the global power structure. They are: a powerful China in the international community and a much weakened US. It is to say that the US today has faced an unprecedented awkward situation that like it or not, it has to work with China closely on almost everything concerned the international community today. What message of the Obama administration is trying to send is to foster a positive and cooperative policy approach toward China. It is obvious that through working jointly on a number of pressing global and regional issues, the future development of US-China relation will be likely led to mutual working partnership. Of course, based on the possible format of G2 in the international community, the US and China will be sharing more responsibilities and have to carried out more policy coordination in the future.¹⁸ In view of complication of international issues, the policy coordination between the US and China has been facilitated further in establishing the Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) held in Washington in July 2009. The second S&ED held in Beijing in May 2010.

Looking on the bright side, it was very encouraging. Obama's visit to China ended with the US-China Joint Statement. It was a beginning touch of the Obama administration with Hu's regime in Beijing. Although disagreement remains between them, it seems that all related issues, global, regional and bilateral ones, could be put to bilateral discussion. Policy teams in Beijing and Washington wanted to make a positive beginning and thus sent friendly gesture to each other. In Washington, his visit to China, the Obama Administration even made some adjustments to cultivate favorable environment for the US-China summit to take place by declining the meeting with President Obama requested by Dalai Lama and delaying the decision of arms sales to Taiwan. The American belief at that time tended to be more accommodated to Beijing and hopefully it could thus bring about mutual trust between them.

Nevertheless, as have been seen in the past few months after the summit, Chinese assertiveness has been accelerated not merely by its own effort but lately more by the outcome of the global financial tsunami.¹⁹ China strengthened its claims to the South China Sea and later in March 2010 referred to it as Chinese "core interest". China manages to strengthen its position in the South China Sea by taking a series of measures: military exercise, deploying fishery administration ships to the region, and organizing fishing boats to increase frequency of operating in the area. Although President Obama attempted to start the relation with China in a more accommodated way, there may be a clear line drawn on his policy toward China, especially on national security. It becomes clear that Obama hoped to develop a cooperative relation with China on many policy areas, but not necessarily on national security.²⁰

Toward the end of 2009, at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the United States and China found their position and interest hard to compromise. At the center of the global issue, the US and China turned out to represent different national groups of interest. Obviously, the US and China

¹⁸ Although Chinese premier Wen Jiabao rebuked the idea of G2, he remains affirmative to have US-China cooperation and coordination on a number of international issues. Many see US-China relation as developing to a G2 format. "Wen: China disagrees to so-called G2, calling for effort to fight protectionism," *China Daily*, November 18, 2009. <<http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/6817072.html>>

¹⁹ Thomas Wright, "America must find a new China strategy," *Financial Times*, August 8, 2010. <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1c9ec504-a32e-11df-8cf4-00144feabdc0.html>

²⁰ Minxin Pei, "Obama is right to be hard-nosed on China," *Financial Times*, August 30, 2010. <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7aa3ba86-b460-11df-8208-00144feabdc0.html>

can not be conciliatory on the progressing agenda of the climate change issue. Early 2010, a news about Dalai Lama's visit to Washington broke through the newly developed pleasant-sounding atmosphere between the US and China. While Washington considered that the meeting between Dalai Lama and Obama was postponed late last year and it was a matter of routine business to be completed, Beijing saw it differently as it may imply for American intention of touching the Chinese nerve, sovereign integrity. Furthermore, the US government on January 30 informed the Congress to approve the \$6.4 billion US Dollar arms sales deal to Taiwan, which immediately angered China. In spite of better relation developed with China, the US does not want to make Taiwan security to be an issue subject to Chinese pressure, as the US will for decades follow what its national interest develops. After the announcement, China fired a few hard shots criticizing the US' policy decision. But, the hard core of Chinese military continues to slash the US for making such an attempt as a great source of disruption to Sino-American relationship.²¹

US Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, proposed a trip to China in June, but unfortunately the proposition was rejected by Beijing. The rejection of Gates' visit to China was seen by the US as sending a strong message of stopping mil-to-mil exchange. Though China later made a suggestion that China would welcome Secretary Gates to visit at an appropriate time, so far the US-China military relation has not yet returned back to the planned momentum.²² Then, it came with Secretary of State Clinton's statement on the South China Sea in July and followed by a series of joint military exercises between the US and its allies in areas surrounding China, i.e. the South China Sea and the Sea of Japan/the Yellow Sea. The US this year tries hard to deepen the ties with Viet Nam, Indonesia, and South Korea. Its policy approach is "no longer reluctant to clash with Beijing to protect its interests and values." It seems that new spat is building up between the US and China. Regional security tension has also been increased as a result.

What specific messages do military exercises by the US and China in East Asia send to the region? Today, Chinese military buildup becomes a real story. As a result of rising power, China is now very reluctant to retreat vis-à-vis US military presence in the region. Chinese official keep criticizing the US for selling arms to Taiwan and continuously operating naval and air reconnaissance along Chinese coast as main obstacles to US-China military relation. China wants to have certain respect in the international community and begin to think of pushing the US influence back away from its coast. Of course, on the political front, both governments have started to show conciliatory attitude toward each other. On September 7, 2010, U.S. National Economic Council Director, Larry Summers, and Deputy National Security Adviser Thomas Donilon came to Beijing for talks.²³ Both sides are now trying to step back after the summer heat and think of pushing through the exchanges.

Conclusion: Is there a New Structure under making?

²¹ General Ma Xiaotian, Deputy Chief of General Staff, People's Liberation Army, China at the 9th IISS Asia Security Summit, The Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore, June 5, 2010, Second Plenary Session: New Dimensions of Security, Q&A made the points. <http://www.iiss.org/conferences/the-shangri-la-dialogue/shangri-la-dialogue-2010/plenary-session-speeches/second-plenary-session/copyof-ma-xiaotian/>

²² "China welcomes Gates' visit at an 'appropriate' time," Xinhua, July 1, 2010. http://www.china.org.cn/world/2010-07/01/content_20397207.htm

²³ Chris Buckley, "UPDATE 1-China, U.S. aim to ease tensions; Hu visit on agenda," Reuters, September 7, 2010. <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTOE68603Z20100907>

Following through the global financial tsunami, the economic centrality of Asia to the world has been recognized. The rise of China is at the center of rising Asia, not Japan. China has expanded its influence not simply on the aspect of economic affairs, but also political and military aspects. China has even become the driving force of Asian economic integration in many ways. For decades, the United States is now at its abyss. Its supreme role has relatively declined as a result of the financial crisis at home and rising China in Asia. Under such a new context, the US-China relation is now entering into a complex situation. As an emerging power, China is desperately asking for respect and its leading place in the international community. This is perhaps in history that we have now seen the closest development gap between the US and China. More cooperation and consultation on international issues and policy issues between the two are more desirable.

After the first year of accommodation, President Obama is taking a more sophisticated approach toward China. Since the national power of the US was weakened, US options on foreign policy were substantially limited. What the US now can do and should do is to continuously and fully engage in the region. This clear understanding has been put forward at its core of foreign policy. The US was seeking for more Chinese cooperation in bilateral, regional and global issues. So far, a new engagement strategy is critically essential to the US. A new structure of bilateral relationship is on the making. It would follow what the US-China Joint Statement indicated in 2009 that instead of taking confrontational and competitive approaches, the bilateral relation could become more comprehensive with positive and cooperative nature.